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This study investigated the impact of the exchange rate regime as well as monetary union on 
businesses in West African countries based on two cases: Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
Explicitly, the main hypothesis covers Ivorian and Ghanaian firms’ responses to monetary 
union and exchange rate regime.  
Two sets of questionnaires needed one in French for Ivorian firms and the other one in English 
for companies in Ghana. 
250 questionnaires had been sent across both countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 57 Ivorian 
companies responded while only 43 Ghanaian were available to fill the questionnaire in. This 
represents a total response rate of 40 percent, which is appropriate, efficient and adequate for 
this research study. 
Mostly, the empirical results based on the primary information and supported with secondary 
data, strongly confirmed all of the research hypotheses.  
The study found that being member of the CFA zone with a pegged currency to the Euro has 
helped expand Cote d’Ivoire’s trade with the European Union in comparison with Ghana. 
The trade statistics in chapter 5 sections 5.3 of the thesis shows evidence of high trade flows 
from Cote d’Ivoire to the European Union as well as the Rest of the World. That trade 
expansion has helped Cote d’Ivoire’s growth despite its instability due to the military and 
political upraising. Exports played a vital role in the development of African countries, 
especially in Cote d’Ivoire. During the period 1973-2005, exports represent on average 39.9 
percent of the Ivorian GDP and imports of goods and services 35.9 percent. While Ghana’s 
exports represent only 20 percent of its GDP and its imports of goods and services 27.2 
percent for the same period.  
Again, the questionnaire-survey shows that overwhelmingly, all firms in both Cote d’Ivoire 
and Ghana agreed on issues related to the benefit of a monetary union and trade with the 
European Union with a strong passion on the benefit of operating in a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Therefore, they all supported the hypothesis that membership of a monetary union is 
beneficial to member states. 
At the microeconomic level, a monetary union has to be a strong combination of 
competitiveness and solidarity by taking into account modernisation of social policies. Also, it 
has to be based on growth or output, higher employment and higher productivity. 
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Finally, a monetary union brings small and medium size enterprises more choices and business 
opportunities, which will be stronger and more competitive. Large corporations enjoy the 
eradication of cross-border operations and competition. 
Again, wealth is created at the microeconomic level through the ability for firms to produce 































Since the 1990s, monetary regime became the focus of many academics and 
policymakers. It plays a primary role in macroeconomic management. This strong 
interest has been reinforced following the successful launch of the Euro as the single 
currency of the European monetary union.  
It renews the commitment of those small currency unions already established for some 
time; and other regions seek to set up similar institutional frameworks and processes of 
convergence for a monetary integration. According to Raimi & Mobolaji (2008, P 130), 
the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a discernible shift in the economic 
and political equation of the world. It is tagged as an age of integration. Countries are 
coming together all over the world with the idea of coping with global economic 
imbalances, enhancing domestic growth and development as well as political. 
In their quest for stabilisation and growth, countries, especially African states, shifted 
their attention to monetary union as well as exchange rate regimes. 
As a monetary instrument, exchange rate movement is a concern for investors, analysts, 
managers, governments and policymakers due to its fluctuations. The choice of an 
exchange rate regime has been and will continue to be a major as well as controversial 
issue of economic research. Thus, it becomes crucial as a country needs a credible and 
appropriate system relevant to its international trade and finance flows. 
In this sense, our study attempts to assess the impact of a monetary union as well as 
exchange rate regime on business enterprises in the context of two West Africa 
countries: Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. Explicitly, the main hypothesis covers Ivorian and 
Ghanaian firms’ responses to monetary union and exchange rate regime.  
These two countries share the same border with some cultural and historical similarities. 
Their economy is based on the export of agricultural produce such as cocoa and coffee 
but with two distinct monetary systems. 
The first part examines the aims and interests governing this research on the impact of 
exchange rate and monetary union on businesses of the two selected African countries.  
The second chapter covers the different exchange rates system and risks surrounding the 
international transactions between the two studied countries and the Rest of the World. 
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Chapter Three evaluates Cote d’Ivoire background information and, the implications for 
CFA francs on the Ivorian economy covering the membership of Cote d'Ivoire into the 
West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  
Like Chapter Three, Chapter Four deals with Ghana background information in order to 
point out the existent relationships between this country and the Rest of the World. 
Moreover, this chapter covers Ghana’s monetary policy and its exchange rates.  
Chapter Five analyzes the trade pattern of Cote d’Ivoire versus that of Ghana in order to 
assess the level of international trade of the two countries. 
Chapter Six examines the research design and the methodology used to gather all data 
on the Ivorian and Ghanaian firms and to analyse the result of the survey-questionnaire. 
However, the survey of Ivorian and Ghanaian companies provides primary data on the 
impact of exchange rates and monetary policies on businesses. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the interpretation of the results across the survey, which is 
very important to deeply understand the impact of the exchange rates regime 
experienced by firms of the two countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and their 
international operations.  
Chapter Eight covers the analysis of the different hypotheses based on the survey 
undertaken for both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana; in order to raise the issue of flexible 
exchange rate, dynamic benefits and risks for firms of links to a monetary union, 
fostering the lessons, which can be learnt from the example of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU).  
It, also, focuses on the issues of financial market needs and cost compliance through the 
changing and influencing business behaviour in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
Finally, the chapter nine summarises the importance of a monetary union, the benefits 
and costs of exchange rates regime, the contribution to knowledge and 
recommendations.  
1.1 Rationale for Research 
There is a vast literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime at macro-level, 
especially on the benefits and costs of entering a currency union. 
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Mundell (1973) presents the model of optimum currency union which allows the 
interplay between monetary policy and exchange rate policy. Particularly, the model 
emphasizes the difference between fixed and floating exchange rates, degree of 
international openness and symmetry of shocks. 
Masson and Pattillo (2003) in Gudmundsson (2007, P109) argue that at the most basic 
level, the theory of optimum currency union compares the microeconomic benefits of 
entering a monetary union in terms of reduced transaction costs with the 
macroeconomic costs associated with losing the tools of independent monetary policy. 
Trautwein (2005, P 21) believes that the institutional forms of monetary integration can 
be considered as extreme commitments to exchange rate targets. They are credible only 
if they are expected to be sustainable; and they are sustainable only if the underlying 
structures of production, trade and finance are dynamically stable. 
To Fiawoyife and Abor (2007, P 144), currency union, in Africa, will facilitate trade 
and investment among countries through the reduction of transactions costs and the 
removal of the turbulence associated with flexible exchange rate regime. Using the 
same research methodology, they conducted a sampling survey by distributing 200 
questionnaires to firms in Ghana. 62 responded, representing a response rate of 31 
percent. This study reveals that firms engaged in international trade have difficulties in 
trading across borders. These difficulties include bureaucracies in obtaining trade 
documents, high tariffs, difficulties in pricing in foreign currencies, foreign exchange 
risks, smuggling, restrictions at border and problems of clearing goods at ports and 
harbours, unfair competition from informal traders and harassment by border officials. 
These difficulties, the firms believe, would be reduced, if not, entirely removed by 
regional integration. Consequently, regional integration would provide enough 
incentives for increased participation in foreign trade and investment (P151). 
Broz et al. (2007, P 4) argue that little academic work directly addresses the exchange 
rate attitudes to business owners operating in different sectors of the economy. By 
contrast, there is a large body of work that examines sectoral and factoral attitudes 
towards trade policy. Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), Broz and his team find systematic patterns linking sector 
of economic activity to exchange rate policy positions. The study exploits a large cross-
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national survey to try to uncover the relationship between the economic activities of 
firms and their owners and managers’ attitudes towards the exchange rate. 
Such analyses typically present that international oriented firms will be especially 
averse to the volatility associated with a floating rate and will therefore prefer a fixed 
exchange rate. They also typically suggest that tradable producers will be particularly 
averse to the relative price effects of a real appreciation. Non-tradable producers, 
conversely, are expected to prefer floating rates and an appreciated currency (P 23). 
According to Acquaah (2009, P46), the globalization of the world economy and the 
surge in competitive pressures in today's business environment has led many emerging 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa to transform their economies from state-controlled 
capitalism towards private entrepreneurial capitalism. Economic liberalization policies 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been used as central 
mechanisms in promoting efficiency, productivity growth, economic development and 
international competitiveness of enterprises. The economic transformation policies have 
led to the creation of different forms of business organizations with the principal forms 
being wholly owned enterprises by domestic entrepreneurs and international joint 
ventures (IJVs) between foreign firms/entrepreneurs and local firms/entrepreneurs.  
In Ghana, the changes in investment legislation over the past two decades have favoured 
IJV formation as a means of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). For example, the 
Ghana Investment Promotion Acts of 1985 and 1994 have made it easier for foreign 
companies to form an IJV instead of establishing a wholly owned subsidiary by 
requiring foreign companies to invest a lower equity capital for IJVs than a wholly 
owned subsidiary. He conducted a survey on 200 largest companies selected from the 
Ghana Business Directory (2001). Out of these 200 companies, 100 were IJVs between 
foreign firms and Ghanaian firms with the foreign firms holding at least 10% equity in 
the IJVs. Approximately 82% of the IJVs were manufacturing firms (mostly in building 
and construction, chemicals, food and beverages, metals, mining, and textiles), while 
18% were in services (mostly in banking, insurance, information technology services, 
automotive retailing, and food packaging and export). The data were collected from 
senior executives of the IJVs, which were made-up of mostly chief executive officers 
(CEOs), deputy CEOs, directors of human resources and marketing (for strategic, 
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organizational, and environmental information), and heads of the finance/accounting 
function (for performance information) operating in Ghana (P 50) 
The findings clearly indicate that because IJVs with partners from advanced 
industrialized economies posses superior resources and capabilities and have 
reputational advantages than IJVs with partners from emerging economies, they rely on 
their superior resources, capabilities, and reputational advantage to compete in low-
income emerging economies. On the other hand, IJVs with partners from emerging 
economies recognizing their lack of credibility in the eyes of consumers as producers of 
quality or differentiated products use their resources and capabilities to focus their 
attention on the masses at the bottom of the income ladder in low-income emerging 
economies by pursuing the cost leadership strategy. Thus, IJVs with partners from 
emerging economies are forced to develop alternative models based on price/value 
tradeoffs in harnessing the potentially vast untapped market at the base of the pyramid 
in emerging economies (P 57). 
The study of Robson and Freel (2008, P 431) is concerned with identifying the 
characteristics of exporters in the three main non-governmental sectors of the Ghanaian 
economy (manufacturing, services and agriculture). Exports represent a flow of income 
into the economy, increasing wealth and standards of living. Moreover, exporting firms 
are frequently involved in higher value-added activities and, to a greater extent, 
represent the relative competitiveness of national economies. Identifying such firms and 
facilitating their endeavours (or encouraging others to emulate them) are familiar policy 
themes. 
Their studies as well as others like (Bonaccorssi 1992, Calof 1994, Javalgi et al. 2000 
and Ruzzier et al. 2007) have provided a number of valuable insights into the 
characteristics of small exporters in terms of relative innovativeness, investments in 
skills labour, firm growth, enterprise maturity and so on.  
The objective of their survey was to gauge the state (and nature) of enterprise in Ghana. 
In total, 500 entrepreneurs provided usable responses, representing an 83.2% response 
rate. The respondents are classified as entrepreneurs to the extent that they meet 
Gartner’s (1988) definition of entrepreneurs: they created their own firms, they manage 
the firms, and they and their families own the firms. Their sample included businesses 
from agriculture, manufacturing and services (P 435). 
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They have argued that the greatest barrier to a developed understanding of the 
behaviours and challenges of African entrepreneurs and small firms is the absence of 
competent firm-level datasets. To this end, their contribution here is empirical. Large-
scale survey data is sufficiently rare, in sub-Saharan Africa, as to be remarkable. 
They believe their findings are more notable than might initially appear to be the case 
for two reasons: the first simply reflects the importance of evidence-based policy. It is 
one thing to believe something to be so. It is another to have it confirmed by 
independent evidence. They find the congruence between policy rhetoric and our 
evidence reassuring. This should not be taken as an endorsement of government policy 
– a sensible and detailed appraisal of which is beyond the scope of both this paper and 
our data. They recognize these findings reinforce the importance of investments in 
innovation and skills, irrespective of sector. Such investments are likely to matter to 
economies dominated by agriculture, as well as to those dominated by services or 
manufacturing (P 447). 
Chelariu et al. (2002, P 457) attempt to examine two issues related to the 
implementation of market orientation among sub-Saharan African firms especially Cote 
d’Ivoire. They stress that Ivorian firms can, potentially, compete in world markets with 
appropriate market-oriented strategies. Recent changes in US trade policy and global 
market conditions suggest that creating a market orientation may be strategically 
imperative for African firms in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire. That policy was marked 
by emphasis on encouraging fair trade among African countries but require more 
marketing skills from firms to compete in US market. They conducted a field survey 
combining questionnaire and telephone interview of 200 Ivorian firms. Given the small 
size of the population of firms in Cote d’Ivoire, 109 out of 200 mailed, is considered 
acceptable for a response rate of 55 percent. The respondents represent firms in public 
sector, private national, private foreign and various combinations of firms in these three 
categories. 
The findings of their study show that Ivorian firms must realign structural influences, 
systems and incentives to reflect both the objectives of the firm and to be sensitive to 
local conditions. However, factors such as lack of marketing skills, lack of financial 
resources and government intervention like price controls, are likely to be important 
deterrents in implementing market orientation (P 467) 
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A frequently cited corollary of East Asia’s remarkable economic dynamism is that its 
economies are rapidly and spontaneously integrating with one another. Although many 
of the reasons for such integration, and its consequences, have been extensively studied, 
the cross-border activities of firms have not. 
 
According to Dobson and Yue (1997, P 3), international firms create linkages across 
borders in their search for profitable opportunities through trade, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), technology contracts, and other arrangements that provide flexibility 
needed to adjust to change and uncertainty in increasingly competitive factor and 
product markets. Change and uncertainty are generated in markets by such factors as 
technological advance, exchange rate volatility, and governments’ policies and 
regulations affecting market access and production costs. Host governments in East 
Asia encourage FDI inflows to augment domestic savings, to promote technological 
transfer to accelerate economic development, and to obtain access to international 
markets for their exports. 
 
The purpose of their study is to examine the trade and investment activities of 
international firms in selected manufacturing industries in eight East Asian economies 
such as China (Guangdong province), Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand in order to assess their impact on regional economic 
linkages. 
A total of 241 firms were surveyed in the eight economies. The surveys gathered data 
on sales and procurement within firms and groups, as well as information on sources 
and uses of capital and production efficiency (P 19).  
Dobson & Yui (P 263 - 266) reveal that the first implication concerns international 
firms’ impact on regional integration. The impact is mixed. Firms investing from within 
the region are more likely to contribute to intraregional trade than those investing from 
outside the region. Most international firms, as they mature, aspire to global strategies; 
hence, intraregional production and trade tend to be organized or, at least, to be 
rationalized within a global rather than strictly regional division of labour. 
The second implication is directly related. The close ties between the regional activities 
of multinationals (and those of the larger regional firms) and their global strategies have 
important implications for governments’ roles in influencing locational advantages. In a 
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number of countries, the domestic market is still not fully open. Firms in Thailand 
surveyed by Ramstetter, for example, saw the lack of transparency in import regulations 
as a persistent problem. Governments continue to rely on more direct interventions in 
the forms of fiscal incentives and performance requirements. 
The third policy implication relates to the high degree of intrafirm trade. Intrafirm trade 
increases because of disintegration of numerous discrete value-chain activities within 
the firm to reduce transaction costs. Also, it is a positive development in economies 
pursuing industrial upgrading and enables East Asian economies to embark on export 
manufacturing without having to undergo a lengthy and costly period of building up 
technological, exporting, and marketing capabilities. 
From the perspective of the international firm, intrafirm trade ensures greater control 
over both upstream suppliers and downstream markets, particularly in business 
environments characterized by diverse political, economic, and legal frameworks. But 
the use of local suppliers, as well as the transfer of technology and industrial know-how 
from foreign investors to local firms, has been slow because it raises transaction costs, 
particularly among the less-internationalized firms. The more experienced the 
international firm is, the more it is capable of locating and using local suppliers. 
 
They find that there are several implications for host governments. Because investment 
and trade are increasingly complementary, it is no longer logical to separate FDI and 
trade in domestic-policy formation. Trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and 
investment-related trade measures (IRTMS) should be integrated to achieve policy 
coherence and effectiveness, for example. The high degree of intrafirm trade means a 
loss of policy sovereignty by governments, particularly with respect to transfer pricing, 
which must be dealt with through tax policy. Perhaps most significant, while FDI 
inflows represent the augmentation of domestic with foreign savings, as well as 
technology transfers and opportunities to migrate up the industry value chain, the 
negative implication is that host economies become more vulnerable to fluctuations in 
the world economy because of the increasing homogeneity of the region’s 
manufacturing industrial structure (which exports final goods outside the region). When 
the world economy slows, as it did in 1995–96, demand for the region’s consumer 




The fourth implication is that these arguments strengthen the case for regional 
intergovernmental cooperation. Governments should bow to the market forces pushing 
integration by removing obstacles to intraregional trade flows. They should open 
domestic economies to allow for greater participation in the international (global) 
division of labour. They should cooperate in providing favourable conditions for 
investment, including the freer flow of product information and accelerated preferential 
trading arrangements and should cooperate to remove restrictions on new forms of firm 
cooperation, such as strategic alliances. 
 
Multilateral measures are under active discussion within the WTO. Such measures 
would encourage governments to liberalize FDI regimes and converge toward common 
standards on right of establishment, fair and equitable treatment, protection against 
nationalization, international-dispute settlement, and assurances for the repatriation of 
earnings and capital. Capping fiscal and financial incentives to reduce distortions should 
also be considered. The interests of multinationals are directly related to progress in 
these areas. When regional exports slow down in response to currency appreciation or 
slowing external demand, as they did in 1995 – 1996, multinationals run the risk of a 
hostile reaction to slower growth, blaming them for what, in reality, are cyclical 
fluctuations or the structural consequences of national trade and FDI policies. 
They concluded that one of the main findings of their study is that East Asia’s economic 
integration rests not only on its rapid growth and the proximity of diverse economies 
but also on firms cooperating successfully with governments. Multinational and 
international firms augment the growth of savings, jobs, and incomes, but their 
objectives will not always coincide with those of host governments. It is in the interests 
of both players to assist in achieving self-sustaining growth, which in turn depends 
heavily on productivity growth. Also, they find production networks contribute to 
regional integration, but this exchange of intermediate goods risks structural and 
cyclical vulnerability because final-goods markets, particularly at the high end, lie 
outside the region. 
 
Mesquita & Lazzarini (2008, P 359) integrate the resource-based view, transaction cost 
economics, and institutional theory to model how collaboration among small-to-
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in environments of weak infrastructure and 
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institutions help them achieve greater collective efficiencies and access to global 
markets.  
To them, in most developing economies, firms are urged to become internationally 
competitive to boost exports and decrease country risk exposure; at the same time, these 
firms tend to be deprived of the superior technology and supporting infrastructure often 
found in developed countries, such as government support, efficient ports, shared scale-
efficient resources that would ease reaching global markets. Ironically, although forging 
inter-organizational collaborative arrangements appears to be critical for SMEs in weak 
infrastructure settings, it is precisely in those countries that firms also suffer from a host 
of institutional failures, such as poor legal systems, discretionary governmental policies, 
and inefficient regulation, that hinder the pursuit of joint action and impose high 
investment uncertainty and exchange hazards. 
They conducted a survey on 521 firms in the furniture business in the province of 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Their response rate was roughly 45 percent (232 responses). 
In the survey, respondents assessed their vertical and horizontal ties and performance (P 
365).   
They found that different types of ties matter in different ways for these SMEs’ 
collective efficiencies. For instance, vertical ties yield manufacturing productivity along 
the supply chain, while horizontal ties enable collective resource use as well as joint 
product innovation. These collective efficiencies, in turn, serve as competitive 
currencies helping SMEs access global markets.   
They recognize that their study is limited in scope, as it suits only the context of firms 
sharing environments with limited infrastructure and weak institutions, such as 
emerging economies. Also, they should try to examine relationships among SMEs in a 
diverse set of countries in a way that the costs and likelihood of contractual enforcement 
vary (P 376). 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, their hope is that the study will encourage 
further work on the global competitiveness of SMEs established within emerging 
economy contexts (P 377). 
Abor (2005, P 306) focuses his attention on foreign exchange risk management 
practices among Ghanaian firms involved in international trade. He seeks to explain 
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how Ghanaian firms manage their foreign exchange risk and the problems involved in 
managing exchange rate exposure and finally the extent to which these firms use foreign 
exchange risk management techniques. Therefore, a survey has been conducted on 100 
firms involved in the importation of foreign inputs as well as exporters (60.3 percent of 
the sample firms were also into exports). Out of the 100 questionnaires sent out, 68 
were received, representing 68 percent response rate. Since, most of the importing firms 
were also into exports, the level of internationalization is measured by trade intensity 
(ratio of export sales plus import sales to total sales). Simple correlation analysis was 
used to establish the relationship between the trade intensity and the mean values of 
each foreign exchange risk management technique. Data obtained from respondents 
were entered into an SPSS database application for analysis. Descriptive statistics were 
basically used in the presentation and analysis of empirical results. 
Foreign exchange risk is mainly managed by adjusting prices to reflect changes in 
import prices resulting from currency fluctuation and also by buying and saving foreign 
currency in advance. The main problems firms face are the frequent appreciation of 
foreign currencies against the local currency and the difficulty in retaining local 
customers because of the high prices of imported inputs which tend to affect the prices 
of final products sold locally. The study also indicates that the majority of the 
respondents never use hedging techniques in managing their foreign exchange risk. 
Overall, Ghanaian firms involved in international trade exhibit a low level use of the 
hedging instruments due to the low level of education and sophistication among the 
firms’ treasury personnel and the under-developed nature of the financial markets (P 
312)  
1.2 Background to the research 
The method used in gathering information is based on previous theoretical perception of 
various authors, periodicals, journals and any other sources related to this research work. 
These materials are considered secondary data. It focuses on information on EMU, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Ghana. According to Blunt and Jones, 1992 in Chelariu et al. (2002, P 457), 
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the world region that has seen little testing of both 
indigenous as well as Western business theories. Therefore, our study is interesting 
from both academic and managerial perspectives in order to reveal the Ivorian and 
Ghanaian business sector.  
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The primary information is based on a survey questionnaire of business enterprises in 
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
1.3 Aim and objectives 
The thesis focuses on businesses of two West African countries sharing the same border, 
both with significant agricultural export sectors but with two different systems of 
exchange regimes: one, a CFA country and the other, a non-CFA country. 
The economies of Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana is analysed to provide a background to 
assessing the impact of exchange rate regime as well as monetary regime on the two 
countries’ firms. 
However, El-Masry and Abdel-Salam (2007, P 741), using 364 UK non-financial firms 
listed on London Stock Exchange, which have historical data available on from 
Datastream and Worldscope Databases for the period from January 1981 to December 
2001, examine the effect of firm size and foreign operations on the exchange rate 
exposure of these companies. Generally, companies are exposed to three types of 
foreign exchange risk: accounting (translation) exposure, transaction (commitment) 
exposure and economic (operational, competitive or cash flow) exposure. Theory 
supports the existence of a relationship between the value of the firm and exchange rate 
movements. Economic theory suggests that changes in the exchange rate can produce a 
shift in stock prices, directly in the case of multinational firms, exporting and importing 
companies, firms which import part of their inputs and indirectly for other companies. 
Exchange rate movements affect both the prices of imported finished goods and the 
costs of imported inputs, thus influencing indirectly those companies that compete with 
such firms.  
They hypothesized that large firms can be expected to exhibit relatively high levels of 
multinational activity and, hence, exposure so, the larger the firm size, the lower the 
exposure should be. Larger firms should have sufficient resources, in terms of personnel 
and knowledge, to hedge their risk in international transactions leading to lower 
exposure. Firms with high level of international activity are the ones with greater 
exposure. However, they are also the ones with the incentive to hedge their exposure. 
As a result, the level of international activity can lead to higher or lower exchange rate 
exposure (P 742).  
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They find that that exchange rate exposure has a more significant impact of stock 
returns of the large firms compared with the medium and small-sized companies. The 
evidence is consistent across all specifications using different exchange rates. 
Consistent with common expectations that companies with a higher extent of foreign 
operations are more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, the results provide evidence 
that the proportion of significant foreign exchange rate exposure is higher for firms, 
which generate a higher percentage of revenues from abroad. The analysis also shows 
that the percentage of positive exchange rate exposure coefficients is greater among 
firms with foreign sales. The evidence means that firms, which generate a higher 
percentage of their revenues from abroad, are more negatively affected by a 
depreciation of the pound. A decrease in the pound value affects the value of these 
companies through its impact on firms’ international competitiveness and profits 
denominated in foreign currencies (P 761). 
This study is confirmed by Bradley and Moles (2002, P 28) stating that the effect of 
exchange rate movements on firm value is important to firms engaged in international 
transactions. These accounting exposures can be managed using financial instruments. 
The increasing economic integration and development of global markets means that few 
companies, if any, are unaffected by currency movements. 
Unexpected changes in exchange rates affect firms’ ability to sell abroad, increase the 
cost of foreign-sourced inputs, and reduce their domestic and international 
competitiveness. 
Firms involved in international trade are subject to transaction risk arising from 
payables and receivables in foreign currencies. In addition, multinational firms with 
operations in several countries will have translation risks from having assets and 
liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. Economic exposure includes these 
accounting effects but also incorporates the competitive situation of the firm (Shapiro, 
1992). Even firms, not subject to accounting exposures, by only sourcing in and 
servicing in their domestic markets, face economic currency exposure.  
With 51 percent response rate, their findings indicate that a significant proportion of UK 
firms are willing to make use of operational and strategic techniques to manage long-
run exchange rate exposures. This proportion is higher for those firms that can take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by owning foreign subsidiaries. The use of 
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operational hedging techniques is also likely to be higher, the greater the sensitivity to 
exchange rate movements of a firm’s sales volumes, profit margins and input costs. The 
proportion of respondents reporting the use of marketing, production, and financing 
strategies to manage economic exposure is higher than that reported in prior surveys of 
UK and US firms (P 37). 
At the macroeconomic level, the choice of an exchange rate regime for developing and 
emerging countries is an ongoing and important debate. Akofia-Sowah (2009, P 296) 
reveals that intermediate exchange rate regimes are no longer viable, and that 
developing and emerging countries have to adopt either an extremely fixed or a fully 
flexible exchange rate regime. In an attempt to gain policy credibility, many countries 
have opted for extremely fixed regimes such as a currency board, monetary union, or 
official dollarization. Although economists have extensively discussed the costs and 
benefits of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, an opportunity to further explore 
the economic implications of these regimes is presented in the exchange rate pass-
through literature. Typically, the exchange rate pass-through is defined as the 
percentage change in local currency import prices resulting from a 1% change in the 
exchange rate between the importing and exporting countries. 
To Akofia-Sowah (P 298 - 306), Mundell (1961) put forth the criteria for establishing a 
common currency; a high degree of capital and labor mobility, greater flexibility of 
wages/prices, greater (actual or potential) trade among member countries, and a 
similarity in the shocks that the member countries face. Monetary integration is said to 
reduce transactions costs, enhance trade, and stimulate economic growth. It also means 
that member countries have to forego the use of independent monetary policy to 
respond to shocks that may be asymmetric in nature. 
Monetary integration can take many forms; formal or informal exchange rate union, full 
monetary union, official dollarization, and currency board. In Africa, monetary 
integration has taken the form of a monetary union, while official dollarization has been 
more prevalent in Latin America. 
The above finding suggests that exchange rate movements in Sub Saharan Africa are 
perceived to be permanent while exchange rate movements in Latin American are 
viewed as transitory. Firms are therefore more willing to adjust their profit margins in 
Latin American than in Sub Saharan Africa in response to swings in the exchange rate. 
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Furthermore, Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008, P 341) argued that major country interest 
rates have a strong impact on conditions in other countries. At the same time, the open 
economy “trilemma” and empirical tests of it suggest that only countries with pegged 
exchange rate regimes give up their domestic monetary autonomy. This loss of 
autonomy then implies a potential channel through which foreign interest rates can 
affect pegs and floats differently, with pegs being directly affected by foreign interest 
rates and floats insulated from these rates.     
Objectives 
The focus of this study is the following: 
 Better understanding of the mechanism surrounding the Franc zone; 
 
 Investigate the relationship between the Euro and the CFA Franc including the 
trading link between the two blocs; 
 
 Analyse the impact of exchange rate regime on Ivorian and Ghanaian firms knowing 
Cote d’Ivoire is part of a monetary union whose currency is pegged to the Euro 
while Ghana adopted a flexible exchange rate system since the 1980s; 
 
 Identify the effects of the exchange rate regimes on transactions between West 
Africa and the Rest of the World; 
 
 Provide a clear understanding of the effectiveness and efficacy of a monetary union 
for firms.  
 
This study will be a source of reference to governments and policy makers. They need 
to redirect their attention on specific issues such as choice of exchange rate system, 
capital inflows, monetary union and socio-political stability. It will open ways to 
multinationals planning to conduct business activities as well as those already in 
operation in the West Africa region. It is also a contribution to the literature covering 




1.4 Hypotheses: To be Tested by Questionnaire Survey 
 







For both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms, there is a relationship 
between exchange rate and firm’s characteristics. 
 
Chap 2 & 5 
 





For Ivorian and Ghanaian, exchange rate as well as 
monetary union influence and change business behaviour 
 






For both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms, the impact of the 
exchange rate fluctuation affects company success including 
its competitive advantage 
 
Chap 2 & 5  
 





For Ivorian and Ghanaian companies, there is a relationship 
between exchange rate regime and company failure 
 






Fixed exchange rate regime and therefore monetary union 
encourage international trade and investment for Ivorian 
businesses. 
 
Chap 2, 3 & 
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1.5 The structure of the study 
Figure 1.5: The Structure of the Study 
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2.0 EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS AND RISKS 
Generally, any currency can be used to write any international contracts but its 
attractiveness depends crucially on whether or not it is attractive as a medium of 
exchange. However, open borders, liquid markets and the absence of restrictions on 
capital movements are all essential to this attractiveness. Also, the currency must hold 
its purchasing power over the periods for which contracting parties may be concerned. 
From the beginning upon the establishment of governmental organisations, the value of 
a nation's currency depends on the confidence in the decision-making institutions of the 
issuing country. Nowadays, countries have the opportunity to develop sufficient 
international confidence in the stability of their institutions to have their currencies 
playing an international role. 
Today, the exchange rate regimes in the international monetary and financial system are 
deeply different in conception and functioning from those envisaged at the 1944 
meeting of Bretton Woods. The conception of that system was fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates to avoid the undue volatility characterizing floating exchange rates and 
preventing competitive depreciations while permitting enough flexibility to adjust to 
disequilibrium under international supervision. 
Also, the quantity of gold of each nation's currency determined the gold value of the 
monetary flows in and out of the country. The balance of payments is the difference 
between the amount of money flowing into the country (to pay for exports and 
purchases of domestic financial securities) and money flowing out of the country (to 
pay for imports and purchases of foreign financial securities). If one country were 
running a balance of payments deficit with respect to another country, they would settle 
that difference by transferring gold reserves from the deficit country's central bank to 
the surplus country's central bank. If the deficit persists, the way to resolve it, is 
devaluation, a situation that occurs when a central bank decreases its currency's 
exchange rate in terms of gold or other currencies.  
Moreover, in 1971, the US gold stock had fallen below US$10bn with no end to the 
balance of payment deficits. As a result of increasing inflationary pressures both at 
home and abroad, the US suspended the conversion of dollars into gold and allowed the 
value of its currency to fluctuate with market conditions. This marked the end of the 
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Bretton Woods system. So, the system of floating exchange rates was adopted. As result, 
market forces of supply and demand freely determine the value of each currency. 
2.1 Exchange rate mechanisms 
Foreign exchange rates are the price of one currency in terms of another. Fabozzi and 
Modigliani (1992, P 664) have defined the exchange rate as the amount of one currency 
that can be exchanged per unit of another currency. For example, the exchange rate 
between the US Dollar and the Swiss Franc can be quoted in two ways: 
a) The amount of US Dollars necessary to buy one Swiss Franc or the Dollar price of 
one Swiss Franc. 
b) The amount of Swiss Francs necessary to buy one US Dollar or the Swiss Franc price 
of one Dollar. 
The exchange rate quotations can be direct or indirect so one currency is considered as 
local currency and the other as a foreign currency. However, a direct quote is the 
number of units of a local currency exchangeable for one unit of a foreign currency. In 
contrast, an indirect quote is the number of units of a foreign currency that can be 
exchanged for one unit of a local currency.  
If both currencies are non domestic, then we have a currency cross rate for example, in 
Japan, the dollar-sterling exchange rate is a cross rate while in the UK or US, it is not. 
So, to avoid any kind of confusion, all exchange rates are characterised as cross rate or 
as hyphenated. The first currency described in the hyphenated exchange rate is the one 
being quoted and the second is the currency of denomination.  
Again, all currencies are traded in terms of US dollar- foreign currency. By convention, 
people are always stated exchange rates in terms of foreign currency units per $ US. In 
that sense, the "foreign currency- US dollar" is that the price of the foreign currency will 
always be denominated in terms of the US dollar. 
According to Allen (1997, P 247), since there is no limitation on how combinations of 
currencies can be quoted, all exchange rates must be internally consistent.  
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Moreover, the cross rate has been defined as the theoretical exchange rate between two 
countries other than the USA can be inferred from their exchange rate with the US  
Dollar.  
Given the vast literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime, the issue will be 
examined in the context of African economy. It is due to the fact that exchange rate is 
very important to economic activities. It is the most important price in any economy and 
routinely set or at least targeted by many governments. 
2.2 Exchange rate regimes in Africa 
In post-independence era, most African countries inherited the fixed exchange rate 
regimes, drifted towards a time of greater regulation at economic level as well as 
monetary which encompassed exchange rate controls frequently combined with 
rationing. 
In independence, the monetary regimes were based on currency boards. For example the 
only role of the central bank was to issue local notes at fixed exchange rates, which in 
turn represented claims on the colonial government. Thus, most countries considered a 
national currency as an important move towards strengthening their identity as 
sovereign countries, and a number of currencies had been created in Africa. 
Simultaneously, the perception of monetary policy changed at the time due to the fact 
that it had been considered as a tool to secure national development coupled with fiscal 
policy. 
After independence, monetary policy diverged in two directions: the regime that 
required monetary policymakers to adhere to strict rules and hence policy reacted 
automatically to events; and the regime where discretion was allowed.  
It is also probable that the majority of African countries will continue to peg their 
exchange rates to a single foreign currency. These countries have a large trade partner 
that provides a standard of reference for setting the peg and visitors having access to a 
strong and internationally liquid foreign currency. It also helps those economies to 
minimize potentially large transaction costs and exchange risks. Finally, these small 




2.2.1 Floating exchange rate regimes 
A flexible exchange rate regime allows large shocks to be more easily contained than 
pegged or quasi-pegged exchange rate regime and avoids the large costs, which often 
follow a breakdown of the exchange rate regime in comparison with the adjustment of 
an already flexible exchange rate. 
Floating allows great flexibility for monetary policy at the time of exchange rate 
pressures and economic difficulty. The floating regime provides that the exchange rate 
really moves up and down in response to market forces. Businesses and financial 
institutions are forced to be aware of the risks inherent in foreign currency borrowing 
and other exposures to foreign exchange risk. Also, it does not exclude the use of 
official intervention and adjustments of monetary policy to influence the exchange rate. 
However, Mussa & al (2000, P 40) stress that the attempt to tightly manage the 
exchange rate primarily through official intervention tends to recreate the risks and 
problems of a pegged exchange rate. If the exchange rate is properly managed, interest 
rates should be a primary tool so that private sector behaviour would be appropriately 
attuned to situations where aggressive interest rate adjustments may occasionally be 
required to support the exchange rate objective. 
Most African countries including Ghana operate some kind of flexible exchange rate 
regime known to be between free floats and hard pegs due to a higher degree of capital 
controls, low integration with world capital markets and weak interbank markets.  
According to Masson and Pattillo (2005, P 518), these issues lead to the development of 
parallel auction markets, which increase volatility and accentuate uncertainty for market 
participants.  
Also, due to their underdeveloped financial markets, these countries have good reasons 
to manage floats more tightly than developed economies. 
2.2.2 Fixed exchange rate 
The success of a fixed exchange rate regime depends on the capacity of any government 
to allow the exchange rate to be a big factor in setting domestic policies. As a result, 
there is a decline in the proportion of fixed rate currencies. However, for countries 
lacking well-developed financial infrastructures including less sophisticated financial 
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institutions and broad and deep markets for foreign exchange, pegs can be a simple and 
credible solution for monetary policy. 
According to Mussa et al. (April 2000, P 41) the economic criteria that influence the 
appropriateness of adopting a fixed exchange rate are the following: 
 the degree of involvement with international capital markets is low; 
 the share of trade with the country to which it is pegged is high; 
 the shocks it faces are similar to those facing the country to which it pegs; 
 it is willing of give up monetary independence for its partner's monetary 
credibility; 
 its economy and financial system already extensively rely on its partner's 
currency; 
 because of high inherited inflation, exchange rate based stabilization is attractive; 
 its fiscal policy is flexible and sustainable; 
 its labour markets are flexible;  
 it has high international reserves. 
Countries with pegged exchange rates are small economies with a dominant trading 
partner that maintains a reasonably stable monetary policy and cannot face the costs of 
attempting to run an independent monetary policy. As a result, WAEMU is successful 
in delivering low inflation mostly due to its external peg as well as its easy access to the 
European Union which generates the growth of trade and output.   
Furthermore, it has been argued by Fritz-Krockow and Jurzyk (2004, P 12) that a 
credible fixed peg increases the value of trade between countries.  
This is due firstly to the trade concentration because countries which pegged their 
currency to a major one always have strong existing trade relations with that country. 
However, the benefits of fixing the exchange rate to the currency of the main partner 
obviously prevailed over the costs stemming from the low diversity of production and 
exports and the terms of trade fluctuations. 
The second reason is the fact that developing countries have poor development of 
financial markets. 
These authors (P 12) state that one of the important arguments in favour of exchange 
rate flexibility with respect to trade is that hedging operations for trade earnings and 
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foreign liabilities are inexpensive. This is probably not the case for most of the poor 
countries as their financial markets mostly lack depth and volume and the banking 
system comprises only a few banks. Is it unlikely that these financial institutions would 
offer inexpensive hedging instruments or a sufficient number of domestic entrepreneurs 
would have access to foreign financial markets for this purpose?  
The stability of the exchange rate in such circumstances would have a trade-creating 
effect. The results seem to indicate that the positive impact of a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement on trade has been decreasing over time due to a great number of 
developing countries moved between fixed pegs, intermediate regimes and free floats. 
2.2.3 Soft pegging 
According to Babula and Otker-Robe (2003, P 3 - 4), soft peg is an intermediate regime 
between hard pegs and floating rates as well as tightly-managed floats which have been 
at center stage in most major crises in recent years. In this light, there has been growing 
support for the view that such regimes will not be viable for any lengthy period of time, 
particularly for countries highly integrated with international capital markets, the so-
called bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The viability of soft peg regimes in 
particular has been questioned: in many instances, soft pegs broke down as the 
authorities directed monetary policy toward domestic goals in an environment with high 
capital mobility. The proponents of the bipolar view hence argued that pegs could not 
be maintained under high capital mobility unless the country makes an irrevocable 
commitment to the peg (as in hard peg regimes) and is prepared to support it with 
necessary policies and institutions. The only feasible alternative to such commitment 
would be to float, putting the country under the discipline of the markets on a 
continuous basis. Hard peg commitments or floating regimes hence have been argued to 
be the only regimes compatible with increased capital mobility. Some observers argued 
for a continued role for intermediate regimes, noting that no single regime would be 
right for all countries at all times or that certain types of intermediate regimes (e.g., 
band, basket, crawl) could help prevent misalignments and provide greater flexibility to 
cope with shocks; some corner regimes, on the other hand, could generate 
misalignments that could damage their sustainability. 
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Wagner (2005, P 618) argued that the main lesson learnt from the Asian crisis is that a 
mixture of liberalised capital markets and imperfect institutional adjustment involves a 
problem for countries which choose soft pegging as their exchange rate system. 
A softly pegged exchange rate regime, although it may be a successful strategy for 
controlling inflation, may increase financial instability (Berger and Wagner, 2001). This 
danger arises in particular in emerging markets with a weak banking and financial 
system. An exchange rate peg that has been stable for a rather long period of time may 
lead market participants to underestimate, or even totally neglect, the exchange rate risk. 
Excessive capital inflows are the consequence. This process is spurred on if the 
countries sterilise the massive capital inflows thereby raising domestic interest rates far 
above the international rates. Thus, a large amount of foreign-denominated debt is 
accumulated, which makes a country vulnerable to sudden shifts in market sentiment. 
Since the institutional framework (including the financial system) cannot be overhauled 
and completely reformed within a short period of time, the choice of exchange rate 
regimes gains a special significance for avoiding financial instability in emerging and 
transition economies. There are two polar regimes or corner solutions that could be 
implemented to avoid some of the severe consequences of financial instability 
associated with the intermediate regime, namely hard pegging and free floating. 
2.3 Exchange rate fluctuation 
The value of any currency is determined by the demand for goods, services and assets 
denominated in that currency as balanced by the supply of the currency.  
Fluctuations in the value of the currency will occur when either demand or supply 
varies. However, the balance of payments is an important determinant of these forces of 
supply and demand. Unanticipated changes in the balance of payments may cause 
currency fluctuations that create foreign exchange rate risks exposure. 
The balance of payments comprises two accounts: the current account and the capital 
account. The current account records all flows associated with international trade in 




According to Allen (1997, P 271) by definition the total balance of payments for any 
country cannot be out of balance. Deficits in the current account are balanced by 
reactive surpluses in the capital account. However, these reactive offsetting surpluses in 
the capital account can be used to forecast exchange rate fluctuation. If a country is 
running a deficit in its current account and in its autonomous capital account then 
interest rates and exchange rates must fluctuate so as to induce an offsetting surplus in 
its reactive capital account to bring the balance of payments into balance. 
Again, if the current markets are efficient, then exchanges rates are determined by new 
information about fundamentals that generate changes in expectations. Increasing real 
economic activity and the rate of price, inflation will increase the demand for money. 
Increases in interest rate decrease the demand for money. 
Since the exchange rate fluctuations are a fact of life in either fixed or floating exchange 
rate policy and result in the determinants of currency risk, the forward 
premium/discount can be used to measure the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. 
If the forward rate is an accurate predictor of future spot rates then the forward 
premium/discount can be used to measure the currency risk born by market participants 
(Allen, 1997, P 273). 
Again, there are different sources of risks in financial markets: 
 Interest rate risk is a function of rate volatility measured using five indexes of 
interest-sensitive securities such as treasury bills, long term treasury bonds, 
mortgage and foreign bonds. 
 Exchange rate risk: its volatility is measured using an index of major European 
currencies and the Japanese yen - US dollar exchange rate. 
 Price-level risk is measured using commodity price volatility as represented by 
an index of US real estate values as well as equity price volatility as represented 
by five indexes of stock price fluctuations: value stocks, growth stocks and 
venture capital firms. 
 




2.4 Foreign exchange rate markets and risks 
The foreign exchange market is the market in which individuals, firms and banks buy 
and sell foreign currencies. The foreign exchange market for any currency for instance 
the US dollar is composed of all the locations such as London, Paris, Zurich, Frankfurt, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo and New York where dollars are bought and sold for 
other currencies. 
The foreign exchange market is designed to transfer funds or purchasing power and 
currency from one nation to another. These transactions are made by telex or the most 
common used direct-dialling telephone service. It consists of a domestic bank asking its 
correspondent bank in a foreign monetary centre to pay a certain amount of the local 
currency to a person, firm or account. 
However, a nation pays for its tourists expenditures abroad, its import, and its 
investment abroad and so on with its foreign exchange earnings from tourism, exports 
and the receipt of foreign investments. 
If the nation's total demand for foreign exchange in the course of its foreign transactions 
exceeds its total foreign exchange earnings, the rate at which currency exchange for one 
another will have to change to equilibrate the total quantities demanded and supplied 
(Salvatore, 1999, P 424). 
If this adjustment in the exchange rates were not allowed, the nation's commercial banks 
would have to borrow from the nation's central bank which would then act as the 'lender 
of last resort' and draw down its foreign exchange reserve (balance of payments deficit 
of the nation). 
2.4.1 Foreign exchange risks 
A nation's demand and supply curves for foreign exchange shift causing the spot (and 
the forward) rate to frequently vary. For example, if the US tastes for British product 
increase, the US demand for Sterling will increase, leading to a rise in the exchange rate 
(i.e. depreciation of the dollar). On the other hand, a lower rate of inflation in the US 
than in the UK will lead to US products becoming cheaper for the UK residents. This 
tends to increase the US supply of pounds and causes a decline in the exchange rate (i.e. 
appreciation of the dollar). 
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From the perspective of a US investor, the cash flows of assets denominated in a foreign 
currency expose the investor to uncertainty as to the cash flow in US dollars. The actual 
US dollars that the investor gets depend on the exchange rate between the US dollar and 
the foreign currency at the time the non-dollar cash flow is received and exchanged for 
US dollars (Fabozzi & Modigliani, 1992, P 667). 
If the foreign currency depreciates against the dollar (US dollar appreciates), the dollar 
value of the cash flows will be proportionately less. This risk is called foreign exchange 
risk. However, any investor who is buying an asset denominated in a currency that is 
not the medium of exchange of the investor's country faces foreign exchange risk. 
In a dynamic and changing world, exchange rates frequently vary, reflecting the 
constant change in the numerous economic forces simultaneously at work. Those 
frequent and relatively large fluctuations in exchange rates impose foreign exchange 
risks or open-position on all individuals, firms and banks that have to make or receive 
payments in the future. However, the spot exchange rates are changing over time. Thus, 
businessmen are risk averse and will want to avoid or insure themselves against any 
foreign exchange risks. So, the spot exchange rate market is the market for settlement 
within two business days. The main factor which affects the expectation of changes in a 
country’s exchange rate is the relative expected inflation rate. The spot exchange rate 
adjusts to compensate for the relative inflation rate between two countries. This 
adjustment is also called purchasing power parity relationship. 
Again, arbitrage does not involve any exchange risk since the currency is bought at the 
cheaper price in one monetary centre and sold immediately at the higher price in another 
monetary centre. 
A foreign exchange risk arises not only from transactions involving future payments or 
receipts of foreign currency (transaction exposure) but also from the need to value 
inventories and assets held abroad in terms of the domestic currency for inclusion in the 
firm's balance sheet (translation or accounting exposure) and also in estimating the 
domestic currency value of the future profitability of the firm (economic exposure). 
Authors such as Fabozzi and Modigliani (1992, P 671) think that there are four 
techniques or instruments that borrowers and investors can use to protect against 
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adverse foreign exchange rate movements: currency forward contracts, currency futures 
contracts, currency option and currency swaps. 
2.4.1.1 Currency forward contracts 
 
It is a contract in which one party agrees to buy 'something' and another party agrees to 
sell the same thing at a designated date in the future. The vast majority of forward 
contracts have a maturity of less than two years. For long forward contracts, the bid is 
increasing so the size of the bid for a currency is increasing with the maturity. 
Consequently, forward contracts become less attractive for hedging long-dated foreign 
currency exposure. 
Again, for foreign exchange, the forward market is the market of choice for the so-
called interbank market where data on the amount of open interest are not public. 
Therefore, the spot rate and the interest rate in two countries will determine the forward 
exchange rate. The relationship between the spot rate, interest rate and the forward rates 
called interest rate parity means that an investor after hedging in the forward exchange 
rate market will get the same domestic return whether investing locally or in a foreign 
country. 
2.4.1.2 Currency futures contracts 
 
Currency futures are limited to hedging long-dated foreign exchange risk exposure. 
Their maturity is March, June, September and December. The longest is one year. The 
futures contracts have to satisfy the demand of potential customers: 1. increased 
volatility in interest rate, exchange rate and market prices put everyone at risks; 2. the 
rise in activity in the spot markets generates increased liquidity; 3. financial engineering 
and innovations in cash instruments induce demand for new ways to manage risk 
efficiently and cheaply; 4. global financial markets are less tolerant of country's 





2.4.1.3 Currency option 
 
In contrast to a forward or futures contract, an option gives the buyer the opportunity to 
benefit from favourable exchange rate movements but establishes a maximum loss. The 
option price is the cost of establishing such risk or return profile. 
There are two types of foreign currency options: options on the foreign currency and 
futures options. The latter is an option to enter into a foreign exchange futures contract.  
2.4.1.4 Currency swaps 
 
In a currency swap, there is an exchange of the interest and the principal while interest 
rate swaps is a transaction where two parties agree to exchange interest payments with 
on exchange of the principal.  
Again, currency swap is an exchange between two parties of either the currency of 
denomination or the form of interest (fixed versus floating rate) payable debts 
instruments. Swaps make financial markets more efficient but crossing over barriers to 
transactions and connecting once isolated corners of the financial world. All parties are 
winner because they have access to financial markets that they cannot access directly.  
One of the best ways to remedy the foreign exchange risks would be the hedging system. 
2.4.2 Hedging 
 
Hedging is defined as the avoidance of a foreign exchange risk or the covering of an 
open-position. So, businessmen could borrow money at the present spot rate and deposit 
that sum in a bank to earn interest before his payment is due. Thus, the cost of insuring 
himself against the foreign exchange risks in this way is the positive difference between 
the interest rates he has to pay on his loan and the lower interest rate he earns on his 
deposit. 
Covering the foreign exchange risk in the spot market, it has a very serious 
disadvantage. To avoid this, hedging usually takes place in the forward market where 
borrowing or tying up of own funds is required. Thereby, the importer could buy 
pounds forward for payment in three months time at today's three month forward rate. 
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In a world of foreign exchange uncertainties, the ability of traders and investors to 
hedge greatly facilitates the international flow of trade and investment. Without hedging, 
there would be smaller international capital flows, less trade and specialisation in 
production and small benefit from trade. 
Large corporations that have to receive and make a large number of payments in the 
same currency at the same time in the future need only to hedge its net open-position. 
Similarly, a bank has an open-position only in the amount of its net balance on 
contracted future payments and receipts in each foreign currency at each future date. 
The bank closes as much of its open-positions as possible by dealing with other banks 
(through foreign exchange brokers) and it may cover the remainder in the spot, futures 
or option markets. 
2.4.3 Speculation 
Speculation is the opposite of hedging. Whereas hedging seeks to cover a foreign 
exchange risk, a speculator accepts and seeks out a foreign exchange risk or an open-
position in the hope of making profit. 
If the speculator correctly anticipates the future change in spot rates, he will make a 
profit otherwise he will incur a loss. Like hedging, speculation can take place in the spot, 
forward, futures or option markets, mostly in the forward market. 
Speculators are usually wealthy individuals or firms rather than banks. However, 
anyone who has to make a payment in a foreign currency in the future can speculate by 
speeding up payment if he expects the exchange rate to rise. 
According to Hallwood and MacDonald (2000, P 33) speculation in foreign exchange 
can take various forms. One of them is ‘pure speculation’ which takes place in the 
forward market. This has the attractive feature that a foreign currency does not have to 
be bought and held, so tying up funds. 
In practice, speculators will be required to make a margin requirement. Equilibrium for 
pure speculation is when the expected spot exchange rate for future date equals the 
forward rate for the same future date. 
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If ‘pure’ speculators are risk neutral, buying pressure in the forward exchange market 
will force the equality. Otherwise, they will not force the equality: expected profit on 
the last contract bought remains positive. 
The second type of speculation is ‘leads and lags’ which is often important when a 
country’s capital account is blocked for resident by foreign exchange controls such as 
many developing countries. Thus, an importer with an outstanding foreign currency 
obligation who expects depreciations of the home currency will ‘lead’ paying off the 
debts to ‘beat’ the depreciation. An exporter holding a similar expectation will ‘lag’ 
transmission home of foreign earnings so as to benefit from the expected higher value 
of foreign currency. 
In both cases, speculation is occurring because a ’bet’ is being made on the outcome 
that the domestic currency will depreciate. 
Leads and lags may sometimes severely distort flows through foreign currency markets 
and can be a problem for authorities that are managing the exchange rate. 
Banks may speculate in foreign currency simply by not covering with their 
correspondents any net foreign currency sales that they may have made during the 
course of a trading day. So, a bank may choose to hold an open-position in foreign 
exchange. 
Other forms of currency speculation have opened up with the recent development of 
foreign currency option where an investor can pay a premium to have the option to buy 
or sell a foreign currency. If the currency moves in the expected direction, the option 
can either be sold at a higher price or the foreign currency can be collected and resold 
on the spot market. Then, there is always the possibility of keeping foreign currency and 
using it the next time you travel abroad. 
Referring to currency fluctuation, let us analyse the Ivorian and Ghanaian economy with 






3.0 COUNTRY PROFILE: COTE D’IVOIRE 
3.1 Country Background 
Cote d’Ivoire is West Africa’s second richest country after Nigeria due to the booming 
of its cocoa and coffee sectors since the 1950s. From the 1970s, the country faced 
enormous economical imbalances but after the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, its 
economy made a strong recovery (OECD, 2002, P 223). 
Since 1999, political instability and social unrest and, more importantly, the drop in 
world commodity prices produced a recession in 2000 and resulted in GDP falling by 
3.3 percent in 2001. A slight increase in coffee and cocoa prices and resumption of 
international aid and cooperation with the IMF produced GPD growth of 1.6 percent in 
2004 and an estimated 1.7 percent in 2007 (World Economic Outlook Database, 
October 2007) but the country's prospects will depend on improving political crisis, 
governance and combating poverty. 
Unfortunately, the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary 
Funds) suspended their assistance in December 2003 due to a military rebellion started 
in September 2002, and which divided the country into two. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3.1.1 Geography                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Cote d'Ivoire covers an area of 322,000 square kilometres (127,000 square miles) and 
lies on the Gulf of Guinea. Mali and Burkina Faso border it in the north, to the west by 
Liberia and the Republic of Guinea and to the east by Ghana. The climate of the country 
ranges from that of equatorial rain forest in the south to the drier savannah belt in the 
north. 
Cote d'Ivoire is a middle-sized country and its population is approximately 16.7 million 
in 2000 and is estimated to 18.7 million in 2007. There are more than 60 different tribes, 
comprising six principal groups and a large community of foreigners. The country has 
the highest density in the Sub-Saharan region due to its mild climate and fertile soil 
because of the forest in the central and southern part of the country. Also, the less fertile 
north-savannah offers goods conditions for growing cotton, sugar and food crops. This 
north-south difference and the economic inequality it created, is an important political 




Cote d'Ivoire was recognized in 1890 by the French authorities because of its excellent 
agricultural possibilities. Among the French colonies in West Africa, the Ivory Coast 
was unique in a number of ways. Firstly, the country was unique in being a neglected 
colony as the colonial rules came later in 1893 in comparison with neighbouring 
colonies.  
Ivorian development through colonialism was short and superficial, historically 
speaking. This sparsely populated colony provided neither an interesting market for 
French exports nor a large labour force for colonial agriculture. The population had 
reached only 2.7 million by 1955. Lacking a natural deep-water harbour, the shipment 
of colonial goods to France was cumbersome (Alschuler, 1998, P 65). 
There were no navigable rivers to the hinterland so colonial economic activities were 
limited to the coastal and tropical zones to the south. During that period, a significant 
change, which occurred, was the introduction of cash crops at limited quantity until 
after the Second World War. However, cocoa was introduced about 1920 followed by 
coffee in 1930 but the main contribution to the French economy was timber and palm 
oil until 1925. Cocoa became increasingly important after 1920 but was supplemented 
by coffee after the world. However, cocoa and coffee constituted on average 90 percent 
of Ivorian export value. Consequently, the main objective of the introduction of those 
cash crops was for the colonial administration to have profound influence on Ivorian 
socio-political structure. 
Thus, the period between 1900 and 1930 saw the production of large quantity of coffee, 
cocoa, bananas and timber. The value of total commodity exports rose from 10 to 300 
millions CFA francs (Berthelemy & bourguignon, 1996, P 5). 
At the beginning of the introduction of these crops, European farmers predominated in 
export agriculture with very large plantations which required African labour, while the 
local plantations were very small and relied on family labour.  
Then, the number of African coffee and cocoa farmers grew from 40 000 in 1944 to 200 
000 in 1959. Over the same period, the European share in coffee production fell from 55 
percent to 6 percent (Alschuler, 1998, P 66). The growing African planter bourgeoisie 
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took place with fierce resistance from the colonial government. This resistance helped 
to strengthen opposition to colonial rule and consolidate the independence movement. 
Thereby, during World War II, production quotas and the harsh treatment of forced 
labour incited protests in the French African colonies, led in Cote d'Ivoire by a wealthy 
cocoa planter, Felix Houphouet Boigny, a former Minister in the French government. 
His party, PDCI RDA -Rassemblement Democratique Africain, section Cote d'Ivoire- 
became the major political party. Opposition to the colonial power was of an economic 
nature rather than an expression of nationalism. 
From 1940, the French started building up some infrastructures to exploit more 
efficiently the country's resources thus an administrative system was set up and shared 
by the French and local leaders. Later, those leaders found out that their economic 
interests did not always match with those of France. Thus, they decided to leave the 
French Community, cutting their political ties with the other former French West Africa 
(AOF) territories. 
In August 1960, Cote d'Ivoire achieved its independence and Houphouet Boigny was 
elected president of the new country. 
Despite independence, the relationship between France and Cote d'Ivoire remained the 
same. A protocol was signed to maintain preferential tariffs for Ivorian agricultural 
exports to France and a preferential treatment of French products in Ivorian markets. 
The rapid expansion of cash crop exports created a class differentiation. The core of the 
class structure was set by the planter bourgeoisie, large and medium-size plantation 
owners and a large rural proletariat. This expansion has attracted a lot of immigrants 
from neighbouring countries to work as rural wage labour. Also, the need for foreign 
technical and managerial expertise as well as foreign investors during this period has led 
to a super-stratification of the society. The growing number of expatriate Europeans and 
Lebanese reached such proportions that it became an issue for the government to try to 
“Ivorianise” at the top and bottom of the chain. According to Alschuler (1998, P 68), 
the exceptional political and social stability of the Ivory Coast might derive in part from 
the extreme financial control by the most privileged and the European entrepreneurial 
class.  
The exceptional growth of Cote d’Ivoire since independence was due to: 
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 The shallowness of colonial exploitation; 
 The emergence of a stable socio-political structure under the planter bourgeoisie. 
 Since that date, Cote d’Ivoire has been a politically stable country, one of the few on 
the West African coast. However, the political landscape changed dramatically, leading 
to an extreme loss in consumer and business confidence as well as a temporary general 
suspension of external assistance. 
Whilst prosperity seemingly gained a foothold in Cote d’Ivoire during the 1960s and 
1970s, the 1980s were marked by an economic downturn, related to the global recession 
stemming from the second oil price shock and increasing popular dissent.  Although, the 
first true elections were held in 1990, the victory of Houphouet-Boigny and his party, 
PDCI RDA was surrounded by accusations of fraud. 
3.1.3 Politics 
From 1960, the Head of State, the President Felix Houphouet Boigny and his party 
PDCI led the country extremely well until 1993 despite some recession periods due 
mainly to deteriorating terms of trade.  
In 1995, Mr Henri Konan Bedie was elected president and presented himself as the 
rightful successor of Houphouet Boigny. However, Mr Houphouet developed the 
structures of the PDCI, the ruling party that dominated the country's political life for 
four decades. 
The 1995 presidential election was considered controversial. Firstly, Alassane Ouattara, 
standing for the RDR was banned due to doubts about his Ivorian nationality. In 
addition, another opposition candidate, Laurent Gbagbo of the Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI) withdrew from the election due to claims of it being manipulated (EIU, 1999). 
Dissatisfaction increased in the following years: a 1998 parliamentary decision banned 
Ouattara once again from standing in the 2000 elections, following an amendment made 
during the Bedie-era, enabling only those Ivorians to stand for president whose mother 
and father were also Ivorian (previously, citizenship of both was not a requirement). 
Popular dissent finally resulted in a ‘bloodless’ military coup in December 1999.  
The military coup, the first in the country's history, led by the General Robert Guei 
ousted President Bedie who sought political asylum in France. However, Mr Bedie was 
52 
 
widely seen as a corrupt manipulator who pushed the nation to the brink in order to 
remain in power.  
The ensuing elections of October 2000 were however boycotted by the RDR and the 
PDCI, whose candidates had both been disqualified, yet with General Guei standing as a 
candidate. Concluding the election, General Guei declared himself head of state, 
however demonstrations supported by arms forces forced him to concede defeat, 
allowing Gbagbo, the real winner of the elections to be sworn in. Unfortunately, this 
outcome was in turn contested by the RDR and the PDCI-RDA. The ensuing political 
and ethnic violence that erupted over the country cost the lives of over hundred people. 
Although Gbagbo created a government of national unity, in August 2002 including 
RDR and PDCI-RDA, they rejected the president proposition as the majority of key 
ministerial posts remained with the FPI. Whilst the PDCI threatened to leave the 
government, it was the Union pour la Democratie et la Paix en Cote d’Ivoire (UDPCI), 
led by Guei that pulled out of the government in protest. 
In September 2002, rebels’ soldiers simultaneously attacked Abidjan, Bouake and 
Korhogo. However, it is still not clear what precisely led to the uprising. While the 
government initially claimed that General Guei had attempted a coup - Guei was killed 
in the first day of the uprising - others claimed that it was a settling of old scores. 
Several days later, some newspapers such as La Voie, claimed that the rebellion was 
due to ‘foreign forces’ acting in the country, in favour of Alassane whose parents came 
from Upper Volts renamed Burkina Faso. 
In any case, whatever the actual causes eventually turn out to be, the uprising has 
destabilized the entire country. While government troops quickly regained control of 
Abidjan, the northern part of the country remained rebel territory. In fact, the rebels 
found it relatively easy to advance south and were controlling large parts of the country. 
Although relative calm was restored, at the beginning of 2003, due to the fact that 
French and American soldiers were dispatched to Cote d’Ivoire to calm the situation. It 
remained fragile but stable since 2007 accords signed between the government and the 
rebellion. In March 2007 President GBAGBO and former New Force rebel leader 
Guillaume SORO signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. As a result of the 
agreement, SORO joined GBAGBO's government as Prime Minister and the two agreed 
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to reunite the country by dismantling the zone of confidence separating North from 
South, integrate rebel forces into the national armed forces, and hold elections. 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel forces have been problematic 
as rebels seek to enter the armed forces. 
However, the real causes of the political-military unrest in the Cote d’Ivoire have their 
roots in the fact that there are currently more than five million non-Ivorian Africans 
living in the country.  The majority is coming from Burkina Faso, and the rest from 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Senegal, Liberia and Mauritania. The fact that the 
social setting did not lead to unrest previously was due to the fact that Houphouet-
Boigny had managed wisely to emphasize ethnic harmony during his three or more 
decades of rule.  
Another issue is the recent decision of the government to implement a 1998 
parliamentary decision on land reform. In fact, the decree would evict first and second 
generation immigrants from ‘their’ land, as under the decree ownership is to be based 
on ancestral rights. 
A further cause of dissatisfaction is no doubt the widespread poverty that characterises 
the population: Cote d’Ivoire is ranked 166th out of 177 countries of the UNDP’s 2007 - 
2008 Human Development Index. In addition, corruption is extremely high: Cote 
d’Ivoire scores relatively poorly on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2007, ranking 150
th
 out of 179, a rank shared with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic 
of Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe.  
The recent political events have had drastic effects on the economy of the country. 
Investment has fallen sharply; in real terms, the economy has shrunk. Although, 
stability had to some extent returned, the population is waiting for a presidential 
election to be held in early 2009, but it has since then been postponed numerous times 
due to delays in its preparation. 
Elections were finally held in 2010. The first round of elections were held peacefully, 
and widely hailed as free and fair. Runoffs are scheduled for November 28, 2010, after 
being delayed one week from the original date of November 21. Laurent Gbagbo will 
defend his post as president against former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. 
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3.1.4 Economic characteristics                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Since 1950, the economy of Cote d'Ivoire has been based on agricultural produce -
coffee, cocoa and timber. Those commodities have denominated the economy of the 
country, dictating the pace of economic growth and the present structure of the economy. 
Between 1960 and 1970, the Ivorian economy functioned extremely well and the 
average annual growth rate of GDP reached 7.2 percent. It has been called the ‘Ivorian 
miracle’ because politicians, economists and others recognized that the general policies 
were the right ones. 
Before discussing growth and structure of the Ivorian economy, let us talk briefly about 
the three developments plans, which are the base of its economy. The first period (1960-
1970) was characterised with the expansion of cash crops for export. The second period 
(1967-1970), which is short, was only a readjustment of the basic development strategy 
of the decade. It consisted in diversifying agriculture and industrialising through import 
substitution. The last period plan (1971-1975) was to deepen import substitution by 
creating intermediate goods industries and agro-industries for the processing and 
exporting of locally produced agricultural goods: 
Economic development policies: 1960 - 1970 
Economic development strategy is viewed as a series of policy refinements punctuated 
by the development plans of 1960 - 1970 and 1971 - 1975. The success of the country is 
monitored to continuously meeting challenges and the changing orientation of its 
political economy, taking into account the foreign capital such as French investment 
capital and low-wage African labour from neighbouring countries.  
As result, the rate of economic growth between 1960 and 1970 was exceptional and has 
earned for the Ivory Coast the prestige of a 'development miracle' along with Brazil, 
South Korea and even Indonesia (Alschuler, 1998, P 69). 
On one hand, the export sector was designed to lead economic growth while on the 
other hand foreign capital, foreign labour and imported technology were to enhance that 
export capacity. So, in 1960, the main policy purpose was to promote and diversify 
agricultural exports (cocoa, coffee and timber) and to focus on import-substituting 
industrialisation. The government had introduced other agricultural products such as oil 
palm, coconut, pineapple, rice, rubber, cotton and sugarcane. Also, the effort to 
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industrialise the country took the form of heavy public sector investments in 
infrastructure and an investment code to attract foreign capital. At independence, 87 
percent of the Ivorian exports were raw materials, with France absorbing 65 percent 
while at least 52 percent of imports were processed goods (consumer and equipment 
goods) mainly from the metropole corresponding to vertical trade.   
The objective of the first development plan was to reduce the instability in export 
earnings through the diversification of export commodities and export markets and 
finally to reverse the increasingly unfavourable terms of trade by means of import-
substitution industries. The primary sector which was a steady and reliable source of 
foreign exchange was to provide the public sector with tax revenues to build 
infrastructure projects in agriculture and industry. The expanding industry and 
agriculture were expected to generate new opportunities for employment, new sources 
of personal income and to enlarge the domestic market for consumer goods produced in 
the new import-substitution industries. According to Alschuler (1998, P 71), with the 
increasing government expenditures on education, again financed from export earnings, 
more and more Ivorians were expected to fill entrepreneurial roles in industry and high 
civil service roles in the public sector. The economic and governmental stability, once 
assured, were to create a favourable climate for foreign direct investment, especially 
where local private and public sectors were unwilling or unable to invest. In other words, 
a steadily growing open economy was to permit Ivorianisation and greater income 
equality. 
Intermediary economic development policies: 1967 - 1970 
The development plan was designed as a corrective measure for the last strategic plan 
and set the stage for the development plan of 1971-75. However, the higher foreign 
investment was over by 1965 and foreign capitals inflows were reduced substantially. 
Also, the outflow of profit repatriation exceeded the inflow of foreign investment and 
thus the government created incentives for the reinvestment of profits. It promoted the 
creation and growth of small and medium size industrial companies. As the limits to 
import substitution were becoming apparent and as the government's debt service was 
growing, corrective measures were necessary. Public investment, which had until then 
favoured industry, shifted dramatically toward agriculture. The amount of public sector 
investment in agriculture has increased, accounting for 30 percent of all government 
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expenditure. The hope was that agro-exports could compensate for the unexpected costs 
of industrialisation (Alschuler, 1998, P 86). As result, in 1968, the government set up 
two infrastructure projects. The deep water port of San Pedro and the hydro-electric 
dams on the Bandama River, both designed to open the way for greater local processing 
of agro-products. The port would facilitate the development of agro-exports in the 
southwest while the hydroelectric projects would produce power for agro-processing 
industries. 
Economic development policies: 1971 - 1975 
The objectives of this plan were added to the existing ones. They consisted of deepening 
the process of import-substitution through the creation of intermediate goods production, 
expanding agro-industries for the processing of local agriculture products and 
continuing to diversify agriculture for export and for domestic consumption. The 
creation of such intermediate goods was to expand industrial employment, reduce 
industrial imports and widen export markets in Africa and Europe. Also, the expansion 
of agro-processing enterprises was to become the focal point of Ivorian development. 
For example, with the production of cotton and textiles, the greatest contribution to 
value added occurred in France, with limited benefit to the country. So, it was decided 
that textiles had to be produced locally with the exported of finished products to the 
world market. That was the idea behind the creation of agro-industries which would 
contribute to a favourable balance of trade as well as the satisfaction of domestic 
demand for certain consumer goods. It would promote greater vertical integration of the 
Ivorian economy and create employment opportunities, located between plantations and 
ports, and reduce the rate of migration to Abidjan. 
Finally, the expansion and diversification of cash crops was a continuation of past 
objectives in line with exporting unprocessed agricultural products quite profitably. 
Throughout the three development plan periods, agricultural exports remained the main 
source of foreign exchange and the motor of the country's rapid economic growth. 
Priorities had moved between import-substitution and agro-industrialisation to solve 
debt dependence and unemployment problems. The repatriation of foreign capital, 
technology and capital goods imports consume foreign exchange. Agro-exports 
replenish foreign exchange reserves to the degree that they are competitive on the world 
market. Rapid economic growth appeared to be the result of the phenomenal expansion 
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of primary export and more recently the agro-industrial exports. The relative political 
calm and infrequent instances of repression found their explanation within the historical 
legacy specific to the Ivory Coast's independence movement (Alschuler, 1998, P 182) 
A) Growth and structure of the Ivorian economy 
1) Achievements 
In the 1960s, growth was rather high (reaching 13% in 1968), but became significantly 
lower from the late 1970s until the second half of the 1990s. High commodity prices, 
especially cocoa, led to expansionary economic policies throughout the 1960s and the 
1970s. Identification and analysis of the factors responsible for the Cote d'Ivoire's 
outstanding performance is to find out what went right instead of the contrary. However, 
over the period 1960 and 1970, the growth has been called 'miracle'. Rapid economic 
growth has ranked high in Ivorian development strategy since its independence. The 
government has consistently argued that, at the country's low level of income, rapid 
growth itself is the key to overcoming economic and social problems. The authorities 
were well aware of the possible trade off between growth and distribution of income but 
their decision to emphasize the former without neglecting the latter, in their early 
development strategy seems justified by the circumstances (Bastiaan, 1978, P 4). 
Again, Cote d'Ivoire did not suffer any disasters that threatened other developing 
countries, combined with a good public investment policy, political stability and the 
creation of an image of a modern growth- oriented economy. Moreover, the government 
focused its development outward in the sense that it was recognized that the export 
sector would be the key to economic growth and that foreign production factors (capital, 
labour, and know-how) would be essential in developing the country's economic 
potential. 
In fact, high prices resulted in a three-fold increase in export earnings from coffee and 
cocoa between 1972 and 1977, which accounted for 90 percent of total export earnings 
at the time. However, during this period, the cost of living increased dramatically (by 
more than 30%), domestic credit increased four-fold while net foreign assets of the 
banking system remained virtually unchanged. In 1977, the price of coffee fell 
drastically and the government believed that fall was transitory and did not alter their 
expansionary investment programme. That was not the case and the institutions of 
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Bretton Woods were called in for structural adjustment in 1980. The adjustment 
programme was implemented successfully and growth recovered. However, the period 
of recovery was brief as the CFA appreciated sharply in the mid 1980s, diminishing 
Cote d’Ivoire’s competitiveness. This, combined with once again deteriorating 
commodity prices, led to a fall in real export earnings in CFA terms of 64 percent 
between 1985 and 1993, while per capita GDP fell between 4 and 5 percent annually.  
Aware of the economic vulnerability of too much dependence on the three main export 
commodities, the government rapidly diversified agriculture by introducing and 
expanding other produce as palm oil, coconut, pineapple, rice, rubber, cotton and later 
sugarcane and other sectors. However, the government was responsible for the Ivorian’s 
impressive economic performance due to the fact that it created a strong atmosphere for 
investment, so that foreign private investors were safe to provide capital. Also, they 
were excited by the political stability of the country and the government’s general 
policy. Increasingly, the public sector itself was able to finance a major share of its 
investment programmes that equalled about 60 percent of total investment in the early 
1970s (Bastiaan, 1978, P 5). 
Cote d'Ivoire performed very well in savings, which generated about 22 percent of the 
GDP in 1970. According to same author, the savings record and the outstanding export 
performance are the major reasons that the foreign debt service has been kept within 
manageable limits. Balance of payments equilibrium has been maintained and reserves 
have been sufficiently large to cope with unexpected developments. 
Also, the government did not invest heavily in purchasing weapons, avoiding large 
military expenditures and costly prestige projects. Moreover, the government was so 
much determined to maintain growth and at the same time correct the imbalances that it 
kept a sizeable investments programme with the public sector's proportion of total 
investments rising from 40 to 60 percent in 1960-70. The foreign direct investment (FDI) 
shrunk in 1985 ($29.20 millions) to fully recover in 1995 ($211.5 millions) and finally 
reaches $265.70 millions 2005. However, FDI plays a key role in the Ivorian economy 
accounting for between 40 and 45 percent of the total capital in Ivorian firms. France is 
overwhelmingly the most important foreign investor in recent years, accounted for 
about one-quarter of the total capital in Ivorian enterprises and between 55 and 60 
percent of the total stock of foreign investment capital (World Bank, 2008) 
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The table below summarizes the general macroeconomic performance of the country. 
Table 3.1.A.1: Macroeconomic Trends 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database, April 2007; World Economic 
Outlook Databases, April 1999, September 2000, October 2007 and International 
Financial Statistics 1990, 1994,2000, 2007 and February 2008 
2) GDP Growth 























































Sources: World Development Indicators Database, April 2007; World Economic Outlook Databases, April 1999, September 2000, 
October 2007 and International Financial Statistics 1990, 1994,2000, 2007 and February 2008 
The real GDP grew rapidly and reached 9.22 percent in 1975 due to increased 
commodity prices and political stability leading to strong public and private investment. 
It shrunk to -1.10 percent with the deterioration in the terms of trade and strong French 
Franc vis-à-vis the US Dollar, coupled with high population growth resulted in a fall in 
living standard. The economy began a comeback in 1994 (with 7.10 percent of GDP) 
due to the devaluation and improved price for cocoa, coffee, pineapple and rubber, 
limited trade and banking liberalisation, offshore oil and gas discovery and generous 
external financing and debts rescheduling by multinational lender and France. 
Chelariu et al. (2002, P 458) reveal that the level of GDP per capita is one of the highest 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the political crisis, GDP growth decreased to -4.60 percent 
before reaching 1.80 percent in 2005 and 0.90 percent in 2006. That growth reflects the 
ongoing political normalisation process, a continued modest increased in private sector 
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confidence and investment, rehabilitation of public infrastructures and redeployment of 
government services in the north which will improve utilization of existing capacity, 
especially in the industry and services sectors.                             
The little drop in 2006 is due to the weather conditions affected cotton and cocoa 
productions and also the decline of volume of oil production.   
3) Inflation 
Cote d’Ivoire’s currency was pegged to the French franc and now to the Euro and its 
monetary policy is conducted by the BCEAO, leaving budgetary policy as the 
government's only instrument of macroeconomic stability. Thereby, inflation is still 
under control, so according to Honohan (1992) in Savvides (1008, P 810), the inflation 
in the core (France) determines the long run inflation trend for individual members of 
the CFA zone.  Between 1974 and 1980, the average inflation rate was about 16 percent, 
compared with 5.7 percent from 1965 and 1974. The fluctuations of the inflation rates 
were the result of price increases in imports from the industrial countries, but the real 
effective exchange rate fell considerably after the mid- 1970s, which meant that 
domestic inflation was higher than inflation abroad. The consequence of this variability 
is the fact that the purchasing power of wage earners in the modern sector declined by 
20 percent between 1974 -1980. 
Graph 3.1.A.3: Inflation  

























































































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 1990, 1994, 2000, 2007; World Economic Outlook April 1999 and October 2007 
Prices have been historically low in Cote d’Ivoire, means that inflation was less than 5 
percent before the devaluation and reached 26 percent between 1994 and 1995 to finally 
drop to 0.7 percent in 1999. Due to the political turmoil started in 1999, prices increased 
to 3.3 percent and there were estimated to 3.1 percent in 2002. Such low inflation rate is 
an exception in sub-Saharan Africa. This accomplishment is due to the country’s 
membership in the CFA zone and its currency linked to the Euro, the European single 
currency 
After reaching 32.2 percent in 1994, inflation fell back to 14.1 percent in 1995 and then 
reached 2.5 percent in 2000. Again, inflation, which was less than 1 percent in 1999 
because of the falling food prices, remained under control despite fuel price rises. 
Inflation was 3.9 percent in 2005, resulted in an increase of food supplies. Despite 
recent food shortages in Sahel countries led to price pressures in 2001 and an economic 
slowdown, inflation reached 3.9 percent that year and fell to 2.5 percent in 2006. With 
the decrease of the national savings behind investment and concessionary capital from 
abroad increasing too slowly, the public sector has contracted growing amounts of 
foreign capital on progressively harder terms. Cote d'Ivoire needed foreign production 
factors to support its future development but the amounts could not continue to grow 
disproportionately thus, there was a need for policy change. 
B) Devaluation of the CFA 
In 1994, the CFA zone was forced to undergo devaluation, advocated by the Bretton 
Woods institutions due to profound economic and financial disequilibria born in the 
1980s. Different adjustments attempted have been made in order to maintain the CFA-
FF parity with negative results. Thus, the member states decided to devalue their 
currency by 50 percent in January 1994 and to implement broad restrictive incomes and 
credit policies and a range of structural and institutional reforms. In sum, the 
devaluation had contributed to a resumption of growth in real per capita incomes in the 
zone at a rate of 0.8 percent from 1994 to 1996 after annual declines of 2.6 percent 
during 1986-93. 
The objective of the devaluation:  
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 Re-establishing external competitiveness of the zone economy and strengthening 
the balance of trade; 
 Reducing budget deficits, which depend on external trade; 
 Intensifying growth. 
From the devaluation, the structural adjustments set by the IMF have been implemented 
successfully so that to achieve a revenue structure that is less vulnerable to external 
shocks and allow a reduction of the tax burden on the modern sectors of the economy as 
well as on exports, governments need to implement in a timely fashion measures to 
broaden the tax base and reduce the scope of exemptions. 
Also, the public sector has been strengthened particularly the tax and treasury 
administration which should facilitate better management of the limited resources 
available to achieve social spending and investment capital. Moreover, the private 
sector has been prioritised to become the engine of economic recovery and growth: 
simplification of administrative procedures, acceleration of privatisation, liberalization 
of prices controls, labour markets and external and domestic commercial activities and 
restructuring the financial sector.  Also, after a sharp initial increase following the 
devaluation, the inflation rate was brought down to single-digit level by the end of 1996. 
Fiscal imbalances have been reduced with the primary balance shifting to a modest 
surplus after sizable deficits during 1986-93. The overall balance of payments deficits 
have been contained while the terms of trade improved modestly. The real effective 
exchange rates depreciated by 26 percent between December 1993 and May 1997. The 
competitiveness gains have been substantially larger in terms of relative unit labour 
costs (Hadjimichael and Galy, 1997, P 10). 
In the meantime, the role of the regional central banks had changed, shifting from direct 
instruments of monetary control to indirect market based instruments and establishing 
inter-bank money market and new financial instruments issued through auctions. Also, 
the banking systems had been restored through the restructuring, privatisation and 
liquidation of insolvent and illiquid commercial banks with the support of IMF, World 
Bank, Paris Club and other development partners. Despite some restructuring in the 
industry sector after the devaluation, the country is still a mainly agricultural one with 
food and export crops accounting for more than a quarter of GDP while food processing 
amounted to 25 percent of the value-added in industry. Thereby, the importance of 
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exports makes Cote d'Ivoire very dependent on external factors such as the weather, 
demand and the world prices. 
C) Performance by sector 
Cote d’Ivoire has developed infrastructure and a relatively well-diversified economy. 
However, the economy is based on the agriculture sector, which was important as it 
contributed from 32 percent to GDP in 1970 to 20 percent in 2006. It has a strong 
manufacturing base focused much more on an agro-industry (18 percent of GDP in 
1970 and 23 percent in 2006). The service sector contributed 40 percent to GDP in 1970 
and 55 percent in 2006 (Graph 3.1.C)  
Graph 3.1.C: Sectoral Contribution in percent of GDP 






















































Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator, September 1999, April 2007 and 
IMF, Statistical Appendix June 2004. 
Trends are examined according to the different sectors such as agriculture, industry and 
services. 
1- Agriculture 
The agriculture sector is the second most important sector in the Ivorian economy and 
has been so for the last four decades. Although, its share had decreased to as low as 
21% in the beginning of 1980s, it has been on an upward trend over the last years before 
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accounting for 20 percent of GDP in 2006. Unfortunately, the sector is still in turmoil 
with internal problems like the lack of credible structures regarding collateral making it 
difficult for operators to acquire financial loans and develop their property. Also, the 
sector suffered political turbulences and shrunk by approximately 3 percent in 2002 
mainly as a result of poor performance of the cocoa and coffee sector. 
Cote d’Ivoire has a variety of agricultural produce such as cocoa, coffee, bananas, palm 
kernels, corn, rice, sweet potatoes, sugar, cotton, rubber and timber. The agriculture is 
quite diversified and accounts for a third of GDP and an estimated two-third of the 
population earns their livelihood in the sector. The country accounts for large share of 
the world market in several of its products. It produces approximately 42 percent of the 
global output of cocoa and is therefore the largest producer worldwide and is the 
world’s fourth biggest producer of coffee to date. Cote d’Ivoire recently lost its position 
as third largest exporter of coffee, producing 27.7 percent less at the end of September 
2002 compared to the same period in 2001. This was due to the low market price and 
quality aspects. Regarding the market price of coffee, the BCC (Bourse du café et cacao) 
offered low prices to farmer. Consequently, producers had little incentive to carry on 
cultivating beans and turned to other cash crops. The quality of cocoa and coffee had 
been left out.  
The rebellion led to logistical problems in case of the cocoa harvest and adversely 
affected this already punished sector. The country is still the world’s leading producer 
(exporter) of palm oil. The country is actually able to increase production, owing to the 
increase in market prices. Production of pineapples and bananas also increased. 
However, marketing and export of pineapples and bananas on international markets still 
remain difficult due to reduction of quotas granted by the European Union and 
overproduction of tropical fruits, issues which led to a strike of the producers at the 
beginning 2002. 
2- Industry 
The contribution of industry to GDP slightly fluctuated over some years. While it 
increased from 19.7 % of GDP in 1980 to 23.2% in 1990, it lost this share in the early 
1990s, decreasing by 4.8% to 18.5% in 1994, which was due to lack in competitiveness. 
This was in particular visible as its share increased to up to 23% in 2006 (Graph 3.1.C). 
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Industrial activity however, once again suffered following the 1999 coup but it 
rebounded in 2001. From 2002, industrial activity continued its upward trend due to the 
agro-processing industry, chemicals, energy and automobiles. 
a) Agro-industry 
Cocoa is the leading activity in the agro-industry, yet only a small proportion of the 
total crop is ground locally. While increasing the proportion of domestically processed 
cocoa is desirable in order to reduce Cote d’Ivoire’s vulnerability to world market prices 
of unprocessed cocoa beans, the government’s policy in this regard does not seem to be 
clear. The government increased the tax rates for the latter substantially more than for 
the former suggested that the cocoa processing industry is not a priority; as such a move 
clearly creates disincentives to process. 
b) Oil and gas 
Cote d’Ivoire has the potential to be one of the region’s leading energy suppliers. It 
boasts large reserves of natural gas and oil and has a well-established energy sector.  In 
fact, the oil industry is one of the key elements of the Ivorian economy as it is becoming 
the main driving engine. While estimates vary, reserves of oil in Cote d’Ivoire are set to 
be high. The country boasts a fairly well developed petro-industry with many 
international companies operating and actually imports crude oil, which is domestically 
processed and finally re-exported. In fact, the country is self sufficient in the production 
of refined petroleum products as well as one of the major suppliers to West Africa. Also, 
the country is becoming a regional gas exporter. 
c) Electricity  
Cote d’Ivoire is self sufficient in the production of electricity and is actually an 
electricity exporter, exporting largely to Ghana. In fact, the state electricity company 
was among the firsts to be privatised. 
3- Services 
The service sector is the largest in Cote d’Ivoire, accounting for 40 percent of GDP in 
1970. The 1999 coup took its toll: the service sector shrank to 43 percent between 2000 
and 2001, the largest fall in Cote d’Ivoire’s history since the 1994 devaluation and a 
clear indication of the detrimental effects of political uncertainty. 
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Furthermore, over the last few years, the country made great improvements in its 
telecommunications sector. The sector grew through transformation and liberalisation 
and recently boasted one of the most reliable networks in Sub Saharan Africa after 
South Africa. Cote d’Ivoire is the regional leader in telecommunications in Africa.  
With the liberalisation of the sector in order to increase competition, three mobile 
operators licensed in 1996 and since then, ownership has hugely increased. After 6 
years, more than 700,000 Ivorians have subscribed to a mobile phone, more than double 
the total number of fixed lines in 2002 and reached 1,531,846 in 2004 (UN Statistical 
Yearbook 2006). 
Before debating on the status of the West Africa Monetary Union regarding the 
emergence of the European Union, let’s analysed the opportunities gained from a 
monetary union in general. 
3.2 Monetary union 
A- Opportunities of monetary union 
The opportunities resulted from a monetary union are related to the gains of 
arrangement which have been analysed in the chapter 8. So, the opportunities are 
following:  
 a) Foreign exchange management 
The West Africa Monetary Union involves the pooling of foreign exchange reserves of 
member states. However, these pooled reserves are managed by the common central 
bank with the collaboration of the French treasury officials or the central monetary 
authorities. The fact of pooling is giving the central bank a wide range of options to 
diversify and rationalise its investment portfolio in order to maximise the earnings from 
the investments of reserves.  
There are some other elements, which are important in the management of pooled 
reserves: the process of common decision-making and the operational characteristics. 
The assertion had been confirmed by Itsede, 2002, p48: < The adjustment mechanism 
through which the pooled would function, regulation of access to resources, 
replenishment and constitution, equalization of adjustment burdens are critical elements 
that should not be over looked. Specifically, it is important to agree on what should be 
pooled at the outset>. 
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 b) Strengthening the financial system 
Within a monetary union, there are lot of opportunities and threats to the financial 
institutions. The different financial systems have been developed and sophisticated with 
the open up of great possibilities in the market. So, the net gains or losses to financial 
services providers depend on the competitiveness, the pro-action and adaptability of 
their financial services. The structure of the financial system has to change and the 
capital markets and the insurance have to be adapted. Again, mergers and acquisitions 
are common features of the financial system as financial reposition for the union market. 
 c) Payments systems 
A single currency requires a single integrated money market, which in turn requires an 
efficient system of payment. The international quality standard for payment systems is 
Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
d) Banking supervision 
The important issue, which could be raised with the introduction of a single currency is 
whether banking supervision should be conducted at the community level or continue to 
be conducted at the national level but subject to the directives of the common central 
bank or a supranational supervisory authority. In the European Union, the arguments for 
centralized supervisory framework were not very strong while in the WAEMU; the 
regional central bank is in charge of the supervision. The German central bank believes 
that supervision should not be the responsibility of the common central bank as some 
occasional bank failures were inevitable or even desirable. Common legal and 
regulatory frameworks for prudential regulation of the banking system have to be 
prioritised. 
 e) The real sector 
A monetary union is affecting the national production possibility, the techniques of 
output and the geographical distribution. The markets unification and dynamics could 
help some industries to relocate to “action areas” to reap the benefit of the common 
market. It is the case of Cote d’Ivoire in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union, which produces 40 percent of the output of the zone, encouraging the producers 
to take advantage of the economies of scale. One said that integration could see the 
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proliferation of a great number of large-scale cross-border industries by both nationals 
and foreign investors. Industries could become much more competitive in their pricing 
policies and much more prone to frequent restructuring in their efforts to cope with 
large and varied demands. For producers and manufacturers, the large market and its 
protective walls are a safe place to conduct product research, development, packaging 
and marketing which are necessary to compete effectively in the global market. 
f) Factor mobility 
The cause of monetary integration would be better served by the movement of factors of 
production within the zone (Mundell, 1961). Such mobility would equilibrate demand 
and supply of factors of production by shifting resources from surplus areas to deficit 
areas in the monetary zone. So, the wage rate may stabilize and thus reducing the 
unemployment. 
 g) Coordination of macroeconomic policy 
The first step of economic integration is the establishment of a credible mechanism for 
macroeconomic policy coordination due to the fact that the member states may have 
different level of economic development and macro policy divergence. The different 
countries have different level of inflation, exchange rate, fiscal deficit, public debts and 
external reserves. Thereby, integrating countries have to set of criteria by which the 
convergence of the different economies would be measured but politicians have to push 
ahead those reforms, which might be unpopular in their country. 
B- The link between WEAMU and EMU 
The European Union Council of Ministers has made an official decision that France as 
member of the EMU can maintain its monetary relationship with the CFA states but any 
further modifications have to be approved by France and the EU Council. However, this 
relationship is a budgetary arrangement between Francs zone and the French Treasury, 
rather than a monetary arrangement with the Bank of France which holds the operations 
accounts of the two central banks: BCEAO and BEAC. It has been already mentioned 
that the French Treasury officials who underwrite any overdrafts for a bilateral balance 
of payment assistance manage the operations accounts. 
Again, in the spectrum of EMU, there is a need of whether the union is desirable as the 
CFA zone does have the potential to provide a net economic benefit through increased 
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policy credibility. It has been argued that the policy credibility has to pass through 
significant reforms of institutional arrangements governing the monetary policy 
decision-making. According to Fouda & Stasavage (2000, P 223), the traditional way to 
assess costs and benefits of participation in a monetary union is with reference to the 
literature on optimum currency areas. Optimum currency area theory emphasises that 
when markets for labour, goods and capital are highly integrated between countries, the 
reduction of transactions costs which results from establishing a monetary union can 
outweigh the costs in terms of loss of the nominal exchange rate as a policy instrument 
for adjusting to country- specific shocks. In the case of the Francs zone, there is limited 
integration between member states in terms of markets for labour, goods and capital. 
Moreover, the country-specific shocks are largely incompatible and making loss of the 
nominal exchange rate. In that circumstance, if a government choose the nominal 
exchange rate as a policy instrument, it has to devalue (or revalue) its currency when 
warranted by economic considerations, but political instability is increasingly the 
outcome of devaluation thus it will be interesting for governments to be part of a 
monetary union even reducing their discretion over macroeconomic policy. So, central 
banks are in charge of monetary policies in that union. This could inspire investor 
confidence and bring faster growth in per capita incomes. 
Also, inflation rates in Francs zone have tended to converge towards those of France, as 
the CFA states have avoided the high inflation suffered by many other African countries 
but they ran higher public sector deficits than others. It has been argued that, in terms of 
economic growth, UMOA states have considerably out-performed than other African 
countries during the periods 1973-79 and 1994-96 through the different structural 
adjustment programmes. 
The CEMAC states significantly out-performed more than other African countries 
between 1973 and 1985 because this union comprised three major oil producers, which 
are Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, and also that period was boom oil 
prices on world markets. After the 1994 devaluation, the UMOA states performed well 
indeed indicating that CFA zone participation still brings clear benefits in terms of 





Table 3.1.B: Real GDP following the 1994 devaluation (in %): 
 WAEMU 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Benin 4.4 4.6 5.6 5.7 4.6 4.7 4.9 6.2 4.5 3.9 3.1 2.9 3.7 
Burkina Faso 1.2 4.0 6.0 5.5 6.4 6.3 2.2 6.8 4.6 8.0 4.6 7.1 5.5 
Côte d'Ivoire 1.8 7.1 6.9 6.2 5.8 1.6 -2.3 0.1 -1.6 -1.7 1.5 1.7 0.7 
Guinea–
Bissau(*) na na na 6.3 -28.2 7.6 7.5 0.2 -7.2 0.6 3.2 3.8 2.1 
Mali 2.3 6.6 4.3 6.7 5.0 5.7 -3.3 11.9 4.3 7.6 2.3 6.1 5.3 
Niger 4.0 2.6 3.4 3.4 6.7 -0.6 -0.2 5.8 5.8 3.8 -0.8 7.4 5.8 
Senegal 2.9 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.7 5.1 5.6 5.6 1.2 6.7 5.8 5.7 2.5 
Togo 16.2 6.8 9.7 4.3 -2.2 3.0 -0.8 0.6 4.1 2.0 2.5 1.3 3.9 
Source: Central Bank of West African States 
(*) In 2009, Guinea-Bissau published a new set of national statistics according to the 
Western African Economic Union accounting criteria (SNA 93) with the year 2005 as a 
base year, whereas the national statistics given the past, achieved on the basis of SNA 
86, had the year 1986 as a base year. 
CEMAC 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cameroon 0.4 4.2 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.3 5.2 4.7 4.0 4.2 3.7 2.3 3.2 
Central African 
Republic 
4.9 6.4 -3.1 4.3 5.3 2.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 -4.6 3.5 3.0 4.3 
Congo -4.8 2.6 6.4 -2.4 3.7 -3.2 7.6 3.8 4.6 0.7 3.7 7.1 7.0 
Gabon 3.7 5.0 3.6 5.5 3.5 -11.3 na 2.0 -0.3 2.7 1.4 3.0 1.3 
Equatorial Guinea 15.6 16.1 37.4 93.8 17.7 23.2 13.1 68.3 20.2 14.4 32.6 8.9 5.3 
Chad 5.9 0.9 3.1 4.4 4.6 0.2 -0.7 10.6 8.5 14.3 33.7 8.6 0.8 
Source: Bank of Central African States 
C- Performance of the zone 
Each member states have given up the sovereign right to note issue and parity 
adjustment in favour of stability and convertibility. However, the monetary policy 




For a long time, the obvious stability and well being of the member states was 
contrasted with the "learning by doing" pratfalls of the non-francophone African 
countries and a positive association developed between UMOA-type arrangements and 
development (Medhora, 2000, P 3). 
 Convertibility of CFA Franc 
The guaranteed convertibility of the CFA francs is probably the most interesting feature 
of the CFA francs system. This convertibility in the Franc zone, however, was 
conceived differently from the Bretton Woods accords, which is ensured by the market 
mechanism of supply and demand. But, in the Franc zone, convertibility was set up via 
the operations account with the French Treasury. (Mbet & Niamkey, 1994, P 1150) 
CFA francs are not bought and sold in the market place but are only converted into 
French francs. So, the convertibility of CFA francs is set up by administrative decisions 
and therefore could not be sustained in the event of an economic and financial crisis at 
the centre. That is why the operations account actually constitutes the foundation of the 
Franc zone. It is so important that it is supported by two specific pieces of legislation, 
the agreement of March 1973 between France and the BEAC countries and the 
convention of December 1973 between France and UMOA countries. Each central bank 
records in its credits or liabilities the receipts of foreign currencies that it acquires 
outside the Franc zone. In its assets, each central bank records the expenditures outside 
the zone. The net balance may be positive or negative. An evaluation of the Franc zone 
monetary co-operation system should include the net balance of the operations account 
and the costs associated with maintaining such account. 
Again, the union (UMOA) manages its foreign reserves collectively and controls the 
credit expansion, which influences the direction and importance of the monetary policy 
every individual country may follow. 
According to Hidjimichael and Galy (1997, P 8), the economic performance of the CFA 
franc countries compared favourably with that of other sub-Saharan African countries, 
being characterized by strong real GDP growth and lower inflation during the period 
from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s. Unfortunately, from 1986 to 1993, the 
cumulative deterioration in the terms of trade of around 40 percent, combined 
sometimes with deflationary fiscal policy, the growth performance of the Franc zone 
had weakened considerably. 
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The decrease of the terms of trade had led to a substantial depreciation of the 
equilibrium real effective exchange rate of the union. 
Furthermore, these two authors argued that in the absence of nominal exchange rate 
flexibility and in the context of a sizable firming of the French franc against the US 
dollar following the Plaza Accord among the G-5 countries, the CFA franc appreciated 
considerably in nominal effective terms. The internal adjustment efforts pursued by 
most member states gave rise to a tiny depreciation of the real effective exchange of the 
CFA; that was not enough to offset the impact of the terms of trade loss therefore giving 
a rise to competitiveness problems. 
3.3 Benefits and Costs of a monetary union 
Cote d’Ivoire belongs to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
which was up to the 1980's one of the few African success stories. At independence, it 
was a low-income country, but by the end of the 1970's, Cote d'Ivoire was one of the 
wealthiest countries in Africa, exporting manufactured goods with annual growth of 8% 
in the 1960's and 6.7% in the 1970's. Thus, part of the Franc zone, this country was 
obliged to deposit 65% of its gains from foreign transactions into the operations account 
at the French Treasury. Let us discuss briefly the history of the CFA Franc. 
3.3.1 History of CFA zone 
The CFA franc zone currently comprises 14 sub-Saharan countries, of which 12 
countries had been French colonies. However, the zone is built around two monetary 
unions: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WEAMU) which are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Togo; and the union of states belonging 
to the Banque des Etats d' Afrique Centrale (BEAC) which includes Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo, Gabon, the Central African Republic and since 1986, Equatorial Guinea. 
(Guillaumont, 1989, P 140) According to authors like Hadjimichael and Galy (1997, P 
4), the CFA franc zone is one of the unique experience in the world due to the fact that 
it is a monetary union with fixed exchange rate, and the anchor currency country, 
France, guarantees the convertibility of the CFA Franc into French Franc. France 
participates in the executive boards of the two regional central banks and provides 
extensive financial and technical assistance to the member countries of the zone. The 
unique features of the zone find their origin in the political and economic relations 
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between France and its former African colonies. From the 1930s to the 1940s, France 
established currencies in each of its colonies that were pegged to the French franc. After 
the independence of the different colonies in 1960, the responsibility of issuing and 
overseeing the functioning of the zone was shifted to the two central banks but these 
banks was dominated by France and in the early 1970’s, their control shifted to the 
countries members. 
Each Central Bank (BCEAO and BEAC) issues its own currency but using the same 
acronym "CFA francs" pegged to the French franc (FF) since the colonial time. The 
currency had been set up December 26th, 1945. That was the day France signed up to 
the first Bretton Woods agreement prior its integration into the IMF. Then, the 
currencies of the French colonies in Africa were consolidated into “Le franc des 
Colonies Francaises” means ‘Franc of French Colonies’. Initially, the currency was 
issued by the Central Bank for France’s overseas territories named Caisse Centrale de la 
France d’ Outre-mer. In 1958, CFA became “Franc de la Communaute Francaise d’ 
Afrique” and lastly “Franc de la Communaute Financiere d’ Afrique for West African 
Monetary Union countries and “Franc de la Cooperation Financiere en Afrique 
Centrale” for Beac countries. The zone had changed over time with the departure (and 
subsequent re-entry of Mali) of some former French colonies and the entry in recent 
years of two sub-Saharan countries that had no colonial relations with France and are 
not French speaking (Equatorial Guinea in 1985 and Guinea-Bissau in 1997). 
Table 3.3.1: CFA Parity 
Creation of CFA 
 
26th December 1945 1CFAF = 1.70FF 
FF devaluation 
 
17th October 1948 1CFAF = 2.00FF 
Institution of new FF 
 
1958 1CFAF = 0.02FF 
CFAF devaluation 
 
12th January 1994 1CFAF = 0.01FF 
Source: BCEAO 
The parity has been fixed at 1FF for 50CFAF since 1958 (see table above) and has 
never been adjusted over the years until January 1994 when the currency has been 
devalued for the first time, advocated by the International Monetary Funds and the 
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World Bank. The CFA zone system involves two regional unions. Four principles 
govern the functioning of this zone: 
a) The fixed parity between the French francs and the CFA francs since 1948 by 
unanimous agreement between member countries and France. This parity is adjustable if 
required by economic reasons after consultation with the French government and 
unanimous decision of all member countries. 
b) The full convertibility of CFA francs into French francs, guaranteed through the 
special operations account opened at the French Treasury but not at the Banque de 
France. 
c) Free transferability without limit within member countries and between these 
countries and France. 
d) Pooled reserves system under which the Franc zone uses a common foreign exchange 
policy against the rest of the world. 
e) Free capital mobility between each region and France but this had been restricted 
since 1993 at only transfers. 
Particular attention will be focused on the West African Central bank: BCEAO 
1) The central bank: BCEAO 
The bank is in charge of the monetary policy of eight countries and of issuance of notes 
and coins by adjusting the global liquidity of the economy related to the economic 
trends in order to stabilise the inflation and promoting economic growth. Other 
functions are: 
- Centralisation of foreign currency reserves of the union 
- Management of monetary policies of member states 
- Bookkeeping the treasury accounts of members 
- Definition of banking laws and rules applicable to banks and financial 
institutions. 
- Powers to exert off-site and on-site control 
- Determination of effective equity 
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- Definition of the modalities for the implementation of the decisions taken by the 
Council of Ministers in the framework of its competences 
- Accounting provisions applicable to banks and financial institutions 
- Determination of credit ceilings for banks staff and managers 
- Organisation of the money market 
- Participation in the capital of establishment or organisations whose activities are   
of general interest to one or several states of the Union.    
- Execution of transfers on behalf of credit establishments 
Medhora (2000, P 5) argued that the central bank has an onerous responsibility for 
which they are only partially equipped. Independent central banks are deemed to be 
credible and in principle, supranational central banks should have a high degree of 
independence at least from individual member governments. In fact, the BCEAO has an 
enviable degree of "de jure" independence, lies above the average for OECD central 
banks largely because of their freedom from pressure from any single fiscal authority 
and the statutory limits on government borrowing. According to Fouda and Stasavage 
(2000) and Guillaume and Stasavage (2000), that “de jure” independence has not 
translated into de "facto" independence. The failure has come from: 1. an inability to 
prevent or control excess credit creation in some countries; 2. an inability to prevent a 
financial sector crisis in some countries; 3. a bias towards the large countries as revealed 
by the pattern of seigniorage flows; and 4. an inability to prevent over-valuation of the 
CFA Franc. 
a) Credit creation 
Within the union, there has been excessive credit creation so a distinction has to be 
made between the ability to control credit and the willingness to control it effectively 
due to its freedom from any political influence and the mandate to defend the historical 
CFAF-FF parity. One said that the central bank is less equipped to estimate credit 
demand and supply in each member country annually. BCEAO does not receive full 
information in the terms of the completeness as well as the speed of reporting. Also, the 
different governments have found a way round the 20 percent of credit limit advocated 
by the central bank so we believe the 20 percent limit is seen as a right not a ceiling. 
Finally, the BCEAO want to show off compared to Anglophone countries by accelerate 
the banking habit and the development of financial institutions. The bank was obliged to 
trade-off rectitude in matters to do with credit creation. 
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If the bank cannot appraise the credit development and the French treasury stands to 
increase the operation account in demand then its role is quite circumscribed by 
institutional features. So, it has to have a strong mandate to be that supranational central 
bank. 
b) Dealing with financial sector crisis 
The 1980s financial crisis primarily, in Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Gabon and 
Cameroon drained savings, scarce management resources and set back financial 
development in the region. It was due to the combination of a weak external and 
domestic economic environment with poor lending practice and inadequate supervision 
by the authorities.  Some privileged sectors received funds at the below-market discount 
rate called “taux d’ escompte preferential” or TEP, led to abuse the system. The 
BCEAO having passively refinanced credit to governments, the agriculture sector and 
other designated entities for years, found itself dealing with the aftermath of a crisis 
among lending institutions. 
c) Seigniorage 
 Seigniorage is defined as the financial benefits of having the “license” to print 
money. The resources gained from issuing high-powered money (monetary 
seigniorage) will be used to cover the bank operating costs, retained or return to the 
public via dividends to the national treasury or subsidized lending to designated 
sectors. Distributing seigniorage via subsidized lending means that the larger 
members or at least those members with large sectors entitled to the preferred credit 
benefit but it had been removed. 
d) The currency: CFAF 
The monetary policy conducted by the central bank is to maintain the CFA Franc at a 
competitive rate under a host of exigencies. The inflation rate was and still admirable 
despite the fiscal adjustment, some countries have to make to become competitive, the 
ability of the central bank to conduct a regional monetary policy and the degree to 





2) Money supply and reserves 
The section will discuss the relationship between the operations of the Central bank and 
the whole monetary system. 
Cote d’Ivoire does not control the total money supply, as the monetary policy is set up 
by the regional Central Bank. The central bank issues the common currency, holds the 
external reserves on the behalf of the entire area in the operations account and provides 
credit facilities to banks, other financial institutions and governments of its member 
states. Thereby, the fixed nominal exchange rate against the French franc, absence of 
controls on capital movements and limited scope for open market operations unable the 
central bank to control all the counterparts of the money supply.  
Lane (1989, P 45) argued that with a fixed exchange rate, the public might hold excess 
real money balances as a result of an increase in domestic credit (supply shocks) or a 
money income shock (demand). The resultant excess real money balances increase 
expenditures, which in turn, result in increased imports. Without offsetting capital 
movements, the increased current account deficit must therefore be financed by a 
lowering of reserves. Again, an increase in domestic money supply is offset by 
reductions in reserves leaving the whole money supply unchanged. The overall decline 
in real deposits held in the banks might suggest that the CFA was not officially 
desirable despite the decline concentrated in demand and not time deposits leading to 
the reduction in the creation of credit if the monetary authorities did not lend to banks. 
During the 1980s, the lending by the monetary authorities had been very important than 
the time and demand deposits. 
In fact, Cote d’Ivoire is faced with the problem of instruments of monetary policy to 
influence the money supply, especially limited scope for open market operations by sale 
and purchase of government securities and no independent interest rate or exchange rate 
policy. However, the expansionary monetary effect of export revenues might be 
affected by the central bank open market sale of government bonds. That operation 
could raise the interest rates and attract more offsetting capital inflows, unless the 
exchange rate is changed. Moreover, the current account deficits have been financed 
externally when Cote d’Ivoire was a credit-worthy country and did not directly 
influence the money supply. The mechanism by which changes in commodities exports 
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prices and volumes affect monetary variables, was the external part of the current 
account deficit, causing a reduction in reserves and a contraction in money supply.  
Moreover, the international economic recession has lead most of the WAEMU countries 
to draw upon pooled reserves simultaneously, which made them vulnerable and 
significant overdrawn at the operations account. In 1980, Cote d'Ivoire has been the 
most substantial borrower. However, the government revenues in most sub-Saharan 
countries rely heavily on duties on both exports and imports and therefore highly 
depend on commodity prices. So, if the increase in revenues falls on trade duties, this 
may reinforce the incentive to mismanage imports and exports. 
According to Georgioni and Holden (2001, P 5), the increased domestic credit 
channelled to the government would either affect the quantity of credit offered to the 
private sector and/or affect the amount of domestic credit. The latter case would lead to 
reduced foreign reserves if demand for money remains the same and in a situation 
where the exchange rate is fixed, in a deterioration of the current account. However, it is 
likely that an increased capital flight might actually reduce the demand for both demand 
and time deposits as well as cash held outside the banks. In other words, money demand 
would be reduced as well. Increased credit to the government could reduce the foreign 
reserves and private credit even further unless lending to the banks by the monetary 
authorities is increased. Thereby, the monetary authorities cannot pump liquidity 
indefinitely into the banking system and the banks are not interested in borrowing at 
higher interest rates. Any increase in the liquidity within the fixed exchange rate regime 
(or rather exogenously determined nominal exchange rate like in the CFA zone) is 
bound to trickle abroad in terms of increased current account deficits and reduced 
foreign reserves, reinforcing the vicious circle of capital flight. 
Moreover, the capital flight is complicating the setting up of monetary policy because it 
is reducing the amount of money in circulation outside the banks and reducing base 
money and deposits (demand and time therefore reducing the reserves of banks held 
with the central bank and domestic credits.  It is very important the way a government 
finances its expenditure by raising taxes, borrowing from external or domestic sources 
or borrowing from the central bank according to Georgioni and Holden (2000). In many 
countries especially the developing and transition economies, there is an additional 
unofficial channel, which is building up arrears in payments to domestic suppliers or 
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wages to employees. That was the situation in Cote d'Ivoire and in most of the 
WAEMU countries. Tax revenues were not enough to cover the expenditures and the 
limit imposed by the central bank on borrowing, the government borrowed from abroad 
and built up arrears.  
Bhatia (1985) and Stasavage (1997) accurately described the events and argued that the 
CFA zone had basically failed to deliver its fiscal responsibility expected and associated 
with the participation in a monetary union and/or external peg. Also, Berthelemy, 
Bourguignon (1996) and Demery (1994) highlighted the heavy involvement and 
interference of the government in the economy. Ironically, the large increase in the 
prices of the commodities Cote d'Ivoire exported in the late 1970s induced the 
government to spend in a way that today appears to have been reckless, leading to 
increased debts and arrears once the boom in commodities was over. Since the 
devaluation in 1994, Ivorian exports received a boost due to high commodity prices 
while imports decreased. Consequently, foreign reserves received a significant boost. 
The high commodity prices appear to be sufficient to stop the accumulation of new 
arrears while slightly reversing the capital flight.   
3) Exchange rate policy  
Cote d’Ivoire does not control its exchange rate policy as it sets up by the regional 
central bank. The country can not use that monetary tool to address any economic issues 
without taking into account the interests of other member states for example its poor 
performance in the 1980s. Anyanwu (2003, P 132-133) reported that the zone’s 
economic performance began to deteriorate from the mid-1980s principally for two 
reasons: the appreciation of French Franc and a series of primary-commodity price 
shocks. Thus, CFA membership and by implication, the high level of exchange rate, 
were partly to blame for the poor economic performance of the zone. Due to the 
overvaluation of CFA Franc and mounting structural problems such as rigidly high 
wages, the economy started to collapse. The zone experienced no economic growth 
between 1980 and 1994, a period when other sub-Saharan Africa countries were 
growing at 2.5 percent per annum. Certain authors such as Devarajan and De Melo 
(1987) and Guillaumont & Guillaumont, (1984) argued that prior to the 1980's, CFA 
countries maintained and improved their economic situations vis-à-vis non-CFA 
countries. Others like De Melo, Rodrik and Panagariya (1992, P 23-24) claimed that 
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CFA countries performed poorly because the Franc Zone rules reduced the need for 
timely adjustment. The burden of adjustment appeared to have fallen disproportionately 
on expenditure-reductions in general and on investment-reductions in particularly. It 
was possible that the very institutional arrangement, which might enable those countries 
to enjoy faster and more stable growth in the 1980’s, was preventing them from 
adjusting to the internal and external shocks of the 1990's.  
Mbet and Niamkey (1994, P 1148) commented that the period of 1980's corresponds to 
an era when CFA countries, mostly export-led economies were exporting to world 
markets at a price fair enough to generate sufficient export earnings to finance 
development projects. Again, during that period, exports were very competitive because 
the French franc was depreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar. 
The period post-1980's showed the decline of almost African countries due to the world 
recession fuelled by oil price shocks and deterioration of terms of trade. Moreover, the 
French franc was sharply appreciated against the dollar following a policy of a strong 
Franc pursued by the French government to keep up with the Deutsche mark within the 
European monetary system. 
Some authors such as Yeats (1990) supported the fact that both CFA and non-CFA 
countries were seriously affected because they pay more for their imports. However, 
Medhora (1990) revealed that for CFA countries of WEAMU, nominal exchange rate 
variability has not measurably hurt the imports of the union so there are no costs on 
these countries because of their membership. But, notice that for most African countries, 
adjustment programmes have been implemented to rectify the disequilibrium between 
domestic supply and demand; such disequilibrium was reflecting on the growing 
external deficits, slowing down the growth in the per capital income, debt and financial 
crisis, all of these declining competitiveness. 
It has been argued that in the CFA countries, since 1981, the exchange rate policy 
supposed to change due to the changed external environment but nothing has been done 
which led to some exchange rates misalignment perceived as the main source of 
economic downturns. 
However, the exchange rate realignment of 1994 prompted significant changes in the 
economic performance of the member states with output, exports and investment 
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increased more rapidly than in other sub-Saharan African countries between 1994 and 
1998. Due to the increase in commodities prices and favourable rainfall in Sahelian 
countries, real GDP in the WAEMU zone grew by about five percent on average over 
the period 1994-1998, compared with 3 percent growth in the rest of Africa. The 
country members applied stability-oriented macroeconomic policies together with 
external assistance, contributed to a substantial reduction in financial imbalances.  
The main argument is that exchange rates volatility has negative effects on trade and 
investment. If not fully anticipated, the volatility will reduce the import and export 
activities and reallocate production towards domestic markets. That is the reason why 
the European Monetary System has been set up to control exchange rate volatility so 
avoiding large misalignments among European currencies. It was also, to reduce 
exchange rate uncertainty to promote intra-EU trade and investments. 
Moreover, countries with pegged exchange rate remain the small economies with a 
dominant trading partner that maintains a stable monetary policy for example the CFA 
franc pegged to the French franc, and since 1999, to the Euro.  
Bernhard Fritz-Krockow and Emilia Magdalena Jurzyk (2004, P 3) argued that: "The 
choice of an exchange rate arrangement can affect the trade performance of small and 
open economies. Countries that depend on exports of one or a few commodities might 
benefit from flexible regime to accommodate exogenous terms of trade shocks. 
Conversely, countries that depend on exports to one particular trading partner country 
might benefit from a fixed exchange rate arrangement of some kind linking its currency 
to that of the major trading partner, since it would imply an increase in economic 
efficiency through a reduction in uncertainty and transaction costs." 
While a fixed peg seems to have a significant influence on the value of trade, sharing 
one currency does not appear to lead to more trade. Some Economists thought that 
monetary union could lead to more trade. It was due to rapid exchange rate changes and 
the associated growing uncertainty in international foreign currency market combined 
with the lack of availability of appropriate hedging instruments could have encouraged 
entrepreneurs in countries sharing one currency to engage in more trade. It might be the 
consequences of trade liberalisation as countries reduced trade barriers in the 1990s and 
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also, the existence of a common currency might have become more and more an 
incentive for trade. 
Concerning the linkage between the CFA Franc and the Euro, the French treasury 
exercises considerable authority over policies in the zone as it has sole responsibility for 
guaranteeing the convertibility of the common currency into Euros. 
Hadjimichael and Galy (1997) argued that the introduction of a single currency, 
managed by an independent and conservative central bank and the establishment of the 
EMU would have significant impact on the world economy in general in terms of 
exchange rate stability, low inflation and nominal interest rates, higher output growth 
and access to the international capital market. 
The developments in the EMU may affect the Franc zone through the output effects, 
price effects and improved access to world capital markets debated slightly above. As 
pointed, the EU countries account for about half of the external trade of the CFA states 
so the potential strengthening of output growth is stimulating the demand for exports by 
the WAEMU countries. The benefits for those countries are reinforced by the entry into 
the EU and the EMU of several central and eastern European and probably 
Mediterranean countries. 
Concerning the price effects, the CFA zone is gaining from the exchange rate stability 
without necessarily adding to the costs of the lack of nominal exchange rate flexibility. 
The peg is contributing to the stabilisation of the nominal effective exchange rate of 
CFA states, stimulating the bilateral trade with the EMU countries and encouraging 
higher inflows of the EU foreign direct investment in the franc zone. If the Euro 
continues to encounter higher stability, it may replace the Dollar as the currency of 
denomination of the world commodity prices. 
On one hand, changes in the value of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar and yen will affect the 
competitiveness of Francs zone because they are so close to the Community by trading 
more with the EU than others and their historical tie. On the other hand, exchange rate 
variability will have great impacts on CFA countries with substantial external debt such 
as Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon. However, when there is a mismatch between the 
currency denomination of the debt and the anchor of the exchange rate regime or the 
currency mix of trade partners, an appreciation of the Euro will benefit countries pegged 
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to the Euro and export primarily to the Euro-area countries but the service debt 
denominated in dollars will decrease its domestic currency cost, probably without a 
fully offsetting decline in export revenue (World Economic Outlook, October 1998, P 
152).   
The exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the Euro will partially shift countries with strong 
trade ties to the EU like the Franc zone from the trade-related effects of currency 
fluctuations. It will leave member countries exposed to changes in interest rates in the 
euro-zone, which will need adjustments in domestic monetary conditions to maintain 
the exchange rate link. Changes in interest rates could affect debt servicing costs as well 
as domestic demand. 
Also, the financial transmission of shocks between the euro area and CFA franc 
countries is modest despite the exchange rate link, given the relative insensitivity of the 
economic activity in most countries of the zone to interest rate movements in 
international financial market. 
3.3.2 The benefits 
The fact that the CFA zone is sharing the same currency represents, by eliminating 
exchange rate volatility, a more credible and permanent commitment towards 
integration, cancelling the arrangement extremely costly in political and economic terms. 
A fixed peg is less severe in term of adoption and abandonment of the regime and 
would only have an impact on trade if economic agents perceived it as a stable and 
credible arrangement. 
Confidence in a fixed peg and the possible trade-creating effect can be undermined by a 
real exchange rate misalignment and the threat and relative ease of changing or 
abandoning the peg. It follows that only credible regimes for example those supported 
by appropriate macroeconomic policies and not threatened by the prospect of an 
upcoming devaluation or regime change might have a positive impact on trade (Fritz-
Krockow and Jurzyk, 2004, P 4). 
Moreover, the longer a fixed exchange rate has been maintained, the higher should be 
the trade between countries linked by this regime, as the credibility of the regime is 
strengthened or the capability of the authorities to carry out macroeconomic policies 
that are in line with the maintenance of the peg. Without such policies, economic agents 
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will loose confidence in the sustainability of the peg, undermining it through increased 
trade in a parallel and flexible exchange rate market and ultimately leading to the 
collapse of the peg. Also, it has been noticed that developing countries which export to 
the EU, Japan and the US are exposed to real exchange rate misalignments and that the 
effects of such misalignments exceeded the trade-reducing effects generated by 
volatility of nominal exchange rates. 
However, the franc zone is having easy access to the European Union money market 
and the prospect of liberalised capital movements between the WAEMU and the EMU. 
The freedom of capital movements, which existed between France and those countries, 
is automatically extended to all EU countries. This openness combined with the ongoing 
trade liberalisation would help the CFA member states to get the full benefit of 
globalisation so avoiding the risk of marginalisation. The benefit would be clear if the 
CFA countries established and maintained strong macroeconomic policies and pursued 
appropriate structural policies. Again, one economist named Rose (2000) analysed the 
impact of currency unions on trade, using a database covering the trade of 186 countries 
between 1970 and 1990. He concluded that countries in a currency union trade over 
three times as much with each other as countries without a common currency. The 
results of this analysis point to the important of the long-term stability and credibility of 
an exchange rate regime. Unfortunately, the case of Franc zone is quite different as 
these countries trade more with their metropol, which is France than each other so they 
have not been much focused on the regional integration.  
We believe that for CFA countries, the economic consequences are positive due to low 
inflation and interest rates and strong output growth in the euro-zone. However, the 
establishment of the euro in 1999 should contribute to reduce the volatility of the world 
commodity prices, other things equal. The existence of the EMU implies smaller 
monetary and fiscal shocks among the EU members thereby reducing the fluctuations 
on the world aggregate demand and indirectly the demand for primary commodities, 
which are important intermediate inputs in global production. It has been argued that 
under flexible exchange rate regimes, export and import prices are becoming more 
volatile thereby adding additional risk to export and import transactions. That additional 
risk incorporates the hedging exchange rate price risks. Then, the exchange rate 
volatility measures have statistically significant effects on commodity prices volatility. 
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3.3.3 The costs 
Main risk would be a potential appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the 
franc zone, which might affect economic activities and weaken the external 
competitiveness of these WAEMU countries. These countries would be exposed to the 
risk of asymmetric exogenous shocks relative to the EMU countries but it would not be 
higher than the shock between France and CFA countries.  
Again, in the short term any European economic and financial imbalances would affect 
the Franc zone by weakening activities in their main export market and increasing the 
interest rate in France and the EMU in general. One said that higher interest rates would 
tend to lower credit demand and investment in the CFA countries and raise service 
payments mainly on external private debts (even though about 30 percent of external 
debt is denominated in US dollars). 
More importantly, there would be the reverse impact on the exchange rate of the CFA 
franc and the zone’s competitiveness from a potential:  
1/ appreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the US Dollar; 
2/ uncontrolled strong Euros; 
3/ higher volatility of the Euro against major non-EMU currencies 
Since the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the currency is more and more strengthening 
while the US dollar is stagnating. That will have effect on the external competitiveness 
of the CFA member states. Alogoskoufis and Porter (1997) and Bergsten (1997) argued 
that the introduction of the Euro would induce an immediate reallocation of existing 
asset portfolios towards Euro-denominated assets, resulting in an initial strong 
appreciation of the Euro. This appreciation would cause the European Union countries 
to run external current account deficits, thereby increasing over time the supply of Euro 
assets and permitting a subsequent partial reversal of this appreciation of the Euro. Also, 
the attractiveness of the Euro as a reserve asset, rivalling the US Dollar and the 
prospective deepening of the Euro capital market would reinforce the upward pressures 




4.0 COUNTRY PROFILE: GHANA  
4.1 Country Background  
Ghana is a nation rich in natural resources and human potential, which, in the early 
1980s was in critical economic condition. At the time of its independence in March 
1957, hopes were widely entertained that the country would prove to be the showpiece 
of African economic development, a model for others to follow. 
4.1.1 Geography 
Ghana is located on West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea only a few degrees north of the 
equator. Half of the country lies less than 152 meters (500 ft) above sea level and the 
highest point is 883 meters (2,900 ft). 
The country covers an area of 238538 square kilometres (92,000 square miles) and lies 
on the Gulf of Guinea with 554 km of Atlantic coastline which is mostly a low, sandy 
shore backed by plains and scrubs and intersected by several rivers and streams. It 
bordered in the west by Cote d'Ivoire, to the Northwest by Burkina Faso and to the east 
by Togo. All the three countries sharing borders with Ghana are former French colonies 
and belong to the CFA monetary zone. The climate of the country is tropical but 
temperatures vary with two main seasons (rain and dry) and elevation. The eastern 
coastal belt is warm and comparatively dry, the southwest corner, hot and humid and 
the north, hot and dry. The south is covered by rainy forest favourable to the growing of 
cocoa, coffee, rubber, oil palm, and plantain and providing timber and gold. The north is 
suited to cereal cultivation. A tropical rain forest belt, broken by heavily forested hills 
and many streams and rivers, extends northward from the shore near the Cote d’ Ivoire 
frontier. This area, known as the ‘Ashanti’ produces most of the country’s cocoa, 
minerals and timber. The manmade Volta Lake extends from the Akosombo Dan in the 
Southeastern of the country to the town of Yapei, 520 kilometres to the north. The lake 
generates electricity, provides inland transportation and is a potentially valuable 
resource for irrigation and fish farming. 
The population of Ghana was approximately 17.34 millions in 1995. According to the 
United Nations Population Fund, the total population of Ghana in 2000 was 20.2 million. 
Currently, the country’s population is growing by 2.5 percent per year. At the same time, 
the total fertility rate has declined from 5.5 children per women in 1995 to 4.5 by 2000.  
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As in the rest of Africa, young people between the ages of 10 and 24 comprise more 
than one third of the total population of the country. By 2025, young people will 
number 12 million. Also, this population is divided into more than 50 ethnic groups that 
70 percent live in the southern half of the country. 
4.1.2 History 
The name of modern day Ghana was taken from the ancient kingdom of Ghana, which 
was one of the most powerful three West African states of Mali and Songhai. Its gloried 




 centuries. After the war in which Ghana’s Empire 
had been defeated, they moved to the coastal belt of present day Ghana. Most of the 
inhabitants along the coast became traders and middlemen between European traders 
and the hinterland traders. Due to a profitable trade in gold, the coast had become the 
modern state of Ghana known as Gold Coast. 
Until its political independence in 1957, Ghana was known as the Gold Coast and was 
first visited by Portuguese explorers in 1471. In 1482, they established a trading 
settlement or trading posts, lodges and castles on the coast. So, the region became a 
major supplier of gold to Europe. Gold, ivory and slaves attracted other Europeans. In 
1642, the Dutch had forced the Portuguese out. In 1849, Netherlands withdrew from her 
Gold Coast colonial expedition after almost two hundred years of turbulence. They sold 
their possessions to the English at the handsome price of ten thousand pounds sterling. 
After a long battle among the European nations and much resistance from the 
indigenous kingdoms especially the Ashanti, the country was colonised by the British in 
1901. At the end of World War I, part of German Togoland was added to the British 
possessions. However, Ghana was the first black African country to achieve its 
independence from a major European power in 1957. The Convention People's Party, 
led by the dynamic, revolutionary and socialist Nkrumah, who had headed the struggle 
for independence since 1951, ruled the country until February 1966 when he was 
overthrown in a military coup. According to Nkrumah, his government, which 
represented the first black African nation to win independence, had an important role to 
play in the struggle against capitalist interests on the continent. Unfortunately, some 
believed that he was a dictator, the reason why there was a coup. The National 
Liberation Council, a military-police junta, then assumed the reins of power until 
October 1969, when it handed over to another civilian administration led by Busia, a 
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pro-western, capitalist- oriented intellectual. However, the leaders of the coup opened 
the country’s borders and its prison gates to allow the return from exile or release from 
preventive detention of all opponents of Nkrumah. Busia’s government limited foreign 
involvement in small businesses in order to create employment for Ghanaians. Those 
measures were very popular but some were not such as the tuition fees at the university 
and the devaluation of the currency. Some observers saw Busia’s devaluation and his 
encouragement of foreign investment in the industrial sector of the economy as 
conservative ideas that could undermine Ghana’s sovereignty. Despite broad popular 
support garnered at its inception and strong foreign, the Busia government was victim 
of a military coup therefore this government was toppled in another 'coup d' etat' in 
January 1972 (Huq, 1989, P 35). Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, 
temporarily commanding the First Brigade around Accra, led a bloodless coup that 
ended the second Republic. The crucial causes were the country’s continuing economic 
difficulties, both those stemming from the high foreign debts incurred by Nkrumah and 
those resulting from internal problems. The overthrow of Busia’s government revealed 
that Ghana was no longer the peaceful place in Africa’s search for workable political 
institutions. Both the radical left and the conservative right had failed thereby confusing 
many people with regard to the political direction the nation needed to take. Ghanaians 
were unable to arrive at a consensus on the type of government suited to address their 
national problems after Nkrumah’s reign. On July 1978, in a sudden move, some 
officers forced to resign, replacing him with Lieutenant General Frederick W. K. 
Akuffo due to the continuing pressure to find a solution to the country’s economic 
turbulences. There were successive military governments until September 1979, when a 
civilian government was sworn in with an elected civilian president Hilla Limann. On 
31 December 1981, that government too was overthrown by the military, again the 
officer Jerry Rawlings. A new government with fifteen civilians took power on 
December 31, 1981 and was the eighth in fifteen years since the fall of Nkrumah. 
Rawlings set up the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and wanted 
Ghanaians to be part of the country decision-making process. Nonetheless, June 1982, 
an attempted coup had discovered and those implicated had been executed, forcing 
many people into exile. By the mid-1980’s, the PNDC demonstrated its ability to move 
towards constitutionalism and civilian rule so that Rawlings had been recognised as an 
honest leader and the situation he was trying to solve was not of his creation. To move 
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in the desired direction, the PNDC needed to weaken the influence and credibility of all 
opponents while it created the necessary political structures that would bring more and 
more Ghanaians into the process of national reconstruction. 
4.1.3 Politics 
After the military coup in 1981, Lieutenant Rawlings started ruling the country and 
imposed an austerity plan that helped control inflation and attract financial aid from the 
West, including support from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The currency was devalued three times in the 1980s. Agricultural 
production increased and Mr Rawlings successfully rescheduled Ghana's most pressing 
loans. Despite his popularity with the masses, Mr Rawlings's regime had to suppress 
many coup attempts during the decade. In April 1992, a referendum re-established 
constitutional government and Mr Rawlings, running as a civilian, won the presidency 
in multiparty elections in November. Since 1981, Mr Rawlings started his 19 years’ 
unbroken reign. Mr Rawlings and his party NDC won the 1996 elections again, but the 
National Patriotic Party accused the NDC of massive electoral fraud coming out with 
documented evidence appropriately titled ‘Stolen Verdict’. After twenty years of being 
in power, the NPP finally snatched political power from the NDC during the December 
2000 elections. Thereby, Mr John A. Kufuor of the national Patriotic Party (NPP) won 
the largest share of the presidential vote compared to Mr Rawlings vice president and 
hand-picked successor John Atta Mills of the NDC. The NPP also won 100 seats and 
the majority in parliament. On January 7, 2001, Mr Kufuor took the oath of allegiance 
to faithfully serve Ghanaians, becoming the first elected president in Ghana’s history to 
succeed another elected president. A strong message went out from the people of Ghana 
to the new elected government that, never again in the history of the nation, would one 
group of people be permitted to rule for so long with such little accountability. 
TWENTIETH CENTURY -Rawlings Era  
 1979: The ban on party politics is lifted and 16 new parties are subsequently 
registered.  
May - A coup staged by junior officers of the armed forces, led by Flt-Lt Jerry 
Rawlings, fails on 15 May and he is subsequently imprisoned.  
June 4 - Junior officers stage Ghana's first violent coup. Armed Forces 
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Revolutionary Council formed under Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings.  
July - Hilla Limann elected president in July.  
 1981: Rawlings stages second coup, December 31. Provisional National 
Defence Council established with Rawlings as chairman.  
 1983: First phase of Economic Recovery Program introduced with World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund support. Rawlings adopts conservative 
economic policies, abolishing subsidies and price controls, privatising many 
state enterprises and devaluing the currency.  
 1985 National Commission for Democracy, established to plan the 
democratization of Ghana's political system, officially inaugurated in January.  
 1988-89: Elections for new district assemblies begin in early December and 
continue through February 1989.  
 1990: Various organizations call for return to civilian government and 
multiparty politics, among them Movement for Freedom and Justice, founded in 
August.  
 1991: Provisional National Defence Council announces its acceptance, in May, 
of multipartism in Ghana. June deadline set for creation of Consultative 
Assembly to discuss nation's new constitution.  
 1992: National referendum in April approves draft of new democratic 
constitution. Formation and registration of political parties becomes legal in 
May.  
 Jerry Rawlings elected president November 3 in national presidential election. 
Parliamentary elections of December 29 boycotted by major opposition parties, 
resulting in landslide victory for National Democratic Congress.  
 1993: Ghana's Fourth Republic inaugurated January 4 with the swearing in of 
Rawlings as president.  
 1994: One thousand people are killed and a further 150,000 are displaced in the 
Northern Region following ethnic clashes between the Konkomba and the 
Nanumba over land ownership.  
Late 1994- Ghana hosts peace talks for warring factions early 1995 of Liberian 
civil war.  
 1995 President Rawlings pays official visit to the United States March 8-9, first 
such visit by a Ghanaian head of state in more than thirty years.  
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Government imposes curfew in Northern Region as renewed ethnic violence 
results in a further 100 deaths.  
 1996: Jerry Rawlings re-elected president for second and last term  
21
st
 CENTURY  
 2000: Presidential and Parliamentary elections took place on 7 December 2000. 
Opposition leader John Kufuor polled 48.4% of the vote, not enough to win the 
first round. John Atta Mills scored 44.8% with the five other parties scooping 
the remaining votes. In parallel parliamentary elections, the NPP achieved a 
majority taking 99 seats. NDC took 92, PNC 3, Convention People's Party 1, 
independents 4. The Presidential run-off between Kufuor and Mills took place 
on 28 December 2000. Kufuor won taking 57% of the votes cast.  
 2001: Kufuor is sworn in as the new president in January 7.  
26 February -Petrol prices rise by 60% following the government's decision to 
remove fuel subsidies.  
2001 April - Ghana accepts debt relief under a scheme designed by the World 
Bank and the IMF.  
May 26 - 126 people are killed at the Accra Sports stadium in a soccer match  
June - Government scraps public holiday celebrating Rawling's military coup in 
an effort to wipe out the legacy of his rule. Thousands marched in Accra to 
protest against statement by Rawlings that army may turn against government.  
June - Floods hit Accra causing 10 deaths and 100,000 to flee their homes. 
 
4.1.4 Economic features  
According to Huq (1989, P 1), part of the difficulty is that the economic confusion of 
much of the post independence period has been associated with corresponding failings 
in the coverage, robustness and timeliness of economic statistics. The Ghanaian 
economy in recent years has provided an unfavourable working environment, even to 





A) Growth and structure of the Ghanaian economy 
Growth of per capita real income during the immediate pre independence years was 
satisfactory and the country had a promising start as one of the richest, most successful 
and politically mature regions of Black Africa. 
Since its independence, Ghana had a good development plan and substantial sterling 
reserves with annual average GDP growth rates of over 6 percent. So, the country was 
far ahead of many other developing countries. In 1960, its gross national income (per 
capita) of £70 was higher than that of Egypt (£56), Nigeria (£29), and so on. A lot of 
fluctuations occurred in the GDP growth during the 70s with negative growth rates and 
the average annual rate over the decade has been only 0.4 percent. The per capita GDP 
in 1982 was 180 Cedi much less than, in 1957, being 230 Cedi (Huq, 1989, P 2). Also, 
poor performances have been observed in the export and import sectors. So, as the fixed 
nominal exchange rate became highly overvalued, there was a significant drop out the 
export level. The trading of imported goods was so profitable that the economy shifted 
from production to trade facilitating a strong corruption in the import license allocation 
system. 
It has been argued that, the disturbance of the economy was partly due to the political 
instability on one hand characterised by different military coups. On the other hand, the 
economy, suffering from various bad policy decisions, the economy was affected by the 
rapid rise in oil prices, declining demand for exports and weakening commodities prices; 
all those worsened the balance of payments. 
The foreign exchange rate of the cedi and policy measures controlling prices of goods 
gave rise to a seriously distorted price structure. Growth in Ghana has been 
consequently positive compared to other sub Saharan Africa countries with per capita 
GBP fell by 0.3 percent per year during the past two decades (average 0.7 percent per 
year). That positive growth was due in 1983 to a shift from an administrative system of 
economic management to a more reliant on market forces. Policy reforms over the 
period helped to reduce fiscal deficits and inflation, improve infrastructure services and 
shift relative prices and incentives toward tradable, exports in particular. Progress in 
policy implementation has not been even over the period, however and at times has 
been marked by fiscal slippages particularly during elections cycles and occasional 
exogenous shocks (IMF, 2003, P 5). 
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In order to achieve the different targets, the Ghanaian government set up strong 
strategies and commitment: 
 Increasing internal revenue mobilization by improving the managerial and 
operational efficiency of revenue agencies; 
 Improving public financial management by a more effective control and 
monitoring of public spending and reform of the public procurement system 
through greater transparency and improving the quality and coverage of our 
fiscal data; 
 Strong monetary policy reducing the inflation and the development of an 
effective inter-bank foreign exchange market; 
 Reducing the government’s domestic debts as a share of GDP; 
 Monitoring and protecting the health of banking system; 
 Tackling the issue of poverty reduction through the implementation of the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
The real GDP growth exceeded the target of 4 percent and the government’s domestic 
balance, the overall budget balance and the net international reserves of the Bank of 
Ghana were all achieved. These results were achieved through strong fiscal discipline 
and reduction in the rate of expansion of reserve money. The tax revenues exceeded the 
target of 5 percent mainly on the account of improved revenue collections and the 
expenditures for administration, services and investments have been reduced. 
Table 4.1.4.A1: Ghana Macroeconomic Trends 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database, April 2007; World Economic Outlook Databases, 
April 1999, September 2000, October 2007 and International Financial Statistics 1990, 1994, 2000, 
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Sources: World Development Indicators Database, April 2007; World Economic Outlook Databases, April 1999, September 2000, 
October 2007 and International Financial Statistics 1990, 1994, 2000, 2007 and February 2008.  
The NDC government’s reform programme reversed the economy’s decline. Being -
11.86 percent in 1975, GDP grew to 5.10 percent in 1985. The real GDP growth 
continued but at a lower pace of about 4 percent in 1995 to finally reached 5.90 percent 
in 2005 and 6.20 percent in 2006 due to confidence among consumers and strong 
investment. Sustained real income growth in Ghana substantially reflected progress on 
structural and macroeconomic reforms, which increased private sector activities and 
investment and raised income levels per capita. The 1983 reforms have seen a 
progressive real growth and been accompanied by a political evolution to a firmly 
democratic form of government in 1992 although, developments were periodically 
interrupted by episodes of weak macroeconomic management during elections. By 
expenditure category, growth has been consistently strongest for exports and imports, 
which, in turn, have stimulated growth in the services sector in Ghana (IMF, 2003, P 6). 
Consequently, a surge in spending on gross domestic capital formation appears to have 
followed on the heels of the 1983 reforms as this category rose from 4 percent of real 
GDP in 1984 to 24.8 percent in 1997 before reaching 32.9 percent in 2006 (World Bank, 
2008). The recovery was most marked in the main export sub-sectors. The restoration of 
incentives has brought fresh investment into mining, where output has more than 
quadrupled since the mid-1980s, and led to a recovery in cocoa output. However, 
performance in Ghana’s key sector, agriculture, is very much at the mercy of the climate. 
If the weather were bad, consequently, the agricultural output would lower and would 
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drag down the overall GDP growth. Economic growth has traditionally been created by 
public sector investment with political, cultural and economic climate inhospitable to 
private business. Early 1990s, the government has eased regulations and gave power to 
business in policy making through the Private Sector Advisory Group. Unfortunately, 
there was a decline of 42 percent in private investment due to the election related fiscal 
shock. That suggests that macroeconomic stability becomes a reality before private 
sector activity takes off. However, with the low level of domestic savings, combined 
with the government budget deficit, the investment effort and hence the growth process 
cannot be achieved without foreign capital inflows (EIU, 1997, P 13). Also, the 
dependence of the economy on aid for imports and capital projects continues to be a 
major concern but it is not strong because Ghana’s net foreign aid was less than 5 
percent of GDP, compared to 8 percent average for the rest of Sub Saharan Africa. 
Moreover, net aid inflows have not always compensated for losses resulting from 
declining terms of trade.   
3) Inflation 
During 1972-82, inflation averaged 66 percent per year. A more sensible monetary 
policy brought down the rate to 10.1 percent in 1991 but since 1992, this downward 
trend has been reversed and inflation soared to a peak of over 59.20 percent in 1995 
before falling back to 25.20 percent in 2000 and 10.90 percent in 2006. During this 
period, inflationary pressures remain subdued and the Cedi, relatively stable. 
Estimates by independent think-tank CEPA indicated that inflation in Ghana was 
affected by change in output and money. The food industry was accounted for 49 
percent in the consumer price index thereby any shortfall in agricultural production had 
significant impact on the inflation. The decrease highlighted the important role played 
by the weather conditions in explaining macroeconomic performance, inflation and 
GDP growth. Fluctuations in money were also a major factor contributing to inflation 
since the country had a low level of monetisation that made prices sensitive to small 
monetary expansion. The government failed trying to control the money supply due to 
massive pay rise, a large deficit and large increase in government borrowing. It has been 
explained that diverse increases were due to the government inability to reach its 
budgetary targets and ‘a higher than expected increase in credit’ mainly to public 
enterprises and institutions. Corrective measures had begun to take effect when 
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purchases resulting from an unexpected large cocoa crop swelled the money supply 
again. The different trend in inflation over the years is explained by improved food 
supply and a relatively stable exchange rate (Bank of Ghana, 1996, P 53). 
The terms of trade shocks, the high government borrowing from the Central Bank and 
the general loss of confidence in the management of the domestic economy contributed 
to the build-up of inflationary expectations, increasing the year-on-year inflation. The 
excessive money supply growth, the loss of local food stocks and the increased 
petroleum prices were all added to the inflationary pressures between 1995 and 2001. 









































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Economic Outlook April 1999 and October 2007. 
These developments were quickly reversed through prudent fiscal management and 
tight monetary policy stance. The government moved away from Central Bank 
financing and resorted more to non-bank financing of its deficit. Also, the relative 
stability of the currency and the good harvest of food crops contributed to the 
deflationary trend (figure above).  
B) Performance by sector 
At its independence, the prospects of Ghana economy were extremely good. It was the 
world’s largest producer of cocoa. It had healthy mining and timber sectors and also by 
regional standards, a relatively well developed manufacturing sector. Kwame 
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N’krumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) government sought economic expansion 
through rapid industrialisation, directed and mainly funded by the state using the cocoa 
sector funds. The programme succeeded in establishing what industrial capacity the 
country has today but the implementation was made difficult by inadequate planning 
and a precipitous collapse in the world price of cocoa. The government failed to control 
the fiscal deficit, which had widened and also to adjust the Cedi to reflect growing 
current account deficits.  
Agriculture, the largest sector in the economy, is contributing on average 36.65 percent 
to the country GDP. Services sector is overcoming the primary sector, reaching 36.83 
percent of GDP. The industry sector is still struggling, contributing on average 23.57 
percent to GDP (Table 4.1.4.B).  
Table 4.1.4.B: Sectoral Contribution to GDP 

























































































































Source: World Development Indicators Database, April 2007 







Ghana’s economy is largely agrarian, considering the size of the agriculture sector, 
comprising just over one-third of GDP and a significant share of workers employed in 
agriculture but the poverty is high among the group. The agriculture sector of the 
country is composed of crops (excluding cocoa) and livestock which together account 
for 63 percent of the value of agricultural production, cocoa (comprising 13 percent), 
fishing (13 percent) and the forestry (11 percent) since its independence. Growth in 
production during the past two decades has been slower than in the industry and service 
sectors and as a result, agriculture’s share in GDP fell from an average of nearly 50 
percent in 1980-1983 to 35.3 percent in 2000 and reached 38 percent by 2006. 
However, the agriculture continues to play a strong role in Ghana economy accounting 
for 36.33 percent of GDP in 1995. Cocoa is perhaps the country’s best-known crop but 
food crops are so far the most important contributor to agricultural output and alone 
make up 30 percent of GDP and employing most of the workforce. Despite its 
importance and fundamental reforms of the sector, growth has been slowed down and 
unpredictable. To remedy that fall, the government had removed food prices controls 
and raise cocoa prices closer to those on the international market. It had also reformed 
the agricultural input subsidy system, recognising that less attention had been paid to 
the sector, which was operating at only 20 percent of its potential. The sector produces 
timber, staple foods and cash crops. There are relatively few plantations and except for 
timber, small-scale operators produce the vast majority of output. Wood harvested for 
export, both in sawn wood and finished form but there are questions as to the 
sustainability of the current high rate of logging. Maize, yam, cassava and other root 
vegetables are the main food crops accounting for 55 percent of agricultural GDP. 
Cereal such as rice, millet and guinea corn rose dramatically, while output increased by 
95 percent. Again, considering the importance of the agriculture in growth and its 
consequent impact on poverty reduction, the government launched a series of initiatives 
to stimulate its development and production. Thereby in the 90’s, policies and 
programmes were guided by medium term agricultural development program, a 
framework aimed at improving the allocation of public resources and institutions in 
order to fully used Ghana agricultural potential while addressing the major constraints 




 A lack of appropriate technology, both in the form of inputs (fertilizer and seeds) 
and farm machinery and implements; 
 Inadequate and poorly maintained rural infrastructure, in particular, limited road 
access to domestic, regional and international markets and a lack of adequate 
post harvest handling, storage and processing facilities; 
 Less developed rural finance system, high real interest rates and the virtual 
withdrawal of commercial banks from agricultural credit following liberalization 
of the banking sector; 
 Weak rural institutions (farmers’ organisations and cooperatives) created by a 
low level of education and extensive illiteracy among farmers and; 
 Excessive reliance on rain fed crops in the presence of a low and erratic rainfall 
and other natural calamities such as soil degradation. 
b) Industry 
Growth in the industry sector fell sharply during the 1980-1983 period, regain in 1984-
1991 and performed roughly the same as the rest of economy. The removal of high 
levels of protection, combined with real devaluations, improved the Ghanaian industrial 
environment particularly in construction, which rose from 24.89 percent of GDP in 
1995 to 21 percent of GDP in 2006 (World Development Indicators, April 2007). 
However, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) has brought mixed results to the 
manufacturing sector. Reduce subsidies and exposure to competition has forced many 
businesses to rationalize and improve performance and capacity utilisation but others 
have gone under. Meanwhile, high interest rates, bank charges and lack of finance are 
prevented new and existing businesses from expanding. This could explain why 
manufacturing grew by a meagre 1.5 percent in 1994 and 1.8 percent in 1995. However, 
it did pick up to 3.3 percent the following year led by a recovery in beverage production 
(EIU, 1997, P 21-22). Again, Ghana has a broad and diverse industrial base covering 
aluminium smelting, sawmills, timber and agricultural processing plants, brewing, 
cement manufacture, oil refining, textiles, electrical, pharmaceutical, mining and many 
others. All this has been set up during N’Krumah reign in order to create self- sufficient 
Ghana with a diversified industrial base. Unfortunately, the planning and policies were 
not properly conceived as many industries closed doors while keeping unviable plants 
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afloat with subsidies and protective policies. In 1982, utilisation of industrial capacity 
had declined to 21 percent in medium and large factories. The real impact of reforms 
began with real outcome after the mid-1980s. Capacity utilisation rates recovered from 
35 percent in 1987 to 40 percent in 1988 and 44.5 percent in 1992. Meanwhile, 
manufacturing has remained stable at around 25 percent of GDP since 1985 (Table 
4.1.4.B).  
Different factors contributed to manufacturing growth including the overall investment 
climate are (IMF, April 2003, P 11): 
 The 1994 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act, which simplified the 
administration burden for the start-up of a foreign-owned company, protected 
firms from expropriation and provided corporate tax and duty incentives 
especially for non-traditional exports. 
 High proportion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) directed to food, aluminium 
and plastic products and non-traditional agribusiness export industries export 
industries as well as secondary effects from FDI, including improved technology, 
products and managerial skills. 
 Ghana’s general comparative advantages, which comprise a huge supply of low-
cost labour, fertile soils and climate and experience with garment manufacturing. 
Unfortunately, there have been missed opportunities for manufacturing and non-
traditional exports and also, investment has been solely made in Great Accra area 
leading to less development and growth in small and medium sized enterprises. 
c) Services sector 
Compared to the agriculture and manufacturing, growth was higher in the services 
sector during the 1990’s with 6.2 percent per annum with higher than average growth in 
wholesale and retail trade which is 6.8 percent, transport, storage and communications 
(5.8 percent) and finance and other business services (4.8 percent). It contributed 41 
percent of GDP in 2006 from 28.05 percent in 1995.The services sector grew rapidly 
due to its complementarity with exports and imports which in turn grew also more 
rapidly than GDP during that period. Ghana has a strategic location in West Africa that 
stimulates transit trade. The country liberalized the cocoa sector, which promoted a 
recovery in cocoa production for export; the positive effects of earlier public 
investments in road, rail and ports and the different adjustment programme which 
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emphasized banking and telecommunications. Developments in the services sector are 
consistent with trends in foreign direct investment and household surveys data. 
d) Telecommunications sector 
This sector was waiting for a new and strong investment and competition capacity in 
1995 was 98,000 lines. Many of which were in bad working order putting availability at 
around five telephones per thousand people. In 1996, the government privatised the 
state-owned telecommunications company, so 30 percent of Ghana telecom has been 
sold to a Malaysian-led consortium to install 225,000 new lines in 2002. Another 
competitor, the ACG Consortium, has been licensed to install a further 50,000 lines and 
will invest more than US$40 million during the next decades. Telephone users increased 
from 218,000 in 2000 to 3 millions at the end of 2005. 
4.2 Ghana Monetary Policy and its exchange rates 
During the period of the independence, Ghana had one of the highest per capita incomes 
in Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. It had also benefited from Great Britain’s 
huge external reserves, when they were leaving the country.  After its independence, the 
country was a typical open economy, strongly dependent on international trade. Its 
economy was rural and its GDP originated in agricultural and related activities. Capital 
and consumer goods were generally imported and exports concerned the cocoa trade, 
generating about three-fifths of total foreign exchange earnings. Again, Ghana, a 
member of the sterling area, had a fixed exchange rate pegged to the British pound. So, 
the country was subject to the general prescriptions of sterling requirements. Any 
payments to and from other countries of the area were relatively free while payments to 
third party countries were subject to the sterling restrictions. 
4.2.1 Monetary policy 
Since 1961-1965, the government started borrowing heavily from central and 
commercial banks, around C149 million but the money supply amounted to only 
C114million. This method of balancing the budget had a strong expansionary impact on 
the monetary situation. This was all the greater because for much of this period, the 
form of government borrowings from the banks, largely the sale of Treasury Bills, kept 
the commercial banks highly liquid and they were thus able to expand their lending to 
other borrowers while at the same time extending more credit to the government 
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(Killick, 1978, P 156). There was great need of government’s borrowing in the 1960’s 
from the banking system although their shares remained constant despite the continued 
growth in its debts. 
The Bank of Ghana, newly established, was focusing more on the smooth transition 
from the Currency Board system than pursuing an active monetary policy. At the same 
time, the monetary trends were potentially inflationary. Thus, in 1964, the Bank of 
Ghana slowed down the growth of bank credit to non-government borrowers by 
reducing bank liquidity and raising statutory reserve ratios but that policy was 
inefficient. In fact, lending to other borrowers than the government had been accelerated 
from 1963 to 1965 and those continued borrowings were added to the monetary 
expansion. That attempt of the bank of Ghana to control access to credit faced three 
factors: 
 The change of the method of financing the cocoa crop combined with serious 
financial problems of the Cocoa Marketing Board was the cause of new domestic 
credit. However, that Cocoa Marketing Board was set up to provide marketing 
services to farmers by purchasing at cheap rate and selling at high price on the 
international market, making large profit.   
 The government owned commercial bank did not observe the reserve ratios set by 
the Central Bank, which, in turn, was unable to insist that they be observed. That 
means that no control could be applied to any state's institutions. 
 The most non-government borrowings, which were undertaken by other public 
bodies, were politically very difficult to control, the same as the government itself, 
for example, the public sector borrowing was estimated to 86 percent of the total 
bank credit in 1965. (Killick, 1978, P 157) 
The Bank of Ghana continued to pursue its policies to curtail inflationary pressures, 
which beset the economy and stopped the depreciation of the local currency against the 
major foreign currencies. Also, the structure of reserve requirements of commercial 
banks was changed to control the level of liquidity in the system. The main objective of 
monetary policy was to reduce inflation and stem the downward slide in the value of the 
currency. Open market operations were intensified to reduce the level of excess 
liquidity in the economy. Also, the wholesale system of marketing Treasury bills/notes 
and Bank of Ghana bills/bonds were introduced, aimed at promoting an active 
secondary market, on one hand and improving the conduct of the open market 
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operations on the other hand. Furthermore, the structure of reserve requirements 
changed essentially to reduce the aggregate secondary ratio and raise the cash ratio (The 
Bank of Ghana, 1996, P13).The purpose was to reduce commercial banks capacity to 
create money and the same time, maintained its lead interest rate, the bank rate at 45 
percent in order to keep its commitment to a tight monetary policy stance. Few years 
ago, the government established and guaranteed the independence of the central bank 
and enhanced the bank’s operational efficiency and strengthened its supervisory role. 
However, the law limited the government borrowing from the central bank to no more 
than 10 percent of the current year’s government revenues and any advances and loans 
made have to be approved by the Board of the Bank of Ghana. Monetary policy is 
focused on reducing the inflation rate as well as the rate of depreciation of the Cedi. The 
Central Bank continued to tighten the monetary policy through open market operations. 
The low level of intermediation in Ghana is associated with a lack of confidence in the 
financial system, weak financial infrastructures and significant crowding out of private 
sector credit owing to high levels of government and parastatal borrowing from the 
banking system. The latter borrowings, in turn, have resulted in high nominal and real 
interest rates, a preference by commercial banks to hold lucrative, relatively risk-free 
treasury bills, rather than extend riskier credit to the private sector and a 
correspondingly small share of private sector investment as a percentage of GDP (IMF, 
2003, P 15).  
Two main keys to promoting financial intermediation are the preservation of a stable 
macroeconomic environment and a reduction in the stock of government domestic debt. 
This will increase public confidence in holding domestic assets, which, in turn, will 
decline inflationary expectations in the economy. 
4.2.2 Money supply and reserves 
Since 1960, every year has been marked by an overall deficit in Ghana's external 
Payments and current account. The country started at Independence with valuable 
external assets which ended with huge negative reserves. However, Ghana had short-
term obligations to the IMF and commercial banks, which exceeded the value of the 
central bank's foreign exchange assets. Thus, the country was obliged to contract very 
large foreign debts amounted to about C640 million in 1966 at the same time of the first 
coup putting Nkrumah outside office. This is added to the poorest performance of the 
104 
 
cocoa industry. So, Ghana which was the world's leading cocoa producer began to slip 
so that, in 1970-1971, it contributed only 26 percent of world output, compared to 37 
percent ten years earlier. Then, a large devaluation of the currency had occurred in 1971 
followed by another coup. Reserves slumped, unpaid import bills piled up and the IMF 
were sent for again (Killick, 1978, P 107). In 1996, money supply recorded a higher 
than expected growth of 34.2 percent. The main contributory factors were credit to the 
private sector and net credit to government by the banking system, creating huge 
domestic debts. Since then, there has been a slowdown in the growth of money supply 
considerably to 13 percent in 2005 while at the same time credit to the private sector has 
increased. 
4.2.3 The exchange rate policy 
In 1959, Ghana launched a state-led development strategy emphasizing import-
substitution industrialization included in the first post independence five-year 
development plan. Thus, that plan was focused on massive increases in government 
expenditure. The real private consumption demand also increased as a result of 
increased income. These factors coupled with falling cocoa prices and a liberal trade 
regime caused the current- account deficit to increase sharply. According to Jebuni, 
Oduro & Tutu (1994, P 1163), economic analysis shows that where a developing 
country undertakes expansionary development programs with a fixed exchange rate, it 
will be forced eventually to use its fiscal and trade policy instruments to compensate for 
the inappropriateness of the fixed exchange rate. Despite the expansionary development 
programme and the deterioration of terms of trade, the fixed exchange rate had been 
maintained. That situation had created severe balance of payments deficits and forced 
the introduction of trade and payment controls in order to protect the domestic import-
substituting industry and increase government revenue in the face of declining fiscal 
performance in case of tariffs. Again, despite the deteriorating balance of payments and 
fiscal deficit, the government launched the seven-year development plan in 1963-1964, 
involving massive public expenditures to increase the import- substitution 
industrialization effort. In the meantime, the government refused the IMF/ World Bank 
adjustment programme involving devaluation. This increased pressures on the system 
resulting in increasing abuse and corruption with the decrease in foreign exchange 
reserves and increase borrowing abroad. 
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Ghanaian policy-makers did not adjust the exchange rate until August 1978 but they 
tried to liberalize the trade regime in 1978-1980. It was recognized that the strict import 
control system contributed to the problems facing the manufacturing industry. It was 
very difficult to completely remove the controls because of the balance of payments 
implications. Moreover, some companies had a comparatively liberal regime while 
others did not, due to the fact that all the state owned firms were not liable to certain 
charges and well-protected vis-à-vis the competition with others. Since, the government 
was not capable in reducing the anti-export bias primarily due to its failure to devalue 
the nominal exchange rate; these attempts to liberalization had not been successful. In 
1982, the real exchange rate had appreciated considerably and there were differences 
between the official and parallel markets exchange rates. Import volumes, real 
government revenue and cocoa export volumes were at their lowest levels since 1960. 
The country was faced with foreign exchange crisis and negative growth rates.  
The decline in the growth of export values and the dependence on foreign exchange 
earnings from merchandise exports was caused by the low producer prices offered by 
the Ghana Cocoa Board and the capacity to import had declined at the same time. The 
performance of the domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors were constrained by 
the lack of imported raw materials and inputs. As a result, the currency has been 
devalued in 1986 including three nominal devaluations. Multiple exchange rates system 
based on a weekly auction system called Window II and a fixed exchange rate which 
was the prevailing official rate (Window I) was introduced in September 1986 to allow 
the exchange rate to be determined by domestic demand and supply factors, promoting 
trade liberalization and divert foreign exchange held outside the banks into the banking 
system. The import licensing system, which was in operation in 1983, had been 
maintained, until 1986 when the new exchange rates system was introduced. The tax 
schedules were adjusted downward in 1983 with the introduction of the bonuses and 
surcharges. The net effect was to increase the effective exchange rate for both imports 
and exports (Jebuni, Oduro, Tutu, 1994, P 1165). Again, the two window system was 
abolished while access to auction increased. 
Foreign exchange bureau (Forex) was set up to freely sell foreign exchange to importers 
and other users and to purchase foreign exchange from non-traditional exporters and 
recipients of remittances from abroad. Market forces through the demand and the supply 
of foreign exchange determined the bureau rate. At that point, two official exchange 
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rates took place, one concerning the liberalization of access to the Bank of Ghana 
foreign exchange auction and the other one the remaining holders of licenses eligible to 
bid for foreign exchange at the auction. The import licensing system was abolished due 
to the introduction of the foreign exchange auction and foreign exchange bureau. Thus, 
exchange rates and international trade taxes are the principal instruments used in the 
implementation of trade policy. Also, the wholesale auctions were abolished and the 
central bank’s management of the exchange rate market took place directly in the inter-
bank markets. 
Given those reforms, the currency continued to depreciate in terms of the major foreign 
currencies in both the inter-bank and the Forex market due to the slow disbursement of 
foreign loans and grants coupled with increased demand for foreign exchange. 
Nonetheless, the share of commercial banks’ foreign operations as well as the share of 
bank assets denominated in foreign currency increased but instable, reflecting the 
increased stability of the Cedi exchange rate. 
The reasons for the stability of the Cedi exchange rate were due to the increased 
confidence of Ghanaians in the prudent financial policies of the government. Indeed, the 
stabilisation was achieved on the fiscal side by strictly limiting the government’s 
borrowing requirements and on the monetary side by shifting its financing from bank to 
non-bank sources through coordinated open-market operations. Also, the reduced 
demand for foreign exchange to service debts as a result of Ghana’s HIPC declaration as 
well as lower government spending and money supply growth are contributory factors 
to the observed stability of the Cedi exchange rate. 
The foreign exchange market had improved remarkably as monetary discipline had been 
restored and macroeconomic performance strengthened. The Bank of Ghana has 
maintained a policy of non-intervention in the exchange market and has made no 
foreign exchange sales to the market other than those for oil imports allowing the 
exchange rate to be determined by market forces.  
It is more and more question of creating a monetary union in West Africa including 





4.3 West African regional integration 
In the last five decades, sub-Saharan African countries had experimented with different 
exchange rate and monetary policy regimes such as currency Boards, fixed exchange 
rates, dual exchange rates and managed-floating regimes. Unfortunately, the results to 
the diverse policies were bad and did not improve the continent living conditions. The 
poor economic performance coupled with the successful launching of the Euro in 1999 
gave some sort of confidence to establish monetary unions in African regional 
economic communities. It also led to calls for a re-examination of the different 
exchange rates regimes on the continent in order to analyse the impact of a monetary 
union on the economic development of a nation. 
However, in April 2000, heads of states of six West African countries (Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone agreed to set up a currency union, the second 
union in he region by 2003 called West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). It expected 
that the new currency would merge with the existing CFA franc in 2004, resulting in a 
single currency in the ECOWAS unfortunately; the project for that union has been 
postponed due to convergence criteria and real commitment from heads of states. There 
were also plans for Eastern and Southern African countries to establish a monetary 
union with a common currency.  
Despite their determination to create a monetary union, less theoretical or empirical 
work had been done to ascertain whether or not a common currency would be feasible 
and/or the optimal exchange rate regime would be a success. At this end, an Ad-hoc 
Expert Group had been set up to analyse the desire or the feasibility of monetary unions 
in African Regional Economic Communities. According to Osakwe and Dupasquier 
(March 2003), there are two alternative exchange rate regimes that are really feasible in 
developing countries: a monetary union and a flexible exchange rate regime and they 
concluded that a monetary union would be beneficial to the ECOWAS region given the 
transaction costs which have to be more than 1 percent of GDP. 
To reach that aim to have a common currency, member states should commit 
themselves strongly by imposing fiscal discipline. That is the case for Nigeria, which is 
the dominant player in the region, has a high fiscal distortion that would put pressure on 
the common central bank to produce excessive inflation and also a history of huge 
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government spending. Nonetheless, the Nigerian bad reputation might change if the 
country joins a monetary union, it had been argued. 
Concerning the effect of a monetary union on fiscal discipline, there are diverse 
arguments supporting the idea that a monetary union may worsen the tendency towards 
excessive fiscal deficits. However, the country with high fiscal deficits and debts would 
be unwilling to tighten their fiscal policy because it will be bailed out by the common 
central bank if it defaults in its debts. Also, in a monetary union, countries could run 
expansionary deficits for a long time before the consequences begin to show up in 
macroeconomic variable of interest to the public and corrective action is taken. 
In contrast, a monetary union could enhance fiscal discipline if the common central 
bank is independent, and thus reducing the strategic influence any government may 
have on the monetary authorities. Moreover, if a monetary union requires members to 
satisfy well specific convergence criteria, it might provide an "agency of restraint" over 
macroeconomic policies of member countries thus enhancing fiscal discipline (Masson 















5.0 TRADE PATTERN: COTE D’IVOIRE versus GHANA 
This section assesses the theoretical aspects of the trade link, on one hand between Cote 
d’Ivoire and the Rest of the World and on the other hand Ghana and the Rest of the 
World including the European Union. A comparison is drawn between these countries 
to appraise the impact of the exchange rate regime on Ivorian and Ghanaian businesses 
and their overall economy in the following chapters.  
5.1 Definitions 
Economists believe that movements toward free trade provide positive benefits. 
However, free trade involves great interdependence among nations and is currently 
linked to globalisation. It has been said that poor countries would gain more from free 
trade or freely functioning global market. That is due to the fact that development 
requires economic growth to alleviate poverty and greater access to world markets is a 
necessary condition for more rapid growth (EUI, 2000, P 19). 
The issue of market access for African countries attracted much attention during the 
1986 -1994 Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations. However, all African countries 
have entered into contractual preference arrangements with the European Union. 
Because of colonial ties, the EU accounts for more than two-thirds of total African trade. 
African countries also enjoy preferential treatment for certain export products to open 
major markets such as the US and Japan under the General System of Preference. In 
recent history, countries which adopted open-economy, export-oriented growth and 
development strategies, have done well (Example of the East Asian Miracle). 
Unfortunately, African countries carried on protecting their economies and have done 
poorly with the models of trade intervention and protection dictated by their historical 
ties (Amponsah, 2002, P 2-3).  
Recent lessons which have been learnt about economic growth are that policy regimes 
make a difference as to whether a developing country converges to high-income levels. 
According to Nash (1993), quantitative restrictions have declined and have been 
replaced with lower tariff levels but little progress has been made by individual 
countries in establishing efficient systems and institutions that would provide exporters 
with access to inputs at internationally competitive prices. 
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Africa, in general, is experiencing declining shares in almost all sub-sectors of 
worldwide trade and is still concentrating on primary commodities whose share of the 
world trade has been declining as shown in the different tables below. 
African countries should change its current economic development course if they want 
to get the full benefit of globalisation such as increasing its available resources for 
productive investment, enhancing efficiency of their uses and facilitating transfer of 
appropriate technology to enhance its production processes, and thereby reduce poverty. 
Furthermore, strong regional integration has been advised or risk of being more 
marginalised by the forces of globalisation. They suggest that African regional 
integration would facilitate wider integration into the global economy so to gain easier 
access to greater trade flows, finance, technology, enhancing economic growth and 
human welfare. 
Moreover, Ajayi (2001) suggested that integration must be achieved through trade, 
capital flows, human migration and advances in telecommunications and transportation. 
However, Africa has faced huge debt problems and unfulfilled promises of official 
assistance from rich countries, lack of political will, weak institutional mechanisms, 
proliferation of sub-regional agreements with multiple membership therefore poor 
implementation, weak bargaining power on the diplomatic front and poor leverage in 
pursuing peace and security (Amponsah, 2002, P 5-6). 
Therefore, if a country is opened up to international trade and sets up the necessary 
capacity to negotiate effectively and efficiently within the WTO’s rules then trade and 
economic growth are likely to increase. This in turn will reduce poverty and improve 
the living condition of the population (Dollar and Kraay, 2001).  
Also, the openness should bring new ideas and knowledge, investment products and 
intermediate inputs from industrial countries which may increase growth significantly. 
African countries are advised to encourage private investment, improve their institutions 
(for example managing conflicts) in order to maintain macroeconomic stability and 
adapt to external changes. Before analysing the Ivorian and Ghanaian trades in details, 
let us briefly review the different trade cooperations between African, Pacific and 
Caribbean countries and their mainly partners, the European Union. 
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5.1.1 European Community/ ACP conventions 
By 1957, the European Community had already established some dispositions allowing 
co-operation between the European countries and African, Caribbean and Pacific States. 
However, the Lome Convention between the fifteen member states of the EU and the 
seventy ACP countries represents the main framework within which cooperation took 
place. Of the seventy ACP countries, 47 are from Africa plus Namibia joining at its 
independence in April 1990 and Eritrea after its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, 15 
are from the Caribbean and 8 from the Pacific. Some countries and territories (OCTs) 
particularly those of the UK and France remain part of the system.  
At the time when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, all the ACP states were still 
colonies, providing an element of aid to these colonies in the form of an implementing 
convention added to the Treaty. Again, it was a sort of unilateral association between 
the EC and its member states and OCTs through which trade and aid links have been 
maintained. 
In 1963, the Yaounde (Cameroon) Convention was signed between the EC6 and 
eighteen new independent countries including Madagascar providing provisions for 
preferential trade arrangements and financial and technical assistance. The second 
Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1969 reinforcing the grants given for economic and 
social infrastructures projects. In 1973, the UK joined the European Community 
dragging in all the Commonwealth countries to the convention. 
In February 1975, the first Lome (Togo) Convention was signed and in June 1975, 
forty-six ACP countries institutionalized themselves as a group with a permanent 
structure. 
According to Frederick Nixson in the ‘Economics of European Union’ (1997, 409), 
Lome I has been described as a ‘partnership of equals’ and a number of joint institutions 
were created to administer the Convention. It introduced Stabex, a system designed to 
stabilize commodity earnings and at a time of stalemate in the global negotiations aimed 
at the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It appeared to offer an 
opportunity for a group of industrialized and developing countries to break out of the 
impasse to establish a regional arrangement that would incorporate a number of items 
on the NIEO agenda. Unfortunately, Lome 1 showed its limit with the first oil price 
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shock of 1973-74 followed by a brief boom in some primary commodity prices and the 
second in 1979-80, which hit the majority of African economies. In 1980, Lome II was 
signed with a large European Development Fund (EDF) and a Sysmin facility in the 
mining sectors. In 1985, Lome III was signed covering a strong commitment to self-
reliant development on the basis of food security and self-sufficiency, enhanced by a 
broad-ranging policy dialogue between EC members and the ACP states. Stabex 
conditionality was tightened up, and with the involvement in macroeconomic policy-
making through the provision of resources incorporating diverse programmes of 
structural adjustment.  
Steven (1990, p84) argued that the first three Lome failed to transform radically the 
ACP economies due to: 
a/ poorly used, financing projects either poorly designed and/or whose possibilities of 
success have been weakened by a hostile policy environment 
b/ aid have been badly administered by donors with slow rates of disbursement, 
duplicated appraisal procedures, over-centralisation and recipient imposition. 
In December 1989, Lome IV had been signed which was the first time covering a period 
of ten years although the financial protocol covered the first five years only with 
mandatory renewal provided for at the end of that time. Lome IV focused on the 
environment protection, agricultural cooperation and food security, industrial 
cooperation and services promotion that support economic development, cultural and 
social cooperation and finally special aid to countries with low incomes and large debts. 
However, the co-operation is typically commercial and the Community tried to 
compensate for the losses in export income, giving grants to countries facing natural 
calamities and adverse economic circumstances. 
In the field of trade cooperation, the objective of the convention is to promote trade 
between the contracting parties, taking account of their respective levels of development 
and in particular of the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of ACP states in 
order to accelerate the rate of growth of their trade and improve the conditions of access 
of their products to the market of the European Economic Community. 
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Products from the ACP states should be imported into the Community free of customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect other than those, which the member states 
apply among themselves.  
The EU is the dominant trading bloc for Africa and one of the principal sources of 
bilateral and multilateral aid. 
However, Africa’s exports to this zone in 97 were worth $48bn while the imports 
totaled $52bn. 
The Euro will encourage more efficient use of cash for example African companies and 
investors will benefit from only having to take one currency-risk rather than 15 and 27. 
And more, it may challenge the dollar’s hegemony as a leading reserve and trading unit 
and will become an international currency of reference for much of Africa. 
The generally disappointing growth in Africa over the last 20 years reflects the 
difficulties posed by institutional and economic factors including the lack of resource 
endowments, the low level of human capital, the administrative, legal, and institutional 
framework, the stance of financial policies and structural policies that have often been 
distortionary. Those factors added the declines in terms of trade have contributed to 
push down the economic growth of Africa. Those declines are due to the fact that the 
Community is the partner of the developing countries rather than the European Union.  
The globalisation of the world economy and the elimination of the Cold War have 
fundamentally changed the geopolitical context of the Europe’s relations with 
developing countries, (Cosgrove, 1999, P3). 
However, the original Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC) recognized the African colonial legacies of the member states. At the earlier 
stage, the relations with Africa are at the core of EU policies towards developing 
countries, while regionally based networks of relations complement the core in the 
Mediterranean, Asia and Latin America. 
In June 2000, a new ACP - EU partnership Agreement was signed in Cotonou, 
introducing some major innovations and assessing the role and impact of the ACP side 
in the different negotiations and some implementation challenges. That new partnership 
is very much different from the Lome Conventions and provides a comprehensive and 
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integrated approach and strengthened partnership that will be more effective in 
addressing the major challenges confronting the ACP. 
The convention is aimed to tackle poverty within the ACP countries by establishing 
effective ACP-EU political dialogue, development support and trade and broader 
economic cooperation. It is particularly focusing on reversing the trends towards 
economic, technological and social marginalisation of the ACP states by specifically 
stimulating regional integration among those countries and their better involvement in 
globalisation trends. It is also about to enhance ACP-EU adherence to the accepted 
international principles of respect for human rights, the rule of law, good governance 
and democratic processes and practices specially corruption and transparency. Its 
uniqueness is also in the ways in which the partnership aims to encourage greater 
participation by civil society, the private sector and trade unions. 
The Cotonou Convention has been signed for 20 years and is to be revised every five 
years. It covers five main points: 
1/ It will be a priority objective in the future to integrate the ACP countries into the 
world economy by liberalising trade, as required by the World Trade Organisation. The 
convention abolished the price stabilisation mechanisms that safeguarded the export 
revenues of the these countries from agricultural products (Stabex) and mineral products 
(Sysmin) 
2/ Aid is no longer automatic. It depends on the achievement of targets (institutional 
reforms, use of resources, the reduction of poverty, long-term development measures). 
Each country has a budget covering aid planned on the basis of a national cooperation 
strategy (NCS). 
3/ The fight against poverty, encompassing regional integration, development of the 
private sector, structural and sectoral reforms, social (youth, equal opportunities), 
cultural and environmental policies. 
4/ The population concerned must be informed and consulted to increase participation 
by the economic, social and local community actors in the implementation of projects. 
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5/ Provision is made for a political dialogue on all matters of mutual concern, nationally 
and regionally as well as at ACP level. Procedures, notably the suspension of aid, are 
put in place in case of human rights violations and/or corruption. 
The ACP group is not homogenous concerning its relation with the Eurozone. However, 
the USA is linked economically and financially to most Caribbean countries while 
Japan and Australia are major partners for much of the South Pacific. The EU is the 
main grant-aid donor for most countries through the Lome Convention. 
At the international level, the Euro is playing an important role in countries with tight 
economic, trade and financial links with the EU such as certain Mediterranean and 
African countries. The Euro is already the reference currency for the CFA franc zone. 
Its effects differ according to the share of economic and financial transactions each ACP 
state has respectively with the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada and the Eurozone. 
According to Dr Granell (1999, P 6), the consequence of introducing the euro for 
countries that have trade, tourism and financial links with Europe are both direct and 
indirect. The direct effects relate to trade creation, trade diversion and the impact of 
establishing a single financial market in Euros for the foreign debt of non-EU countries. 
The indirect effects relate to the global or 'systemic' effects of the euro as a new 
international currency. It is worth pointing out here that ACP states receive significant 
amounts of aid from the EU and the denomination of this aid has been switched already 
from ECUs to Euros. 
The ACP countries maintaining a close US Dollar link will be affected to the extent that 
the Euro would be more or less volatile against the other G3 currencies. The most 
important question is whether the Euro will increase or reduce exchange rate volatility 
between the main international currencies. Therefore the developing countries must 
watch the different fluctuations between international currencies.    
5.1.2 Ivorian Trade 
Being a coastal country, Cote d'Ivoire's markets have always been diverse, more than its 
land-locked neighbours. But, the country is a narrow export base consisting of primary 
products such as cocoa, coffee, timber and recently petroleum products. Chelariu et al. 
(2002, P 458) argued that the country has a long history of positive net trade accounts 
with the world, primarily with the European Union and the US markets, a feat that is 
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rare in Africa. With increasing global competition, Cote d’Ivoire is likely to lose market 
share in global markets in which it has traditionally held comparative and competitive 
advantage.  
The country is extremely vulnerable to changes in commodities prices whilst it runs a 
positive trade balance since 1960's. Cote d'Ivoire did have a negative balance in the 
1980's due to the large fall in commodity price led to a recession. According to the IMF, 
the deterioration in Cote d'Ivoire's external competitiveness in the 1980's reduced its 
opportunities for developing non-traditional sectors and diversifying exports. Since 
1995, the government has implemented a series of trade reforms to open up the 
economy. Non-tariff barriers on goods and services began to fall with the elimination of 
import restrictions on wheat, rice, sugar, flour, second-hand clothes, tyres and spare 
parts. Only refined petroleum products and cotton fabrics faced import restrictions. 
Items such as bread, prescription drugs, schoolbooks, butane gas and indicative 
producer prices for major export crops remain under price control. Other reforms have 
been introduced with the partial liberalisation of the coffee and cocoa sectors. 
The economy of country, which relies hugely on its agricultural exports is characterised 
by a positive trade balance but this has declined since 2002 due to its politico-military 
crisis. However, Ivorian exports are reasonably diversified although mostly agricultural 
products, especially to France, the Netherlands and the United States. In return, the 
country depends on France for as much as one third of its imports. It benefits 
particularly from the Lomé Agreements which made Cote d’Ivoire one of the associates 
of the European Economic Community (Common Market) but its strong dependence on 
the former ‘mother country’ has contributed to its balance of payment problems. The 
stability brought by a currency attached to the French Franc and now Euro sometimes 
diverted exports to less privileged neighbours. The government put in place a vast 
programme of diversification to export non-traditional goods. Therefore, oil exports 
rose, accounting for 15 percent of total exports, in 2005. The trade with EU-25 
accounted for 42 percent of imports to Cote d’Ivoire while ECOWAS accounted for 25 
percent of aggregate trade the same year (OECD, 2006, P 9). The trade within Africa is 
about 35 percent of exports and 29 percent of imports, its largest African import 
suppliers being Nigeria, Cameroon and Senegal. In an attempt to promote the free 
circulation of goods, services, manpower and capital within the Community, tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade within ECOWAS, some reforms have been put into place.  
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Moreover, Cote d'Ivoire benefited from the Lome convention, giving preferential trade 
agreements with the European Union; it is now part of the Cotonou agreement which 
replaced the Lome convention in June 2000, thus still enjoying referential trade. It 
captures 0.19 percent of all ACP-EU trade (Eurostat, 2000). 
In sum, the surplus in the Ivorian trade balance should increase if the country achieves 
its former stability, attracting international investment by improving the business 
environment. 
In 2002, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), Cote d’Ivoire was not among the African nations most affected by the 
overall reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI). Ranking 78
th
 in the list of countries 
receiving the most FDI in the world, the country is in the 4
th
 place among Sub-Saharan 
African countries behind South Africa, Angola and Nigeria (OECD, 2006, P11). 
The country’s economy shows signs of high vitality and offers many diversification 
opportunities. It is keen to diversify its trading partners while continuing to rely on its 
historical partner, which is France. Let us analyze the volume of trade between the two 
countries in order to have a clear understanding of their link. 
Graph 5.1.1: Ivorian trade with France 






























































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1960, 1970, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2007 
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During the period 1960 and before the Euro was introduced in 2002, trading with 
France means holding export earnings in French Franc (FF) and paying for imports with 
FF with no exchange rate. According to Mbet & Niamkey (1994, P 1159), trading 
outside the zone implies higher exchange costs and since exchange-risk costs outweigh 
interest payment, this has led to net losses. As a result, we believe, Cote d’Ivoire was 
tied to trade with France despite the very low export decrease in 1990 (209 million US 
Dollars), Table 4.1.1. Since then, trade continues to grow and reach a peak in 2004 
(export: 1550million US $; import: 1540 million US $). Even today, the trade link 
between both countries is much stronger as French constitute the centrepart like 
guarantor between Cote d’Ivoire and other EU member states. 
5.1.3 Ghanaian Trade  
Since the 1990’s, Ghana has introduced extensive reforms by liberalising trade and 
investment and moving away from agricultural exports. Merchandise exports and 
imports as a share of GDP have expanded substantially from 18 percent and 29 percent 
in 1993 to 28 percent and 39 percent of GDP respectively in 1998. Trade is relatively 
concentrated both in commodities and markets. Primary products, overwhelmingly 
cocoa and gold, account for most exports. Non-traditional exports including processed 
food, timber and aluminium products account for 20 percent of exports, up from 3 
percent in 1986. Recently, export diversification has slowed down. Most manufactured 
products including machinery and other inputs are imported to Ghana. Ghana’s main 
trading partner remains the EU, accounting for almost half of total exports, essentially 
due to trade preference, and imports. Within the EU, Italy has overtaken the UK and 
Germany as the main export market. Italy, UK and France are the main European 
sources of imports (WTO, 2001, P 2). The West African region has a potential market 
of over 200 million people and the Ghana export to this market including CFA zone and 
Nigeria is growing faster than average and represents over 20 percent of non-traditional 
exports in 1999. Despite these exports including a significant amount of transhipments, 
there are a large number of domestically produced goods, which are exported by road to 
neighbour markets. Export development has been led by private firms producing low-
value manufactures (for example plastic and aluminium products) and more recently by 
foreign investors who see the country as good location to reach regional markets 
concerning cosmetics and pharmaceuticals because of its political stability and safety. 
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Unfortunately, Ghana does not have the ability to take full advantage of these regional 
export opportunities due to the following: 
1/ lack of implementation of the ECOWAS trade agreements, which result in 
discriminatory treatment of Ghana exports; 
2/ transport logistics including numerous checkpoints within neighbouring countries; 
3/ inefficient import regime particularly regarding duty drawbacks. 
Ghana’s economy remains vulnerable to external commodity price fluctuations and also 
to weather conditions. Other internal and external economic imbalances, such as large 
budget deficit, thus placed extra pressures on the economy which may weaken the 
government’s actions on trade liberalization. 
The most important factor contributing to growth has been the shift away since 1983 
from an administrative system of economic management to relying more on market 
forces. Policy reforms have helped to reduce fiscal deficits and inflation, to improve 
infrastructure services and shift relative prices and incentives towards tradables, 
particularly exports. 
5.2 Data issues 
In order to eradicate tariff and non-tariff barriers to their exports, Africa nations need to 
back up their negotiations with strong data. Unfortunately, data is sometimes not 
available or fully complete, thereby reducing their chances to succeed at international 
and multilateral levels. However, the Ivorian figures are available and constantly 
updated, lifting the country’s statistics office to high standard while Ghana has a poor 
record of collecting data. The IMF staff argued that the Ghanaian national accounts are 
in need of revision as the existing sector surveys that form the basis for the estimations 
are outdated. The series have not been revised backwards before 1993 resulting in a 
discontinuity between the 1975 based series and the current one estimated by IMF staff 
for earlier years (IMF, May 2003, P 8).  
Due the fact that the European Union is main trading partner to the two studied 
countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, the section below covers, in general, their exports 




5.3 Analysis of trade: Cote d’Ivoire versus Ghana  


























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005 




























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006 World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005 
Trade exports, generally, play a vital role in the development of African countries, 
especially in Cote d’Ivoire. During the period 1973-2005, exports represented on 
average 39.9 percent of Ivorian GDP and imports of goods and services 35.9 percent 
(Graph 1a). While Ghana’s exports represented only 20 percent of its GDP and its 
imports of goods and services 27.2 percent for the same period (Graph 1b). 
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Both countries were highly dependent on imports of goods and services but the balance 
between Ivorian exports and imports was significantly positive compared to Ghana’s.  
Since 1999, Ivorian exports have grown; rising from 41.8 to 50.4 percent of GDP in 
1999 – 2005 and have had strong impact on its overall economic growth. Imports grew 
from 33.6 to 40.3 percent of GDP (Table 1a and 1b in Appendix).  
Meanwhile, there has been an increase of both exports and imports as percent of GDP. 
A great Ivorian trade recovery started after the 1994 currency devaluation and has 
strengthened since then. The growth has been positive due to the diversification in 
tradable exports therefore overall sectors reforms. Cote d’Ivoire’s export of goods and 
services as percent of GDP was 44.4 and its import 34.2 in 1994.  
The increase of Ivorian export reached 50.4 percent and import 40.3 percent in 2005. 
Therefore, the country is more dependent on international trade coinciding with the 
introduction of the Euro and the growing number of the European Union states from 12 
in the 1990’s to 27 members in 2007. 
Despite the political crisis which started in September 2002, the Ivorian government is 
battling to put its economy back on track. However, for the past five years, the country 
has been divided in two due to a military coup. Rebels are still using the north of the 
country as their stronghold. This crisis has deeply affected the economy and social 
cohesion. According to the OECD (2006, P 231), the causes of this political turmoil lie 
in poorly controlled immigration, absence of real policy of land management and the 
country’s institutional and democratic governance systems. 
For the same period (1999 – 2005), Ghana’s exports of goods and services were 36.8 
percent of GDP on average while its imports amounted to 52.6 percent. Ghana is more 
dependent on the imports of goods and services which have increased sharply, resulting 







Graph 2a: COTE D’IVOIRE: Exports and Imports of goods and services (Billions of 
























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006 
Graph 2b: GHANA: Exports and Imports of goods and services (Billions of US Dollars) 























































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006 
Although both countries have strategic locations in West Africa, and have embarked on 
trade liberalization as well as fiscal and monetary reforms, Cote d’Ivoire has done more 
to increase the openness of its economy and stimulated export growth and the services 
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sector. Cote d’Ivoire is more exporting than Ghana resulting, in the study period, in a 
positive trade balance. 
For both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, the export and import of goods and services started 
to increase after 1992. Ivorian exports were 3 billion US Dollar and 7.3 billion 
respectively in 1992 and 2005 while imports were 2.4 billion and 5.9 billion US Dollar 
for the same period (Graph 2a). Ghana’s export reached 1.2 billion US Dollar in 1992 
and 2.3 billion in 2005 while its import was 1.6 billion and 5.8 billion respectively for 
the same period (Graph 2b).  
In 1992-98, average Ivorian export growth was 5.5 percent and its import, 3.2 percent 
while for the period 1999-2005, the export growth reached 6.5 percent and import 7.1 
percent. 
Between 1992 and 2005, Ghanaian export growth averaged 11.7 percent and the import 
growth, -11.1 percent. For the period 1999-2005, its export growth was 3.5 percent and 





















to the World 
YEAR Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1970 0.308 0.277 0.468 0.388 
1971 0.297 0.278 0.455 0.399 
1972 0.346 0.307 0.545 0.454 
1973 0.594 0.476 0.912 0.71 
1974 0.803 0.563 1.213 0.966 
1975 0.648 0.664 1.187 1.126 
1976 1.007 0.77 1.642 1.303 
1977 1.292 1.043 2.154 1.748 
1978 1.376 1.406 2.324 2.315 
1979 1.594 1.375 2.514 2.486 
1980 1.953 1.706 3.142 2.99 
1981 1.387 1.157 2.536 2.404 
1982 1.18 1.033 2.274 2.186 
1983 1.076 0.945 2.091 1.848 
1984 1.379 0.801 2.752 1.647 
1985 1.782 0.927 2.934 1.72 
1986 2.038 1.107 3.354 2.055 
1987 1.656 1.225 2.898 2.271 
1988 1.582 1.251 2.78 2.101 
1989 1.747 1.287 2.807 2.111 
1990 1.5 1.023 2.813 2.098 
1991 1.523 1.029 2.777 2.103 
1992 1.73 1.355 3.001 2.446 
1993 1.665 1.085 3.109 2.231 
1994 1.99 0.928 3.646 2.091 
1995 2.311 1.708 3.728 3.038 
1996 3.135 1.5 4.996 2.909 
1997 2.209 1.401 4.15 2.756 
1998 2.318 1.616 4.395 2.86 
1999 2.32 1.484 4.486 2.85 
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2000 1.657 1.051 4.22 2.99 
2001 1.745 1.13 4.1 2.48 
2002 2.526 1.144 4.83 2.42 
2003 3.109 1.956 5.65 2.67 
2004 2.688 1.584 6.09 2.93 
2005 3.048 2.427 7.251 5.873 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 
and Quarterly September 2006. 
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Import to the World
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 





Table 3b: GHANA Trade with the European Union and the World (Billions of US 
Dollars) 
GHANA 
Trade to  
European Union 
Total Trade  
to the World 
YEAR Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1970 0.226 0.191 0.458 0.41 
1971 0.172 0.208 0.337 0.418 
1972 0.191 0.122 0.429 0.299 
1973 0.229 0.199 0.573 0.426 
1974 0.327 0.319 0.729 0.818 
1975 0.308 0.301 0.807 0.79 
1976 0.332 0.336 0.828 0.838 
1977 0.427 0.464 0.935 1.262 
1978 0.429 0.418 1.234 1.376 
1979 0.432 0.387 1.201 1.299 
1980 0.491 0.465 1.206 1.129 
1981 0.258 0.435 0.973 1.174 
1982 0.302 0.265 1.057 0.775 
1983 0.19 0.271 0.712 0.787 
1984 0.179 0.25 0.595 0.68 
1985 0.233 0.401 0.455 0.793 
1986 0.443 0.396 0.862 0.782 
1987 0.501 0.5 0.976 0.988 
1988 0.525 0.51 1.046 1.193 
1989 0.621 0.672 1.071 1.308 
1990 0.78 0.703 1.258 0.966 
1991 0.524 0.305 0.617 1.273 
1992 0.371 0.904 1.237 1.614 
1993 0.496 0.824 1.24 0.511 
1994 0.799 0.882 1.595 2.139 
1995 0.856 1.105 1.629 2.053 
1996 0.898 1.402 1.723 2.073 
1997 0.851 1.402 1.778 2.533 
1998 1.095 1.503 1.756 3.421 
1999 0.979 1.323 1.754 3.251 
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2000 0.805 1.282 1.485 2.868 
2001 0.777 0.949 1.479 2.684 
2002 0.895 1.084 1.65 3.009 
2003 1.037 1.245 1.984 3.875 
2004 1.11 1.637 2.26 5.265 
2005 1.084 1.697 2.349 5.824 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 
and Quarterly September 2006. 











































































































Export to the World
Import to the World
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 







Table 4a: Cote d’Ivoire: Growth of Trade to European Union and the World (%) 
 RCI 
     Trade to  
European Union 
Total Trade  










1971 -3.7 0.36 -2.86 2.76 
1972 14.16 9.45 16.51 12.11 
1973 41.75 35.5 40.24 36.06 
1974 26.03 15.45 24.81 26.5 
1975 -23.92 15.21 -2.19 14.21 
1976 35.65 13.77 27.71 13.58 
1977 22.06 26.17 23.77 25.46 
1978 6.1 25.82 7.31 24.49 
1979 13.68 -2.25 7.56 6.88 
1980 18.38 19.4 19.99 16.86 
1981 -40.81 -47.45 -23.9 -24.38 
1982 -17.54 -12 -11.52 -9.97 
1983 -9.67 -9.31 -8.75 -18.29 
1984 21.97 -17.98 24.02 -12.2 
1985 22.62 13.59 6.2 4.24 
1986 12.56 16.26 12.52 16.3 
1987 -23.07 9.63 -15.73 9.51 
1988 -4.68 2.08 -4.24 -8.09 
1989 9.44 2.8 0.96 0.47 
1990 -16.47 -25.81 0.21 -0.62 
1991 1.51 0.58 -1.3 0.24 
1992 11.97 24.06 7.46 14.02 
1993 -3.9 -24.88 3.47 -9.64 
1994 16.33 -16.92 14.73 -6.7 
1995 13.89 45.67 2.2 31.17 
1996 26.28 -13.87 25.38 -4.43 
1997 -41.92 -7.07 -20.39 -5.55 
1998 4.7 13.3 5.57 3.64 
1999 0.09 -8.89 2.03 -0.35 
2000 -40.01 -41.2 -6.3 4.68 
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2001 5.04 6.99 -2.93 -20.56 
2002 30.92 1.22 15.11 -2.48 
2003 18.75 41.51 14.51 9.36 
2004 -15.66 -23.48 7.22 8.87 
2005 11.81 34.73 16.01 50.11 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 
and Quarterly September 2006. 
Table 4b: Ghana: Growth of Trade to European Union and the World (%) 
Ghana  
     Trade to  
European Union 
Total Trade  










1970         
1971 -31.4 8.17 -35.91 1.91 
1972 9.95 -70.49 21.45 -39.8 
1973 16.59 38.69 25.13 29.81 
1974 29.97 37.62 21.4 47.92 
1975 -6.17 -5.98 9.67 -3.54 
1976 7.23 10.42 2.54 5.73 
1977 22.25 27.59 11.44 33.6 
1978 0.47 -11 24.23 8.28 
1979 0.69 -8.01 -2.75 -5.93 
1980 12.02 16.77 0.41 -15.06 
1981 -90.31 -6.9 -23.95 3.83 
1982 14.57 -64.15 7.95 -51.48 
1983 -58.95 2.21 -48.46 1.52 
1984 -6.15 -8.4 -19.66 -15.74 
1985 23.18 37.66 -30.77 14.25 
1986 47.4 -1.26 47.22 -1.41 
1987 11.58 20.8 11.68 20.85 
1988 4.57 1.96 6.69 17.18 
1989 15.46 24.11 2.33 8.79 
1990 20.38 4.41 14.86 -35.4 
1991 -48.85 -130.49 -103.89 24.12 
1992 -41.24 66.26 50.12 21.13 
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1993 25.2 -9.71 0.24 -215.85 
1994 37.92 6.58 22.26 76.11 
1995 6.66 20.18 2.09 -4.19 
1996 4.68 21.18 5.46 0.96 
1997 -5.52 0 3.09 18.16 
1998 22.28 6.72 -1.25 25.96 
1999 -11.85 -13.61 -0.11 -5.23 
2000 -21.61 -3.2 -18.11 -13.35 
2001 -3.6 -35.09 -0.41 -6.86 
2002 13.18 12.45 10.36 10.8 
2003 13.69 12.93 16.83 22.35 
2004 6.58 23.95 12.21 26.4 
2005 -2.4 3.54 3.79 9.6 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1969-73, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 
and Quarterly September 2006. 
Both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana trade heavily with the European Union. Ivorian trade 
exports to EU accounted an average for 1.6 billions US Dollar and its imports, 1.2 
billion US Dollar over the period 1970 - 2005 while Ghana exports to the EU accounted 
an average for 0.6 billions and its imports, 0.7 billion US Dollar for the same period 
(Table & Graph 3a & 3b). For the same period, on average, the Ivorian export growth 
with the EU reached 4 percent and its import growth, 3.4 percent while the Ghanaian 
export growth was 1.1 percent and its import growth, 1 percent (Table & Graph 4a & 
4b). Cote d’Ivoire’s trade is nearly double that of Ghana, showing the strong link 
between these West Africa Monetary Union states including Cote d’Ivoire and its EU 
partners. Ivorian exports to the EU have continued to increase, accounting for 2.3 
billion US Dollar in 1999 and reaching 3.048 billion US Dollar in 2005 with slight 
decreases in 2000 and 2001, due to the country’s political situation (Table 3a). Cote 
d’Ivoire has a strong import policy which consisted of monitoring imports, leading to 
positive trade balance thorough the study period. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2006), membership of the Franc Zone helped to contain inflationary 
pressures, owing to the government’s firmness on public sector wages and the strength 
of the Euro and thus the CFA Franc against the Dollar. Moreover, in recent years, the 
country's export structure has changed with the share of cocoa exports falling as a result 
of increased petroleum production and crude oil exports. Oil exports are estimated to 
have exceeded cocoa exports in 2005. This reflects both increased oil exports and high 
international oil prices, creating large trade surplus (EIU, 2006, P 44). The assertion has 
been confirmed by OECD (2003, P 116) that the European Union is still the strongest 
partner of Cote d’Ivoire taking 45.1 percent and 46.3 percent of exports respectively in 
2000 and 2001. However, there were considerable changes in its exports destinations 
within the EU. For example, France is buying fewer Ivorian exports with 13.9 percent in 
2001 compared with 15.2 percent in 2000 and the Netherlands more (14.1 percent 
compared with 9.8 percent in 2000). This is due to the fact that the country is much 
more open to competition, with a strong policy and commitment to diversify the 
country’s trade partners. With the introduction of the Euro, other non-French but EU 
firms such as Cargill, ADM and Callebault are dominating the cocoa processing export 
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being better at handling cocoa bulk than French firms and also improving efficiency and 
cutting transport costs. The close trade involvement with the European Union has 
helped Ivorian overall growth. Conversely, Ghana imports are still high resulting in a 
negative trade balance. The decline of Ghana’s exports is due largely to under-
performance of both cocoa and gold, the major export earners of the country during the 
study period from 1970 to 2005 (Table 3b). According the World Trade Organisation 
(2001, P 2), the Ghanaian economy remained relatively weak and vulnerable to external 
commodity price movements and other shocks such as weather conditions. The country 
is still heavily dependent on agriculture, accounting for 40 percent of its GDP. Although 
Ghana’s main export market is the Netherlands, where much of its cocoa is processed, 
followed by the UK and the US, the country cannot strengthen its trade links with the 
EU as had Cote d’Ivoire. However, these trade flows are declining as a proportion of 
Ghana’s overall trade compared to newer trading partners such as Nigeria, (supplying 
the majority of the country's oil) and China with textile as well as capital goods used in 
areas of construction and infrastructure development in 2005 (EIU, 2006, P 45). 
5.4 Conclusion 
From the direction of trade statistics analysed above, there is strong evidence that 
membership of the CFA Zone and now the link to the Euro have helped expand Cote 
d’Ivoire’s trade with the European Union in comparison with Ghana. The EU remains 
the strongest partner of Cote d’Ivoire and the Ivorian export destinations have 
diversified within the European Union, opening up competition among partners. Strong 
trade involvement with the EU has helped Ivorian overall growth despite the military 
and political instability which has been a heavy burden on growth and economic 
policies, and even though the partition of the country disrupted trade within Cote 
d’Ivoire itself and diminished its role as a regional hub. The external current account 
held up, thanks to an increase in oil exports since 2002 and overall favourable terms of 
trade (IMF, July 2007, P 8).  
Nevertheless, according to Okonedo (2003, P 3), trade with the European Union is 
currently between 40 and 50 percent of total goods trade for Africa with countries in 
North Africa and CFA Franc Zone at the higher end of this range. The share of Cote 
d’Ivoire in total world exports has been generally stable over the period 1994–2006. 
The country represents two-thirds of WAEMU exports. Also, the share of the EU in the 
country’s trade remains high but it is falling more sharply for exports than for imports 
(IMF, July 2007, P 20). Furthermore, Zafar (2005, P 5) argued that the objective of the 
peg system is to maintain macroeconomic stability in CFA zone as well as strengthen 
trade and financial flows between Europe and the two zones by creating an environment 
with a stable exchange rate. The Ghanaian economy has performed well in recent years 
due to good cocoa harvests, discovery of two new gold mines and strong activities in 
construction and services responding to the improved business environment. Despite its 







6.0 METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY DESIGN 
The objective of the survey on Ivorian and Ghanaian firms is to analyse the impact of 
the exchange rate regime on company performance in West Africa, how it affects the 
different transactions between regions and how important a monetary union for 
countries is. The key hypothesis being addressed is the fact that Cote d’Ivoire’s 
membership of the Franc zone has helped Ivorian firms’ expansion and consequently its 
overall economic growth. The theoretical aspect of the survey is covered in Chapter 5 
which assesses trade between Cote d’Ivoire-the Rest of the World and Ghana-the Rest 
of the World including the European Union. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 analyse empirically, 
the impact of exchange rate regime on businesses behaviour in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
6.1 Definition 
Modern statistics is a theory of information with inference as its objective, so the set 
of measurements is the population while the subset of measurements selected is the 
sample. Information from sample surveys affects almost every aspect of our daily 
lives. Such information determines government policies on, for example, the control 
of the economy and the promotion of social programmes. The common methods of 
data collection in sample surveys are personal and telephone interviews. 
a) Personal interviews 
This method of data gathering is effective but costly. Its advantage is the fact that 
people will usually respond when confronted in person. Also, the interviewer can 
note specific reactions and eliminate misunderstandings about the questions asked. 
b) Telephone interviews 
It is a widely used method, less expensive and avoiding travel expenses. A general 
problem is the establishment of a sample that corresponds to the population, though 






c) Self-administered questionnaires 
It is a useful method of data collection, which may be carefully constructed in order 
to encourage respondents' participation. The advantage of this method is that a 
savings can be made from the survey cost and can be combined with telephone or 
personal interviews if the rate of responses is low. 
d) Direct observation 
Appointing an observer or electronic counting equipment, but using an observer can 
also be a source of errors in observation. Direct observation is also used in surveys 
that do not involve measurements on people, which could be costly. 
Moreover, the sample size will have to be defined carefully to avoid waste because 
surveys cost money. If the sample is too large, time, effort and talent are wasted. 
Obviously, if the sample is too small, sampling errors are huge. Thereby, the 
number of observations needed to estimate the population should take into account 
errors of estimation (Scheaffer & Mendenhall, 1990, P 48-49). 
 
6.1.1 Enterprises with fixed exchange rate – Cote d’Ivoire 
According to Berrospide (2006, P 30), under fixed exchange rates, firms borrow 
extensively in foreign currency and do not hedge because they have no incentives to 
do so given that government provides a type of free risk management. 
The Ivorian economy faced a major challenge, the shift from a state controlled 
economy to a more decentralised economy led by the private sector. As a result, the 
private sector was required to develop and be more imaginative to take over most of 
the activities sold by the state. Unfortunately, due to a weak domestic private sector, 
the move toward more liberalisation and privatisation led to an increased foreign 
control of the economy. A survey conducted by Bohoun, McKay and Kouassy 
(1995, P 10-11) showed that in the wake of the devaluation, exporting firms were 
mostly foreign (54 percent of the total) with a very high proportion of French firms 




6.1.2 Businesses with flexible exchange rate – Ghana 
Berrospide (2006, P 30) argued that under a flexible exchange rate regime, when the 
probability of currency depreciation is moderate and hedging is affordable. Firms 
use currency forwards to hedge their exchange rate risks exposure and reduce the 
probability of financial default. Hedging works as collateral allowing hedged firms 
to expand their capacity to access foreign capital markets. 
Empirical research reveals that the majority of Ghanaian firms exhibit a low level 
use of hedging techniques in managing their foreign exchange risks due to a low 
level of education and volatile nature of the economy (Abor, 2005, P 311) 
6.2 Survey design 
6.2.1 Business environment in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana 
The Ivorian economy is largely market-based and depends heavily on the 
agricultural sector. According to OECD/AFDB (2008), 66 percent of the Ivorian 
people are engaged in some form of agricultural activities which contribute 70 
percent of the country’s export revenue. Cote d’Ivoire has been for years an island 
of tranquillity in West Africa, a safe country where refugees around the world could 
flee without fear of persecution. The name of its commercial capital, Abidjan, was 
synonymous with good life. Since 2002, the country has suffered from the social 
and economic consequences of conflict which affected neighbouring countries. That 
instability has seriously shaken its economy and the confidence of investors. Many 
foreign business owners fled the country.  
While Ghana has relatively diverse and rich natural resource-based minerals, 
agriculture remains a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-third 
of GDP and about 55 percent of formal employment. The country’s long term 
economic performance in the early independence years was closely associated with 
cycles of political instability and shifts in policy regime including changes in 
strategies between state-led and market-led development, hostile to dynamic private 
sector investments, entrepreneurship and growth. Since the introduction of the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) from the World Bank – IMF in the 1980s and 
the advent of the multiparty democracy, in the 1990s, Ghana has entered a period of 
relative political stability and gradually improving policy and growth performance.  
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Ghana economic growth became more broad-based due to its government’s aim to 
promote the private sector and make its term a ‘Golden Age of Business’. Cote 
d’Ivoire is ranked 155 out of 178 countries in doing business while Ghana is ranked 
87 of 178 in 2008 according the World Bank, World Business Survey. Ghana is 
celebrated as major reformer in Sub-Saharan Africa for the second year running; 
continue to increase the efficiency of its public services (World Bank, 2007). 
a) Risks encountered by firms 
Exchange rate risks discourage firms from engaging in international trade and West 
African currency markets are less developed and less competitive. The more 
unpredictable are exchange rates, the more risky are foreign transactions and the less 
likely are companies to engage in foreign trade and investment. Although the 
elimination of national currencies is leading to gain in economic efficiencies, Gagnon 
(1992) argued that a currency or monetary union promotes trade by eliminating 
exchange rate volatility but no firm empirical evidence shows that exchange rate 
volatility has a significant negative effect on trade flows. It is clear that exchange rates 
matter but their effect on individual firms and hence the impact of different exchange 
rate regimes on investment and living standards in different locations appears to be 
heterogeneous and to vary over time. Moreover, the impact of exchange rate movements 
on firms located only in a single country will vary according to the extent of their 
international exposure and factors such as the share of total revenues derived from 
exporting, the ratio of imported inputs in production and the extent of foreign 
competition in the home market. Also, transaction costs are lower for the country with 
the fixed exchange rate regime, and this further encourages trade and investment 
compared to the country with a floating exchange rate regime. Therefore, it is better for 
West African firms to convert their currency to one instead of 27 currencies when 
trading with the European Union, thereby reducing transaction costs.  This is a real 
benefit for both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
In Africa, in general, including Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, the key problems that 
undermine any operations are excessive documentary requirements, outdated official 
procedures, insufficient use of automated systems, lack of transparency, lack of 
predictability and consistency in customs activities and lack of modernization of and 
cooperation among customs and other governmental agencies. As a result of poor 
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quality but expensive telecommunication services, businesses in Africa are less 
competitive as they lack up-to-date information on prices of goods and services. 
The most common and popular method of payment is the documentary credit payment 
system. However, this practice is characterized by confused and complex procedures. 
The basis of the system is a series of checks in which the progress of goods towards the 
buyer is pinned to the progress of payment to the seller. The process is time consuming, 
requires physical movement of documents between different banking institutions in two 
different countries and is not well understood and badly managed by many users. In 
addition, the system is open to fraud. In Cote d’Ivoire, 75 percent of companies 
surveyed are foreign based firms which have facilities and structures to cope with 
payments. 
b) Access to capital markets 
Given better access to the EU capital market than before, Ivorian businesses need to 
play their part in addressing financing issues like raise capital in Europe. In both Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire, entrepreneurs are afraid of incurring significant debt finance due to 
their operating practices such as inaccessible company data. Also, they are reluctant to 
raise equity finance either through ignorance of the products available or because it 
involves ceding a degree of control over their business. These businesses need help in 
accessing the most appropriate form of finance for their needs. Many growing 
businesses have to export in order to expand output, increase productivity and spread 
risks. Through exporting, they are exposed to tougher competition and more demanding 
consumers, which in turn improve their competitiveness. Contacts made through 
overseas trade also help firms tap into new ideas and knowledge of markets and 
marketing. Achieving positive results means being clear about what firms want to get, 
shaping their agenda and working closely with international partners.  However, there 
are increasingly a growing number of microfinance institutions which provide financial 
services to small and middle-size enterprises. Access to credit of these SMEs is one of 
the greatest barriers to their operations and growth. According to the United Nations 
Capital Development Fund, where good-quality credit information is available and legal 
rights are stronger, more credit is extended. Benefits flow beyond those gaining access 
to credit. With better-functioning credit markets, unemployment is lower and women 
and low-income people benefit the most.  
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c) Labor and skills 
In both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, government and businesses view skills 
development as an important factor in the drive to enhance productivity, stimulate 
economic competitiveness and raise people out of poverty. According to the World 
Bank (2004), there is a trade-off between the achievement of skills development 
with technical and vocational education and training and providing universal basic 
education both are important to economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Unfortunately, these governments have limited resources to meet these goals. Also, 
in these two countries, the informal sector comes to the forefront in view of the 
growing scarcity of the formal wage employment. This informal sector becomes a 
driving force but needs to be structured. 
d) Wages and income distribution 
In Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, it is very difficult to compare rural incomes with urban 
incomes. Rural revenue is coming from the production of agricultural goods rather 
than from the sale of labor. Agricultural workers do not control the commercial and 
industrialization process after production. By contrast, urban workers have taxed 
incomes but they often benefit from supplementary non-market sources of income 
such as subsidized housing, access to credit on relatively favorable terms.    
e) Infrastructures 
Cote d’Ivoire has an outstanding infrastructure where there is an excellent network 
of roads, good telecommunication services including a public data communications 
network, mobile phones and internet access. Also, there are two very active ports. 
Abidjan’s is the most modern in West Africa and the largest between Casablanca, 
Morocco and Cape Town, South Africa. 
There are good schools by regional standards and modern real estate development 
but unfortunately, due to its recent military-political crisis, the country needs heavy 
investment on economic infrastructures to sustain growth. 
Its three airports serve 25 international airline companies and Abidjan airport is the 
hub in the region. 
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Ghana is determined to be the gateway to West Africa by creating maritime and 
airports hubs and opening up trade for its landlocked neighbours which are already 
attracting more businesses. Before liberalising the entire economy in 1985, parts of 
communities were inaccessible by vehicle due to the poor state access roads. Now 
with the participation of the private sector in infrastructure building, Ghana is 
getting a good access to roads and an active telecommunication sector. The 
objective is to facilitate both intra regional trade and to open up rural areas for 
investment, productivity enhancement and job creation, introduce or deepen 
competition and create an attractive environment for the private sector to spearhead 
the country’s development. According to the Government, road transport is very 
important to the Ghanaian economy. It is estimated that road transport accounts for 
94 percent of freight ton-miles and about 97 percent of passenger miles in the 
country. Most major international carriers fly regularly to Kotoka International 
Airport (KIA) in Accra, the main entry point to Ghana by air. According to Bogetic 
and Sanogo (2005, P 4), infrastructure investments facilitate private investments by 
lowering product costs and opening new market thereby creating new profit 
opportunities. Roads reduce transportation costs. Ports reduce transaction costs and 
facilitate trade, exposing local firms to the innovation forces of international 
competition. From this point, it is very important for Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana to 
invest heavily in infrastructure using the private sector to reach a sustainable 
economic development.  
f) Market structure 
According to Scherer in Schwimmer (1979, P 683), market structure is basically an 
indication of the degree of concentration within a specific industrial market, which 
varies between the extremes of monopoly or monopsony and perfect competition. 
Thus specified, it is related to supply and demand conditions and to pricing, 
production and innovation strategies to provide an organizational model of the 
relevant industry. In both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, large corporations have 
embarked on extreme monopoly without using market forces. They are influencing 
the formulation and implementation of economic policies so creating states of non 
competition. On one hand, Cote d’Ivoire is considered as a capitalist model in 
Africa, the institutional setting for free markets and competition has never been 
sufficient, especially in the vital cocoa sector where there is huge uncertainty over 
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economic fundamentals and their management as well as regulatory institutions. 
Since 2002, the Ivorian business community has become increasingly frustrated 
with the political process and it has publicly complained about the government’s 
private sector policies such as heavy tax regimes or road blocks. Due to that 
instability, the informal sector has gained in importance as smuggling and other 
illicit activities continue to grow. The concept of monopolies and oligopolies is not 
regulated consistently. As a result, the heart of the economy such as electricity, 
water, fixed-line telephones, major commercial banks and transport are all French-
owned companies that hold de facto monopolies. On the other hand, for Ghana, 
opening up an economy to trade will benefit the more abundant factor because this 
factor will be relatively cheap and will increase demand for this factor overall. Since 
unskilled labor is the abundant factor in poor countries, opening up will benefit 
unskilled labor and, hence, the poor. But the theory breaks down when local product 
and factor markets are segmented, either because of poor infrastructure or because 
of the local power of middlemen and moneylenders. The black market is more 
developed in Ghana than Cote d’Ivoire. It occurs when governments try to restrict 
capital flows by imposing various types of restrictions including licensing, waiting 
time and various taxes. These restrictions create excess demand for foreign 
currencies that cannot be managed by the official market and thus create an 
unofficial (black) market. The size of the black market premium indicates the extent 
of exchange rate mismanagement and signals the need for adjustments (devaluation). 
Table 6.2.1f: black market premium 
Country Premium 
Cote d’Ivoire 3.3 
Ghana 310.2 
Nigeria 88.0 
South Africa 4.5 
Malaysia 1.1 
Dollar based % of the official rate 
(Khalifa, 2004, P 486) 
g) Level of transparency 
A minimum of transparency is needed in these countries as corruption is the 
consequence of bureaucratic burden due to the fact that civil servants are expecting 
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to get so-called tips to deal with any dossiers. As a result, the public administration 
is very slow, inhibiting the expansion of operating firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana. The extended family places significant pressure on civil servants, forcing 
them to engage in corruption and nepotistic practices. They use their public 
positions to generate benefit for themselves, their families, and their ethnic and 
social groups.  Also, these practices occur with the changing face of the 
administration due to rebellion or ‘coup d’etat’. Companies view corruption as an 
obstacle to invest in these countries and it has a great impact on judicial proceedings, 
contracts award, customs and tax issues. Businesses have reported corruption at 
every level of the civil service including stamps, copies and an official act to register 
an activity and vehicle, all carry a supplemental commission. Some investors 
especially in Cote d’Ivoire have raised specific concerns about the rule of law and 
the government’s ability to provide equal protection under the law, poor record in 
enforcing the rule of law. While in Ghana, taxes are not overly burdensome but 
onerous bureaucratic hurdles and red tapes still complicate entrepreneurial activities. 
6.2.2 The design 
Similar survey to our study was analysed by Broz et al. (2007, P 3). The authors used 
firm-level data from the World Bank’s World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
on micro-level, cross-national evidence on sectoral attitudes over the exchange rate. 
They found systematic patterns linking sectors of economic activity to exchange rate 
policy position. Owners and managers of firms producing tradable goods prefer 
greater stability of the exchange rate. In countries with a floating currency, 
manufacturers are more likely to report that the exchange rate causes problems for 
their business. The difference between Broz et al.’s survey and ours on the impact of 
exchange rate regime on the success of West African firms is based on the method 
used to implement the questionnaire.  
As stated earlier, one of the most common methods of data collection surveys, the 
telephone interviews, was intensively used because it was easier and less costly and 
less time consuming. The contribution made to the survey is the fact that 
background information is gathered before conducting the interview. That is a very 
important element in the whole design process which cut the interview duration. The 
researcher spent a shorter period of time completing the questionnaire while he was 
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on the telephone with the interviewee. The method is believed to be unique as the 
researcher never came across, in the literature on methodology, this way of 
conducting a survey in this field. This deemed to be the effective way of collecting 
data in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana due the rapid growth of the telecommunication 
sector. Chelariu et al. (2002, P 459) collected some data on 109 of 200 Ivorian firms 
through a field survey. Questionnaires with completion instruction were hand 
delivered to target managers. After two weeks, the questionnaires were collected by 
field assistants. Individuals who had not returned the questionnaires were reminded 
to do so by telephone.  
Other authors such as Fening et al. (2008, P 701) administered their questionnaire 
through the face-to-face method of collecting data in Ghana. It is becoming difficult 
to use such technique to conduct interviews due to low response rate. McLean and 
Blackie (2004, P 244) argued that business and management researchers find 
increasingly difficult to achieve an acceptable response rate to face-to-face 
questionnaire.  
The researcher travelled to Cote d’Ivoire three times and once to Ghana but this 
generated a very low response rate therefore it had been decided to part-collecting 
information and part-conducting telephone interviews.  Sturges and Hanrahan (2004, 
P 108 – 110) concluded that telephone interviews can be used successfully in 
qualitative as well as quantitative research. It is an acceptable and valuable method 
of data collection and is successful in obtaining completed interviews.  
In sum, the survey was organized into two parts. The first focused on collecting 
strong background information on firms and the second sought directors, executives 
and managers’ opinion on their different transactions, exchange rate regimes and 
monetary union in general.  
The downside of the method is that the respondent may not understand the question 
so his answer may not be accurate. Also, the researcher could not verify the identity 
of the person he was talking to or who, he said to be.  
6.2.3 Selection 
Firms were selected, purely based on their involvement at international level. A 
panel of about 250 firms of which 100 responded (57 Ivorian against 43 Ghanaian) 
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was picked randomly across the three activity sectors (primary, industry and 
services). The researcher had the opportunity to make appropriate selection due to 
the primary data collected on enterprises. Also, the background information was 
focused on different transactions with the companies’ European counterparts and 
trade links between the countries involved.  
The survey comprising 37 questions was administered to Business Managers and/or 
Directors, Human Resources Executives, Communication and Administration and 
Finance Officials in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The survey was structured into five 
parts. Section 1 was based on the respondent’s organization – basic details. Part 2 
covered markets and/or market forces in which the firm operates while part 3 
focused on its financial details. Section 4 was about Ivorian and Ghanaian firms’ 
risks management and part 5 discussed its foreign exchange.  
Applying background research and telephone interview, we look at individual 
responses to the fundamental question which is: How exchange rate regime affects 
Ivorian and Ghanaian firms’ success? How the monetary regime affects business 
transactions between West Africa and the Rest of the World, in general. 
Following the high level of information collected through the implementation of the 
survey, SPSS as well as the common formulae are the appropriate tools which are 
used to analyse the data gathered in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. Most of the SPSS 
tools and formulae were used such as frequency, cross-tabulation, chi-square, 
correlation, comparative descriptive statistics and difference of means to evaluate 
the different variables and their interactions.   
Respondents were asked to indicate their position using the five-point Likert scale, 1 
representing strongly disagree to 5 representing strongly agree or the following 
ordered scales: 1= “No benefit”, 2= “Some benefits”, 3= “Moderate benefit”, 4= 
“Important”, 5= “Very important” or on ticked box scale: 1= “One box or more and 






6.2.4 Firms classification 
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1. ABB-CI  
2. Blohorn 
3. Carnaud Metalbox-CI  
4. Central Azito  
5. Challenger-Wrangler  
6. Coca-cola CI  
7. Colgate-Palmolive CI 
8. Cosmivoire 
9. Cotiplast 
10. Elf oil CI 
11. Filivoire SARL 
12. Filtisac  
13. Gestoci  
14. Gonfreville  
15. Hoechst  
16. Hydrochem-CI  
17. Ivoire Coton 
18. Nestle-CI 




23. Shell-Ci  
24. SICOR 
25. SIR 
26. SITAB  
27. SIVOP 
28. SMB 











1. AJ Seward CI 
2. Bernabe CI 
3. CFAO CI 
4. Chevron West 
Africa 
5. Chimtec 
6. Flutec Brossette 
7. Jean Abile Gal CI 
8. Pride Petroleum 



















































1. African Explosives 
2. Air Liquid Gh. Ltd 
3. Akuaba Furniture 
4. Ashanti Goldfield 
5. Concrete Production 
Gh  
6. Garko Farm & Co. 
7. DKC Group of 
Companies  
8. Enerst Chemists Ltd  
9. Fan Milk Ltd 
10. Ghana Breweries Ltd 
11. Ghana Cylinder Co. 
12. Ghana National 
Petroleum  
13. Gold Coast Resource  
14. Interplast Ltd  
15. Lagray Chemical Co. 
16. Nexans Kabelmetal 
17. Omanhene 
18. Pipes & Plastics 
19. Portem Cocoa 
Processing 
20. Qualiplast Gh Ltd 
21. Resinex 
22. Steeledale Gh Ltd 
23. Unichem Gh Ltd 
24. Wilkins Engeering 
Ghana 
25. Wire Weaving 
Industry 
26. Yekans Intl. Ghana 
 




3. De Jong Ltd 
4. GNPA 
5. Gold Business 
Co. 









11. Process & Plant 
Gh 
12. Taysec  



















Respondent rate is 40 percent which is a very good rate for a survey based on 
African firms that are not willing to disclose their data. In sum, the telephone 
interview combined with primary background information is very useful and 
practical. The important issue is the fact that the researcher recorded accurately the 
interviewees’ responses.  
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6.2.5 Size Distribution  
Firms have been chosen randomly therefore it is difficult to comment on firms’ 

























Source: Survey on the success of Ivorian and Ghanaian firms dealing operating internationally. 
They have been selected across the three sectors of activity such as agriculture, 
manufacturing and services sectors. We focused our attention on formal sector firms 
with international operations. These firms prosper, invest, export and adopt new 
technologies. Thus, Van Biesebroeck (2005, P 546) states that in Africa, the largest 
and most productive firms display the highest growth rates and contribute 
disproportionately to aggregate growth. This leads to divergence between firms at 
the top and bottom of the distribution. Small firms rarely reach the top of the size 
and productivity distribution.  
6.3 Implementation of the survey 
6.3.1 Dates 
I spent three months in 2001 and nearly two years (2003 – 2004) working in the field to 
implement the survey due to the fact that in Africa, nothing is straightforward. You 
have to beg people about the importance of your research and a survey is absolutely 






It is very difficult to conduct and implement a survey in Africa. Strangely, no one is 
available to discuss company figures and strategic planning. I believe they are not 
willing to provide the researcher with information despite a letter of introduction 
brought from his University. 
In some cases, especially in Cote d’Ivoire, I used connections and networks to get the 
data I needed. Often, I presented myself as a Research Officer who was conducting a 
survey on behalf of Westminster University, London.  
For others, I conducted telephone interviews to get them to fill the questionnaires in. 
Before conducting any interviews, background information on firms is gathered. This 
method is believed to be appropriate and effective in implementing the survey. 
In Ghana, the telephone interview was very useful and adequate as I do not have any 
connections whatsoever in the country. The only person I know in Accra works for the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  
The lesson learnt from conducting a survey on African firms is to emphasize the 
benefits of the study to their business and the promise to share a copy of the summary 
results with respondent. More importantly, maybe, I should have promised using the 
University of Westminster networks to support their operations in the UK. 
 6.3.3 Response 
I believe I received correct and accurate answers to my questionnaire. I mostly used 
telephone interviews to get the information I needed. Before approaching a company, I 
researched its background, current affairs and its perspectives for the future. With this 
strong knowledge on the firm, the different telephone conversations were highly 
interesting and much more focused. Therefore this saved the respondent’s time, the 
researcher’s time and was less costly. As a result, the various and different respondents 
did appreciate my methodology. They were much more open to give me concise and 
consistent information. All interviews were animated with laughs and courteous. In the 





This section covers the analysis of the survey using comparative descriptive statistics 
and difference of means for both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. Our focus will be on 
variables which are statistically significant. As described in Chapter 6, our survey 
involved questionnaire designed to encourage respondent-firms to share as much 
information as possible in an unconstrained manner. 
7.1 Comparative Descriptive Statistics: Table 
Table 7.1 (Appendix 8) presents the descriptive statistics from the surveys of Cote 
d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
Given the importance of the Franc zone for the Ivorian firm’s expansion and 
consequently, the country’s overall economic growth, mean and standard deviation are 
used to facilitate the comparison of data collected in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
Generally, the formulae are the following:  
                                                       _  
Mean:    X = ∑X/N                              
                                                         
                                                                                                                              
                                                                 __ 
Standard Deviation:  S=  √∑(X – X)²/N-1  
                                            
                                         __              






7.2 Difference of Means: Table 
Table 7.2 (Appendix 9) presents statistical tests for differences between the two means 
(of Cote d’Ivoire data and Ghana data). The tests are ‘t’, with degrees of freedom (df), 
and the formulae for these are shown below: 
            Xbar - Ybar 
 t =         ──────────── 
                        ______________ 
 √(S12/m) + (S22/n) 
  





df = ───────────────────────── 
(S1
2
/m)² / (m-1)  +  (S2
2
/n)² / (n-1) 
where Xbar and Ybar are the means of the data for two countries, S1 and S2 are the 
standard deviations and m and n are the countries sample sizes. The final column of 
Table 7.2 reports on whether there is a significant statistical difference between the 
means for the two countries and the level of significance of this difference. All the 
degrees of freedom are greater than 30 and the critical values are as below. 
The critical values for ‘t’ (two-tailed test) are:  
10%  = +/- 1.671 
5% = +/- 2.390 
1% = +/- 2.660 
The 1% level indicates very strong significant evidence of a difference, 5% strong 
evidence and 10% some evidence. 
Note: ‘t’ is positive and significant if the score (mean) is higher for Cote d’Ivoire than 
Ghana while negative ‘t’ if score (mean) is higher for Ghana.  
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7.3 Interpreting results 
By applying these statistical tools, there is strong evidence that the following issues are 
very important to the understanding of the success of firms operating within a currency 
union and how exchange rate regime affects the different transactions between Africa 
and the Rest of the World, specifically between Cote d’Ivoire and the Rest of the World 
and Ghana and the Rest of the World including the European Union. The questions, 
which relate to the success of firms within a monetary union, are set in the table below: 
No Variables Questionnaire 
1 Currency pegged to major international currencies Q24a 
2 Completely flexible exchange rate Q24b 
3 Shifting export towards manufactures Q25e 
4 Diversifying trade Q25f 
5 Greater interregional trade Q25g 
6 Harming trade and investment Q28c 
7 Higher export price seriously reduces competitiveness Q30a 
8 Cheaper to purchase new technologies Q30c 
9 Exchange rate depreciation improves exports price competitiveness Q31c 
10 
 
Exchange rate depreciation affects dollar-denominated debts by requiring more francs 
to pay off dollar debts 
 
Q31e 
11 Policies inappropriate to domestic needs Q33b 
12 Long term credit for investment Q34b 
13 Short term trade credit Q34c 
 
The general hypothesis being tested by the survey is that membership of a currency 
union (CFA Zone) linked to a major world currency (Euro) is of commercial benefit to 
business enterprises in the union. In terms of the survey, the hypothesis will be 
supported if Ivorian firms are strongly of the opinion that operating within a monetary 
union linked to the European Union leads to better performance compared with 
Ghanaian firms. The analysis is as followed: 
(1) Currency pegged to major international currencies 
Companies operating in the CFA zone are subject to the peg of the CFA Franc to the 
Euro. 79 percent of Ivorian firms preferred a peg, therefore strongly supporting the 
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hypothesis compared to 26 percent in Ghana (Q24a). There is a significant difference at 
the 1 percent level between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana with Cote d’Ivoire emphasizing 
this factor more strongly than Ghana. However, the peg contributes to stabilizing the 
nominal effective exchange rate of the Francs area, keeping inflation low, which has a 
beneficial impact on economic growth and development for open economies. Thus, 
Fielding and Shields (2005, P 1052) argued that a peg reduces international transactions 
costs and exchange rate risk, which promotes more trade and greater business cycle 
synchronicity. Also, the liberalization of capital movement between the two zones, 
combined with the ongoing trade liberalization helps the CFA zone to gain full benefits 
from WAEMU. 
(2) Completely flexible exchange rate 
Firms operating in Ghana strongly agree on the value of a flexible exchange rate (Q24b). 
52 percent of these companies preferred a completely flexible exchange rate regime 
compared to zero percent in Cote d’Ivoire. In Ghana, firms have the opportunity to 
avoid risks through hedging. Above all, countries as well as businesses appear to 
support the system they are familiar with. 
(3) Shifting exports towards manufactures  
51 percent of Ivorian firms agreed that a fixed exchange rate regime encouraged 
manufactures compared to 16 percent in Ghana (Q25e). The industry sector is the 
driving force of economic progress because it creates value-added goods and high 
employment. In that sense, the Ivorian government puts in place policies designed to 
encourage new as well as existing manufacturing firms such as Nestle, Saco, Blohorn. 
(4) Diversifying trade 
39 percent of Ivorian firms thought a fixed exchange rate system encouraged export 
diversification compared to only 8 percent in Ghana (Q25f). The Ivorian government 
has frequently voiced its concern regarding the concentration of its export trade. The 
ideal is to get easy access to all the principal international markets. Various pressures 
may be exerted to induce small countries to purchase most of their needed imports from 
the larger trading partner that has bought most of their exports. In case of Cote d’Ivoire, 
most of the exports were directed to France until recently the trend changed to other 
major destination such as the Netherlands, USA and Nigeria. 
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(5) Greater interregional trade  
86 percent of Ivorian firms thought that the membership of a fixed exchange rate system 
encouraged greater interregional trade compared to 42 percent of Ghanaian ones (Q25g), 
and this difference is highly significant. Companies consider that concentration of 
activity in one region increases the incentive for other firms to relocate there in large 
part in order to benefit from external economies, mainly the technology set up in that 
agglomeration. It gives the opportunity for firms to specialize within their industry and 
produce high quality export products. 
(6) Harming trade and investment 
In Cote d’Ivoire, the business community believes that the flexible exchange rates harm 
trade and investment. 51 percent of firms agreed with this assertion compared to 12 
percent in Ghana (Q28c). Since the advent of the Euro, many countries or regions are 
planning to set up monetary unions, as it would strengthen trade links and high 
investment between member states and regions.  
(7) Higher export price seriously reduces competitiveness 
 
Ivorian firms faced the issue of appreciation of the exchange rate in the pre-devaluation 
period. As a result, the CFA Franc was devalued in 1994 to allow the country’s export 
to be more competitive. 84 percent of these firms especially the industry sector, felt 
exchange rate appreciation seriously reduced competitiveness compared to 60 percent in 
Ghana (Q30a). 
One major disadvantage of the fixed exchange rate was the relative rise of the CFA 
Franc as a result of the currency devaluations elsewhere in Africa and beyond.  
In the late 1980s, the depreciation of US Dollar against the French Franc consequently 
led to the rise of the CFA Franc. This undermined the competitiveness of the CFA 
countries, which found it increasingly difficult to export goods that other countries 
supplied more cheaply.  




(8) Cheaper to purchase new technologies 
Despite the high export prices due to the appreciation of the exchange rate, most Ivorian 
companies used the opportunity of cheaper imports to get new technologies in order to 
be ahead of their regional counterparts. That was the reason why the view that exchange 
rate appreciation makes it cheaper to purchase new technologies has been highly 
defended by these firms. 79 percent of Ivorian firms agreed, strongly supporting the 
hypothesis compared to 40 percent of Ghanaian businesses (Q30c). 
(9) Exchange rate depreciation improves exports price competitiveness 
Ivorian firms agreed with the view that the exchange rate depreciation improves export 
price competitiveness. 90 percent of these companies are strongly supporting the 
hypothesis compared to 50 percent in Ghana (Q31c). In 1994, the Franc zone had been 
forced to devalue its currency due to the loss of its export competitiveness also due to 
France policy of ‘Franc fort’ in respect of the US Dollar. 
(10) Exchange rate depreciation affects Dollar-denominated debts by requiring more 
Francs to pay off Dollar debts 
Ivorian firms strongly agree with the view that exchange rate depreciation affects dollar-
denominated debts by requiring more Francs to pay off Dollar debts (Q31e). 30 percent 
of these companies faced with the issue while only 9 percent of Ghanaian firms have 
concern about it. It is due to the tight trade link between Cote d’Ivoire and the European 
Union and also the CFA Franc is pegged to the Euro. Conversely, the majority of 
Ivorian international transactions are denominated in Dollars, which is the means of 
exchange. 
(11) Policies inappropriate to domestic needs 
41 percent of Ghanaian firms felt that within a monetary union, policies are not 
appropriate to domestic needs compared to 30 percent of Ivorian firms (Q33b). They 
think policies are not specifically tailored to individual countries. 
Governments do not have control over monetary policies as they are set up at regional 
level. As result, it weakens their ability to adjust to external shocks to domestic 
economy for example the volatility of export price and international interest rates.   
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(12) Long term credit for investment  
86 percent of Ivorian firms strongly favour the view that banks with a fixed link to the 
Euro encouraged long term credit for investment compared to 51 percent of Ghanaian 
enterprises (Q34b). The access to the European capital market allows firms to acquire 
for example new machinery or new plants or expansion. 
(13) Short term trade credit 
97 percent of Ivorian firms considered banks were important sources of short term 
credit compared to 42 percent in Ghana (Q34c). It is easy for companies to get grants 
and/or small loans to export their product abroad especially those involved in 
commodity trading. 
Both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana firms agreed at 100 percent on the following issues: 
(1) Company’s competitive advantage 
 Firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana strongly believe that company image is very 
important to access different markets worldwide (Q17a). Business environment is 
opened to well-known brands. 
 Again, the quality of the product of companies is very important (Q17b). Quality is 
one of the best instruments to access global market.  
 Ivorian and Ghanaian firms strongly agreed good communication enhanced 
competitiveness (Q17m). Serious enterprise needs a strong and powerful 
communication service to boost its image. 
 
(2) Variables influencing the company success 
 The issue of effective strategic planning is considered very important by both 
Ivorian and Ghanaian firms (Q18g).  It is the process of defining a direction and 
allocating companies resources (capital and people) in order to achieve its goal by 
using different techniques such as SWOT and PEST analysis. 
 Ivorian and Ghanaian firms all agreed that they should emphasize quality 
management (Q18h). Top management should have a clear and concise vision to 




(3) Benefit of operating in a fixed exchange rate regime 
 All Ghanaian firms agree with their Ivorian counterparts on the issue of less volatile 
exchange rate when operating in a fixed exchange rate regime (Q26a). However, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are small economies in which their financial markets are 
less developed. So, they all recognize the benefit of fixed exchange rate regime to 
boost their export trade with the EU, which is maintaining stable monetary policy. 
 Also, they are strongly supporting the elimination of exchange rates risks by joining 
a monetary union (Q32d). Consequently, it will encourage trade between countries 
by eliminating risks coming from uncertain fluctuations of exchange rates and 
transaction costs.  
 Finally, firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana strongly support the view that lower 
inflation and interest rates result when operating within a monetary union (Q32m). 
Ivorian firms are benefiting from low inflation and interest rates.   
 
(4) Variables influencing exchange rates  
 Capital inflows: Both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms strongly agree with the view that 
companies operating within a monetary union have easier access to capital inflows 
(Q37c). However, foreign interest rates have been the pushing factor driving capital 
inflows and determining their magnitude but country creditworthiness can influence 
the timing and geographic destination of the capital flows. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The survey shows overwhelmingly that all firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana 
agreed on issues related to the company’s image, the quality of its product, its 
communication system, its effective strategic planning, its quality management, less 
currency convertibility issues, less volatile exchange rate, elimination of multiple 
exchange rates risks, low inflation and interest rates and finally capital inflows. 
Therefore, they all very strongly support the hypothesis that, generally, membership of a 
monetary union (fixed exchange rate regime) is beneficial to its member states. The 
monetary union combined with other appropriate policies could play a vital role in 
enabling firms to grow. It is due to the fact that it may provide macroeconomic stability, 
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which can greatly enhance the prospects for export. As result, Cote d’Ivoire performs 
relatively well compare to Ghana.  
Trade exports represent a large proportion of the country’s overall GDP. The fact of 
being member of the West Africa Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) gives Cote 
d’Ivoire enormous opportunities to explore and export more to the EU. The Ivorian 
overall growth has been boosted by its greater trade involvement with the European 
Union. Furthermore, Cote d’Ivoire deserves credit for its efforts at trade liberalization 
(Chapter 5).  
Despite the Ivorian performance, Ghana has caught up during the last few years by 
broadening its economic activity. While agriculture continues to be a key sector, 
manufacturing and construction are emerging as important contributors to overall 
growth. The country has focused on implementing an export-led trade policy with 
impressive results.  
Although, the objective of a monetary union is to achieve a low, stable, and predictable 
rate of inflation, exchange rate, asset prices and credit availability, there are also 
enormous issues which pull back a currency union in West Africa. Attention should be 
paid to social, cultural and socio-political factors examined in Chapter Eight. Chibba 
(2008, P 300) added the following factors such as knowledge and information, 
monetary policy framework, access to credit, structural issues and good governance.  
There is a great need to consider and integrate the needs and the role of poor who 
represents the majority in these countries. Most of the population is not served by the 
formal financial sector so any financial issues are of interest. Also, effective 
implementation of policies requires political will, appropriate allocation of resources 
and adequate restructuring of business environment and institutions. Again, monetary 
union leads to the loss of exchange rate as a policy instrument and the risk of 
overvaluation. In the case of WAEMU, member states import the effects of any 
imbalances from the EU such as currency fluctuation and financial turmoil. The 
inflation is close to the rate experienced in Europe. Such a policy results in weakening 
the ability of CFA countries to adjust to external shocks to the domestic economy. 
Linjouom (2004, P 5) argued that monetary union contributes to a lack of intra-regional 
trade. There is a diversity of production and trade structure in the WAEMU so the 
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impact of terms of trade shocks will vary widely. Any attempt to address these shocks 
will not be uniform across countries. 
Another important issue is the peg of CFA Franc to the Euro. Siddiqi (1999, P 3) argued 
that there are risks for commodity-based developing countries from linkage to a hard 
and strong currency. The appreciation of the Euro, seen today, will undermine export 
competitiveness of CFA countries in Dollar-based world markets for crude oil, coffee, 
cocoa and cotton; and also lead to significant deterioration in the terms of trade for these 
countries. As a result, producers’ earnings in Euros will decline, due to an appreciation 
in the real effective exchange rate. Therefore, the export-led growth of the Francophone 


















8.0 HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS 
This section covers the analysis of the different hypotheses (Chapter 1 section 4) using 
frequency table, cross-tabulation and chi-square tests. Also, the correlation test is 
applied to emphasize the link between the different variables. The focus is to identify 
the relationship between business sector, country of origin and various issues arisen 
from exchange rate regimes and monetary union. We find similarities between our study 
and global research on the impact of exchange rate and monetary union on businesses. 
8.1 Hypotheses analysis using cross-tabulation and chi-square tests 
A cross-tabulation is defined as a joint frequency distribution of cases based on two or 
more categorical variables. Displaying a distribution of cases by their values on two or 
more variables is known as contingency table analysis and is one of the more commonly 
used analytic methods in the social sciences. The joint frequency distribution can be 
analyzed with the chi-square statistic (χ²) to determine whether the variables are 
statistically independent or if they are associated. 
In statistics, a result is called statistically significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by 
chance. The phrase test of significance was coined by Ronald Fisher. The amount of 
evidence required to accept that an event is unlikely to have arisen by chance is known 
as the significance level or critical p-value: in traditional Fisherian statistical hypothesis 
testing, the p-value is the probability of observing data at least as extreme as that 
observed, given that the null hypothesis is true. If the obtained p-value is small then it 
can be said either the null hypothesis is false or an unusual event has occurred. It is 
worth stressing that p-values do not have any repeat sampling interpretation. 
The significance level is usually denoted by the Greek symbol α (lowercase alpha). 
Popular levels of significance are 5% (0.05), 1% (0.01) and 0.1% (0.001). If a test of 
significance gives a p-value lower than the α-level, the null hypothesis is rejected. Such 
results are informally referred to as 'statistically significant'. 
 
By using frequency table, cross-tabulation and chi-square tests, the results are:  
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8.1.1 Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between exchange rate and firm’s 
characteristics 
The test result reveals no relationship between the different variables such as business 
sector, country of origin and the view that the exchange rate regime has an effect on 
both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms’ characteristics. This hypothesis is kept in line with the 
correlation test. This test, detailed in Section 8.2 below, confirms a relationship between 
exchange rate and the characteristics of firms in Cote d’Ivoire.  
8.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Exchange rate and monetary regimes influence and change business 
behaviour   
2.1 Capital inflow 
Table 2.1a Capital inflows 











No impact 2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Little impact 2 2.0 2.0 4.0 
Some impact 19 19.0 19.0 23.0 
Important impact 5 5.0 5.0 28.0 
Serious impact 72 72.0 72.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 2.1b Business sector, country of origin and Capital inflows: Cross-tabulation 














Q2 Agriculture    Count   4 0 3 7 
     % within Q2   57.1% .0% 42.9% 100.0% 
Industry Count   2 3 34 39 
% within Q2   5.1% 7.7% 87.2% 100.0% 
Services    Count   0 0 11 11 
% within Q2   .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count   6 3 48 57 
% within Q2   10.5% 5.3% 84.2% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 1 0 0 1 2 
% within Q2 .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 1 1 10 1 13 26 
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% within Q2 3.8% 3.8% 38.5% 3.8% 50.0% 100.0% 
Services Count 1 0 3 1 10 15 
    % within Q2 6.7% .0% 20.0% 6.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 2 2 13 2 24 43 
% within Q2 4.7% 4.7% 30.2% 4.7% 55.8% 100.0% 
 
Table 2.1c Business sector, country of origin and Capital inflows: Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 




Pearson Chi-Square 19.861(a) 4 .001 
N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 12.290(b) 8 .139 
N of Valid Cases 43   
 
The test reveals significant association between business sector and capital inflows in 
Cote d’Ivoire due to its openness since its independence. However, the industry (87.2 
percent) and services (100 percent) as well as the Ghanaian services sector (66.7 percent) 
are more concerned due to the high volume of foreign companies operating within the 
Ivorian business environment. This assertion is confirmed by Acquaah (2009, P 57) 
who indicates that because IJVs with partners from advanced industrialized economies 
posses superior resources and capabilities and have reputational advantages than IJVs 
with partners from emerging economies, they rely on their superior resources, 
capabilities, and reputational advantage to compete in low-income emerging economies. 
On the other hand, IJVs with partners from emerging economies recognizing their lack 
of credibility in the eyes of consumers as producers of quality or differentiated products 
use their resources and capabilities to focus their attention on the masses at the bottom 
of the income ladder in low-income emerging economies by pursuing the cost 
leadership strategy. Thus, IJVs with partners from emerging economies are forced to 
develop alternative models based on price/value tradeoffs in harnessing the potentially 
vast untapped market at the base of the pyramid in emerging economies. 
Also, due to mounting debts, foreign direct investment (FDI) becomes increasingly 
important sources for developing countries’ capital flows so FDI reforms are set to 
improve business environment in order to attract foreign capital (Boateng, 2004, P56). 
Thus, the Ivorian economy is characterized by strong foreign presence as a result of 
former ‘open-door’ policies aimed at attracting foreign direct investment. Foreign direct 
investment plays a key role in Cote d’Ivoire where France is overwhelmingly the most 
important foreign investor for about one-quarter of the total capital in Ivorian firms and 
over half of the total stock of foreign investment capital.  
The majority of Ivorian firms despite their multinational status recognize that capital is 
a serious issue. Robson & Obeng (2008, P 386) argue that capital is showing to be the 
major problem owner-managers have to overcome at the conception stage and also as 
they grew from commercialization to growth. It is believed to be a worldwide concern 
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but unfortunately, the Ivorian domestic capital market is underdeveloped, resulting in 
limited access to the EU financial markets so there is urgent need to strengthen the 
Ivorian financial market links with the global market. 
2.2 Socio-political instability 
Table 2.2a Socio-political stability 









Some impact 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Important impact 2 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Serious impact 97 97.0 97.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 2.2b Business sector, country of origin and Socio-political stability: Cross-tabulation 








Cote d’Ivoire Q2 Agriculture Count  2 5 7 
% within Q2  28.6% 71.4% 100.0% 
Industry Count  0 39 39 
% within Q2  .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Services Count  0 11 11 
% within Q2  .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count  2 55 57 
% within Q2  3.5% 96.5% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 1  1 2 
% within Q2 50.0%  50.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0  26 26 
% within Q2 .0%  100.0% 100.0% 
Services Count 0  15 15 
% within Q2 .0%  100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1  42 43 






Table 2.2c Business sector, country of origin and Socio-political stability: Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 14.805(a) 2 .001 
N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana  
  
Pearson Chi-Square 20.988(b) 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 43   
 
The test shows significant association between business sector, country of origin and the 
view on socio political stability. This issue is very important for Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana (Table 2.2b) as firms in both countries have experienced ‘coup d’état’, rebellion 
and social instability. Chi-square test is extremely significant in Ghana with 0.00 score 
and Cote d’Ivoire, 0.001 showing the extreme importance of socio-political stability on 
company success. 
It is interesting to note the negative impact of socio-political instability on economic 
activity and especially on the economic growth. According to Nyembwe (2005, P7), the 
instability induces a lack of property rights protection; this can lead to a decrease of 
capital accumulation as less investment is undertaken. Fosu (1992) argues that the same 
decrease characterizes human capital accumulation because of the brain drain that 
occurs due to the instability. He also argues that a breakdown in the level of GDP can 
be observed because the production process is likely to be interrupted during episode of 
severe crises like coup d’état and revolutions. Moreover, the negative impacts of 
instability on growth work through a deterioration of productivity. As a result, 
production will decline. 
Socio-political instability is very important due to the following: 
 Politicians avoid any structural reforms and pursue wait and see policies in 
order to limit disagreement with the population and the country as whole; 
 Politicians avoid to keep up with their commitments in appropriate policies, 
declining any accountability; 
 Corruption becomes a tool used in all sectors of activity. 
 
Empirically, Guillaumont et al. (1999) establish that as other primary instabilities, 
political instability influences African growth through lowering the rate of investment 
and appreciating the real exchange rate. It leads to a negative impact on the capital 
accumulation and the productivity of investment. However, in Cote d’Ivoire, business 
people commonly use this proverb: ‘L’argent n’ aime pas le bruit’ interpreted as ‘capital 
flees when there is instability’ to show the importance of stability. It proves the fact that 
people invest in safe environment. All events such as threat of a coup, demonstrations, 
upraising and protests produce substantial capital flight. The speed and magnitude of 
capital flight suggest that its sources are not only economic. Socio-political instability is 
the most important factor associated with capital flight. According to Vu Le & Zak 
(2006, P 309), empirical studies show that capital flight is a substantial impediment to 
growth in developing countries. Although, capital flight is purely a private sector 
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activity, the drain of foreign exchange resources through it creates a greater need for 
governments to borrow abroad. 
Linjouom (2004, P15) identifies four sources of political instability in most developing 
countries: lack of administrative capacity, overzealous government rules and regulations, 
rent-seeking behaviour and inefficient political cycles. The author adds that a state is 
weak when the sources of political instability are numerous and widespread, a situation 
that can be found in both democratic and dictatorial political systems. 
Given its stability, Ghana was recognized for its economic and democratic 
achievements in 2006. The economy has performed well with a solid macroeconomic 
management including major debt relief, large inflows of donor resources and high 
cocoa and gold prices. In Sub-Saharan Africa, political institutions are weak because 
government policies change when key individuals change jobs. The implication of this 
fact is that political risks in Africa limit financing choices available to foreign investors 
and affect capital inflows crucial for economic development (Boateng, 2004, P 64). 
Therefore, both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are increasingly promoting and maintaining a 
transparent legal system, capable of gaining confidence of foreign investors.    
2.3. Local social values and customs 







Valid Not important at all 38 38.0 38.0 38.0 
Less important 7 7.0 7.0 45.0 
Moderately important 24 24.0 24.0 69.0 
Important 9 9.0 9.0 78.0 
Very important 22 22.0 22.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 2.3b Business sector, Country of origin and Local social values and customs: Cross-tabulation 












Q2 Agriculture Count 1 1 1 0 4 7 
% within Q2 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% .0% 57.1% 100.0% 
Industry Count 20 4 8 4 3 39 
% within Q2 51.3% 10.3% 20.5% 10.3% 7.7% 100.0% 
Services Count 7 0 3 1 0 11 
% within Q2 63.6% .0% 27.3% 9.1% .0% 100.0% 
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Total Count 28 5 12 5 7 57 
% within Q2 49.1% 8.8% 21.1% 8.8% 12.3% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 1 1 0 0 0 2 
% within Q2 50.0% 50.0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 5 1 8 3 9 26 
% within Q2 19.2% 3.8% 30.8% 11.5% 34.6% 100.0% 
Services Count 4 0 4 1 6 15 
% within Q2 26.7% .0% 26.7% 6.7% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 10 2 12 4 15 43 
% within Q2 23.3% 4.7% 27.9% 9.3% 34.9% 100.0% 






All firms operating within the three sectors of activity are of concern (Table 2.3b). This 
test reveals that there is a significant association between business sector and the view 
on local social values and customs in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Given its over sixty ethnic groups, Cote d’Ivoire is a country with rich and diverse 
cultural values. It provides a rich source of study. Properly tailored, these values will 
make an important contribution to the expansion of Ivorian companies. Darley & 
Blankson (2008, P 374) argued that there is consensus that culture has a fundamental 
influence on marketing practices in ways parallel to their effects on consumers as 
marketing involves an outlay of resources. Mendonca & Kanungo (1996, P 74) stressed 
that taking into consideration the socio-cultural environment, managers should adopt 
specific strategies to overcome constraints and build on the strengths of firms’ internal 
work culture. Today, the world is a global village where there are transfers of 
investment from developed countries to African nations. Therefore, great understanding 
and appreciation of African culture or social values is not an option but a necessity. 
As stated by Iguisi & Rutashobya (2002), the lack of proper integration of culture in 
management in Africa is to deny the continent the resultant synergy needed in national 
economic, managerial and social development. The issue is of importance to Ivorian 
firms given the openness of its economy as foreign direct investment plays a significant 
role, accounting for between 40 and 45 percent of total capital in these firms (World 
Bank, September 2008). Due to an economic interrelationship in Africa combined with 
global financial transactions and joint ventures between businesses and the growing 
attraction of foreign direct investment, Darley and Blankson (2008, P 374) stress how 
surprising little is documented about African culture and its interface with business 
prosperity. Moreover, business literature lacks consideration of African culture (Ford, 
Q3 Value df. 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 18.108a 8 .020 
N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 12.340b 8 .137 
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2002). To succeed in their marketplace, it is clear that Ivorian firms need to tackle 
appropriately the issues of belief, attitudes and perceptions that characterize the 
country’s culture. 
Given the diversity of the Ivorian cultural environment, new social class emerges that is 
sophisticated and well-educated. That gives the opportunity to investors and industrials 
to be up to date for their company expansion. 
Chelariu et al. (2002, P 467) confirmed that the findings of their study show that Ivorian 
firms must realign structural influences, systems and incentives to reflect both the 
objectives of the firm and to be sensitive to local conditions. However, factors such as 
lack of marketing skills, lack of financial resources and government intervention like 
price controls, are likely to be important deterrents in implementing market orientation. 
 
8.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Impact of exchange rate fluctuation on company success including 
its competitive advantage 
3.1 Bank credibility 
In Table 3.1a, Companies in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana were asked if they felt that their 
competitive advantage was affected by the credibility of their bank. 94 of the 100 
companies or 94.0 percent agreed strongly supporting the hypothesis. 
Table 3.1a Bank credibility 





Valid Not important at all 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  Moderately important 1 1.0 1.0 2.0 
  Important 4 4.0 4.0 6.0 
  Very important 94 94.0 94.0 100.0 
  Total 100 100.0 100.0  
Table 3.1b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on that the company competitive advantage was the credibility of its bank and 
Table 3.1c the associated chi-square test. This test shows significant association 
between business sectors and the view on bank credibility in Cote d’Ivoire due to the 
facility for foreign firms to repatriate their capital while in Ghana there is no significant 








Table 3.1b Business sector, country of origin and Bank credibility: Cross-tabulation 











Q2 Agriculture Count   2 5 7 
% within Q2   28.6% 71.4% 100.0% 
Industry Count   1 38 39 
% within Q2   2.6% 97.4% 100.0% 
Services Count   0 11 11 
% within Q2   .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count   3 54 57 
% within Q2   5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 0 0 2 2 
% within Q2 .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0 1 0 25 26 
% within Q2 .0% 3.8% .0% 96.2% 100.0% 
Services Count 1 0 1 13 15 
% within Q2 6.7% .0% 6.7% 86.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 1 1 40 43 
% within Q2 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 93.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 3.1c Business sector, country of origin and Bank credibility: Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 8.808(a) 2 .012 
 N of Valid Cases 57 
 
  
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 4.490(b) 6 .611 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
Major banks in Cote d’Ivoire are subsidiaries of foreign banks especially French-owned 
financial institutions. They play a significant role for companies as most of the Ivorian 
firms surveyed, operate internationally. These banks became more profitable following 
the restructuring of the financial sector in the early 1990s and the devaluation of the 
CFA Franc in 1994 due to lack of incentives, deficiencies in the legal and regulatory 
framework, weak capitalization, inadequate technical and managerial capacity. 
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King and Levine (1993) in Azam et al. (2001, P 520) support empirically the 
Schumpeterian view that the financial sector is key to promoting growth. Also, given 
the guarantee provided by France over the convertibility of the CFA Franc to Euro, this 
arrangement facilitates inter-state trade and payment, movement of capital and labour, 
and maintains the stability of the exchange rates between the two currencies, has such 
the prosperity of businesses. 
3.2 Marketing research and customer intelligence 
In Table 3.2a, Ivorian and Ghanaian firms were asked if they felt that their competitive 
advantage was their marketing research and customer intelligence. Only 49 firms or 
49.0 percent agreed it is very important. 
Table 3.2a Marketing research and customer intelligence 





Valid Not important at all 8 8.0 8.0 8.0 
  Less important 3 3.0 3.0 11.0 
  Moderately important 25 25.0 25.0 36.0 
  Important 15 15.0 15.0 51.0 
  Very important 49 49.0 49.0 100.0 
  Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3.2b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on that the company competitive advantage was its marketing research and 
customer intelligence and Table 3.2c the associated chi-square test .The test shows 
significant association between business sector and the view on marketing research and 
customer intelligence in Cote d’Ivoire due to large number of multinational subsidiaries 













Table 3.2b Business sector, country of origin and Marketing research and customer 
intelligence: Cross-tabulation 












Q2 Agriculture Count 3 1 1 2 0 7 
% within Q2 42.9% 14.3% 14.3% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 2 2 12 7 16 39 
% within Q2 5.1% 5.1% 30.8% 17.9% 41.0% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 0 2 0 9 11 
% within Q2 .0% .0% 18.2% .0% 81.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 5 3 15 9 25 57 
% within Q2 8.8% 5.3% 26.3% 15.8% 43.9% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0  0 0 2 2 
% within Q2 .0%  .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 1  6 4 15 26 
% within Q2 3.8%  23.1% 15.4% 57.7% 100.0% 
Services Count 2  4 2 7 15 
% within Q2 13.3%  26.7% 13.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 3  10 6 24 43 
% within Q2 7.0%  23.3% 14.0% 55.8% 100.0% 
 
Table 3.2c Business sector, country of origin and Marketing research and customer 
intelligence: Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 22.776(a) 8 .004 
  N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 3.176(b) 6 .786 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
Despite the so-called ‘civil war’ in Cote d’Ivoire, the volume of business activities is 
increasing and a vibrant society is more and more developing with the improvement in 
the political stability. The demand for goods and services is extremely high and 
supermarkets and shops are well-stocked with a wide range of national and international 
products. So that, Akamavi et al (2004) argued that the wealth of marketing 
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opportunities is clearly evident in Abidjan which is home to more than ten major 
international advertising agencies. A social class is emerging that is sophisticated, well-
educated and wealthy, proving attractive to investors (P 469). Therefore, marketing is 
playing a vital role to fully provide high customer satisfaction. As result, firms can 
influence the demand for goods and services through marketing research and customer 
intelligence. Chelariu et al. (2002, P 458) reveals that in Cote d’Ivoire, the level of GDP 
per capita is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, implying the presence of a 
significant proportion of consumers with substantial purchasing power. Consequently, 
firms can benefit from being market oriented, requiring more marketing skills. Given 
the changing behaviour of customer in the Ivorian business environment, it is 
imperative to firm’s managers and owners to listen to their needs and expectations. 
Fening et al. (2008, P 699) stressed that firms should take into account the needs of 
these consumers if they want to stay in competition and become competitive. As much 
as possible, to be able to compete, firms need knowledge about their customer. 
3.3 Research and development in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana  
In Table 3.3a, Ivorian and Ghanaian firms were asked if they felt that their competitive 
advantage was based on research and development. 61 of the 100 firms or 61.0 percent 
agreed strongly supporting the hypothesis. 
Table 3.3a Research and development 





Valid Not important at all 15 15.0 15.0 15.0 
  Less important 3 3.0 3.0 18.0 
  Moderately important 7 7.0 7.0 25.0 
  Important 14 14.0 14.0 39.0 
  Very important 61 61.0 61.0 100.0 
  Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3.3b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on that the company competitive advantage was based on research and 
development and Table 3.3c the associated chi-square test. This test shows significant 
association between industry sector, country of origin and the view on research and 
development in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The significance is very important for 








Table 3.3b Business sector, country of origin and Research and development: Cross-
tabulation 














Agriculture Count 5 0 0 1 1 7 
% within Q2 71.4% .0% .0% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Industry Count 2 1 3 6 27 39 
% within Q2 5.1% 2.6% 7.7% 15.4% 69.2% 100.0% 
Services Count 4 2 1 2 2 11 
% within Q2 36.4% 18.2% 9.1% 18.2% 18.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 11 3 4 9 30 57 
% within Q2 19.3% 5.3% 7.0% 15.8% 52.6% 100.0% 
Ghana Q
2 
 Agriculture Count 0  1 0 1 2 
% within Q2 .0%  50.0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0  1 3 22 26 
% within Q2 .0%  3.8% 11.5% 84.6% 100.0% 
Services Count 4  1 2 8 15 
% within Q2 26.7%  6.7% 13.3% 53.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 4  3 5 31 43 
% within Q2 9.3%  7.0% 11.6% 72.1% 100.0% 
 
Table 3.3c Business sector, country of origin and Research and development: Chi-
Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 27.087(a) 8 .001 
  N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 14.844(b) 6 .022 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
This test shows significant association between industry sector, country of origin and 
the view on research and development in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The 
significance is very important for the industry sector with 70 percent of Ivorian firms 
and 85 percent of Ghanaian’s. Multinationals are increasingly involved in research and 
development in developing countries due to their importance to their parent companies’ 
long-term fortune. It is more and more a question of emphasizing the role of universities 
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in the development of these countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana using applied 
research and increasingly, innovation and technology management activities. That 
legitimate role for universities will facilitate long-term economic growth and achieve 
direct impact on poverty reduction for example. 
Robson and Freel (2008, P 447) recognize these findings reinforce the importance of 
investments in innovation and skills, irrespective of sector. Such investments are likely 
to matter to economies dominated by agriculture, as well as to those dominated by 
services or manufacturing.  
Unfortunately, universities in both countries are not playing significant roles in the 
expansion of the business sector, which is the engine of sustainable economic prosperity 
and crucially, they are under-funded. 
3.4 Availability of raw materials 
For both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, 85 of 100 firms or 85 percent in Table 3.4a strongly 
agreed that the impact of the exchange rate regime on company success leads to the 
availability of raw materials. 







Valid Strongly disagree 7 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Undecided 4 4.0 4.0 11.0 
Slightly agree 4 4.0 4.0 15.0 
Strongly agree 85 85.0 85.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3.4b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on the availability of raw materials and Table 3.4c the associated chi-square test. 
This test shows significant association between industry sector, country of origin and 
the view on the availability of raw materials in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. The 
significance is very important for the industry sector with 92.3 percent of Ivorian and 












Table 3.4b Business sector, country of origin and availability of raw 
materials: cross-tabulation 










Q2 Agriculture Count 0 0 1 6 7 
% within Q2 .0% .0% 14.3% 85.7% 100.0
% 
Industry Count 1 1 1 36 39 
% within Q2 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 92.3% 100.0
% 
Services Count 3 1 0 7 11 
% within Q2 27.3% 9.1% .0% 63.6% 100.0
% 
Total Count 4 2 2 49 57 
% within Q2 7.0% 3.5% 3.5% 86.0% 100.0
% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 0 1 1 2 
% within Q2 .0% .0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0
% 
Industry Count 1 0 1 24 26 
% within Q2 3.8% .0% 3.8% 92.3% 100.0
% 
Services Count 2 2 0 11 15 
% within Q2 13.3% 13.3% .0% 73.3% 100.0
% 
Total Count 3 2 2 36 43 
% within Q2 7.0% 4.7% 4.7% 83.7% 100.0
% 
 
Table 3.4c Business Sector, country of origin and Availability of 







Pearson Chi-Square 12.969a 6 .044 
N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 15.378b 6 .018 




The industry sector in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana are more concern about the 
availability of raw materials. These firms need to produce large quantities of goods to 
large market at a competitive price. Therefore, they require capital to purchase their raw 
materials unfortunately; the cost of capital is high in both countries. According to Tettey 
et al. (2003, P 37), capital for investment to start or expand a firm is even more difficult 
to find. Formal banking institutions rarely lend to small manufacturing firms, preferring 
quicker and larger returns in high interest short-term commercial notes to traders or 
Treasury Bills purchased from the Bank of Ghana. These firms, also, face fierce 
competition from large multinationals associated with transportation costs, low 
imported goods and government policies. 
3.5 Exchange rate is highly volatile 
The individual responses represent the dependent variable of our analysis which we will 
refer to as exchange rate issue. For both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, 89 of 91 firms or 97.8 
percent in Table 3.5a strongly agreed that highly volatile exchange rate affects company 
success. 
Table 3.5a Exchange rate is highly volatile 





Valid NO 2 2.0 2.2 2.2 
  YES 89 89.0 97.8 100.0 
  Total 91 91.0 100.0  
Missing System 9 9.0   
Total 100 100.0   
97.8 percent of firms of both sides admit that highly volatile exchange rate poses a real 
issue on their operations showing the scale of the problem. Further tests are conducted 
relating exchange rate volatility to business sector and country of origin. We notice that 
the issue of high volatility is a real concern to the industry sector for both countries. 
Table 3.5b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sectors, country of origin and 
the view on that in a flexible regime, exchange rate was highly volatile and Table 3.5c 
the associated chi-square test. The test shows a significant association between business 
sectors and highly volatile exchange rate due to Ivorian firms have never experienced 
flexible exchange rate regime. That is also due to Cote d’Ivoire being part of a monetary 
union, WAEMU, with a stable currency, CFA Franc, pegged to French Franc before and 
the Euro now. While in Ghana, there is no significant association between business 
sector and the issue of highly volatile exchange rate even though Ghanaian firms 







Table 3.5b Business sector, country of origin and Exchange rate highly volatile: Cross-
tabulation 
Q3 Exchange rate highly volatile 
Total NO YES 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Q2 Agriculture Count 1 4 5 
% within Q2 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0 37 37 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 6 6 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 47 48 
% within Q2 2.1% 97.9% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 2 2 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 1 25 26 
% within Q2 3.8% 96.2% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 15 15 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 42 43 
% within Q2 2.3% 97.7% 100.0% 
 
Table 3.5c Business sector, country of origin and Exchange rate highly volatile: Chi-
Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
 (2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 8.783(a) 2 .012 
  N of Valid Cases 48   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square .669(b) 2 .716 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
All Ivorian firms (97.9 percent) view high exchange rate volatility as an obstacle to their 
business operations due to the fact that they are all multinationals operating 
internationally. Also, they are used to a fixed exchange rate regime. From their 
viewpoint, they prefer stable currency especially in Africa where the economy therefore 
business is overshadowed by political instability including leadership context, coup 
d’etat and rebellion. 
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Even in Ghana with flexible exchange rate regime, the majority of firms (97.7 percent) 
across all sectors view exchange rate volatility as threat to their business. However, 
since 1960 until 1986, the country suffered serious political crises coupled with severe 
economic imbalances. This assertion was proved by Bhattarai & Armah (2005, P 5): 
“Ghana had a disastrous performance on economic growth in the last 20 years. A 
correct exchange rate has been one of the most important factors for economic growth 
in the economies of Southeast Asia and volatility in exchange rates has been one of the 
major obstacles to economic growth of many African and Latin-American economies". 
 
Companies are always keen to find ways to reduce the threats of the exchange rate 
volatility. Therefore, Tarr & Shatz (2000, P1) argued that despite a trend toward more 
flexible exchange rates, more than half the world’s countries maintain fixed or managed 
exchange rates. In the 1980s and 1990s, developing countries as a group progressively 
liberalised their trade regimes but some governments defended their exchange rate in 
actions. The authors emphasized that exchange rate management in many countries has 
resulted in overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Roughly 25 percent of the countries 
for which data are available, have overvalued exchange rates with black market 
premiums from 10 to more than 100 percent.  
 
Again, according to Salifu et al. (2007, P1), the frequent changes in foreign exchange 
rate in Ghana is of prime concern to firms due to its effects on their operations, revenue 
and valuation. Exchange rate variability is a source of cash flow risks for firms with 
foreign denominated assets and liabilities (whether exporters or importers) as well as 
firms with overseas operations. 
 
Even firms without foreign revenues, costs or operations are also affected indirectly by 
exchange rate changes through its impacts on foreign competition and the country’s 
macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Given the difficulty in predicting exchange rate movements, corporate managers, 
investors and analysts have to find the best option of managing or investing optimally to 
neutralise exchange rate risks to their companies. 
 
Why is there no significant association between business sector and highly volatile 






Ghanaian firms operate in highly volatile exchange rate so they all agreed that volatility 
affects their business regardless of the business sector. They believe the remedy is to 
monitor carefully the currency fluctuations and focus their effort on the local market.  
However, due to the Ghanaian economy being based on the agriculture sector, the 
government opted for a flexible exchange rate to sell its commodities abroad at a 
competitive rate and boost the national purchasing power.  
 
Broz et al. (2007, P7) argued using firm-level data from the World Bank’s World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES), that volatile exchange rates create uncertainty 
about international transactions, adding a risk premium to the costs of goods and assets 
traded across borders. It has the greatest advantage of allowing a government to pursue 
an independent monetary policy. However, that independence is said to provide 
flexibility to accommodate foreign and domestic shocks, including changes in the terms 
of trade and world financial conditions and to affect the competitiveness of the tradable 
goods sector. 
They also present that international oriented firms will be especially averse to the 
volatility associated with a floating rate and will therefore prefer a fixed exchange rate. 
They also typically suggest that tradable producers will be particularly averse to the 
relative price effects of a real appreciation. Nontradable producers, conversely, are 
expected to prefer floating rates and an appreciated currency (P 23). 
 
Given the enormous studies conducted worldwide, on the exchange rate regime and its 
implications for macroeconomic management as well as managing foreign exchange 
risks, there is little literature on firm exposure to exchange risks in Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana. That is the reason why our study is relevant. 
 
Over 80 percent of firms, in the sample of this thesis, are subsidiaries of large 
multinationals and hence have a substantial value of their assets and liabilities 
denominated in the currencies of their parent companies. They also depend on foreign 
imported input and machinery. Therefore, the depreciation of the Ghanaian Cedis 
against the US Dollar makes imported goods more expensive and this may result in a 
shift in demand to local substitutes.  
 
Another argument is that all these firms have significant exposure to US Dollar 
exchange rate risks due to most of their transactions being denominated in US Dollar. 
As a result, the retail sector is more affected as it deals mainly with imported goods 
which are expensive as more Ghanaian Cedis are required to import the same unit of 
items. Consequently, all major currencies of international transactions of Ghana even 




There are a number of techniques available worldwide to manage foreign exchange 
risks such as balance sheet hedging, use of derivatives, leading and lagging. These 
techniques are too sophisticated and hard to implement in developing countries due to 
underdeveloped financial systems. Corporate managers and investors should apply 
simple tools like the use of forward contracts and swaps to supplement price 
adjustments and investment in foreign currency in order to minimise their exposure to 
exchange risks. Abor (2005, P317) found that most firms in Ghana manage their foreign 
exchange risks through two means: the use of price adjustment to reflect balance sheet 
changes and the buying and holding of foreign currency in advance. This author 
revealed that Ghanaian firms involved in international trade exhibit a low level use of 
hedging instruments for managing their foreign exchange risk. The reason may be 
attributed to the low level of education and sophistication among the firms’ finance 
personnel and also because of the under-developed nature of financial markets.  
 
3.6 Price instability 
 
Both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms were asked if they felt that a flexible exchange rate 
regime led to price instability. In Table 3.6a, 94.5 percent (86 of 91 firms) of firms 
strongly stress that price instability may affect their business. 
 
Table 3.6a Price instability  





Valid NO 5 5.0 5.5 5.5 
  YES 86 86.0 94.5 100.0 
  Total 91 91.0 100.0  
Missing System 9 9.0   
Total 100 100.0   
 
Further tests are conducted between business sector, country of origin and the view that 
a flexible exchange rate system led to price instability. In Table 3.6b, the majority of 
firms across business sectors express their view that price instability may have an 







Table 3.6c the associated chi-square tests shows a significant association between 
business sector and price instability in Cote d’Ivoire while in Ghana, there is no 
significant association between the two variables. 
Table 3.6b Business sector, country of origin and Price instability: Cross-tabulation 
 
Q3 Price Instability 
Total NO YES 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Q2 Agriculture Count 1 4 5 
% within Q2 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0 37 37 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 6 6 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 47 48 
% within Q2 2.1% 97.9% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 2 2 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 4 22 26 
% within Q2 15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 15 15 
% within Q2 .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 4 39 43 
% within Q2 9.3% 90.7% 100.0% 
 
Table 3.6c Business sector, country of origin and Price instability: Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 8.783(a) 2 .012 
  N of Valid Cases 48   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 2.884(b) 2 .236 





Why are there different results between the two countries despite the strong view 
expressed by these firms regarding the impact of price instability on their business?  
Firstly, Waugh (1966, P 508) argued that price stability, in itself, appears to be neither a 
virtue nor a vice, neither good nor bad, neither harmful nor beneficial. It all depends 
upon the level at which the price is stabilized and whether one is concerned with the 
welfare of the consumer or of the producer. Also, using the surplus approach, Mansell 
in Turnovsky et al. (1980, P 135) showed that, if both producers and consumers are 
considered in a closed model, society as a whole prefers price stability, with the gainers 
in principle being able to compensate the losers. However, in the absence of 
compensation, price stability is only potentially desirable, since one group may lose.  
 
According to the European Central Bank, price stability is defined as a year-on-year 
increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro area of 
below 2 percent, excluding deflation. The best contribution that monetary policy can 
provide to economic growth is to maintain price stability with the following: 
 Improve price transparency; 
 Stable and low inflation support private consumption via its positive impact on the 
real value of households’ income and wealth; 
 Reduce the borrowing costs for individuals and firms; 
 Inflation erodes the purchasing power of the nominal return on long-term loan 
contracts or bonds; 
 High inflation results in less profitable investment projects so capital accumulation 
will be lower and the potential output growth rate is consequently reduced. 
 
Secondly, in Cote d’Ivoire, inflation is generally low due to the monetary union in 
which its currency CFA Franc is pegged to the Euro so the inflation rate does not affect 
people’s economic decisions. The country as well as businesses benefit from the policy 
of price stability set up by the European Union aimed to contain the rise in the price of 
imports from the euro area. The low inflation is believed to increase consumer 
confidence and establish credibility as well as reduced costs to business transactions and 
investment. 
Conversely, any appreciation of the Euro exchange rate will lead to the appreciation of 
the CFA Franc, contributing to lowering the costs of imported goods making local 
products less competitive. 
Aizenman (2003, P 596) argued that multinational firms opt to invest in more stable 
emerging market. High instability will induce multinationals to diversify the production 
locations. 
 
Finally, the rising of inflation softens business and consumer confidence due to the rise 
of prices such as oil price. The economic boom, in less developed countries, such as 
China and India which, are now competing aggressively for oil and consumer goods in 
the global market place, drives the prices up. As a result, Ghana is trying to control 
price instability by adopting various methods such as increased credit to the private 
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sector by removing all controls like ceiling on commercial bank credit, regulation of the 
interest rates and removal of certain tax elements on basic consumable commodities. 
 
8.1.4 Hypothesis 4: There is a correlation between exchange rate regime and company 
failure 
This test reveals only one issue, the “local infrastructure” which is statistically 
significant. 
In Table 4.1a, firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana were asked if they felt that the 
relationship between exchange rate regime and company failure led to local 
infrastructures. 61 of 100 firms or 61 percent agreed thus supporting the hypothesis. 
 







Valid Not important at all 25 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Moderately important 4 4.0 4.0 29.0 
Important 10 10.0 10.0 39.0 
Very important 61 61.0 61.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 4.1b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on the fact that exchange rate regime led to company failure and Table 4.1c the 
associated chi-square test. This test shows a significant association between business 
sectors and the view on local infrastructures in Ghana because these firms operate in a 
flexible exchange rate regime and face with competition from multinationals and low 












Table 4.1b Business sector, country of origin and local infrastructures: cross-tabulation 










Q2 Agriculture Count 2 0 0 5 7 
% within Q2 28.6% .0% .0% 71.4% 100.0% 
Industry Count 8 2 2 27 39 
% within Q2 20.5% 5.1% 5.1% 69.2% 100.0% 
Services Count 3 0 1 7 11 
% within Q2 27.3% .0% 9.1% 63.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 13 2 3 39 57 
% within Q2 22.8% 3.5% 5.3% 68.4% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0 1 0 1 2 
% within Q2 .0% 50.0% .0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 7 1 3 15 26 
% within Q2 26.9% 3.8% 11.5% 57.7% 100.0% 
Services Count 5 0 4 6 15 
% within Q2 33.3% .0% 26.7% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 12 2 7 22 43 
% within Q2 27.9% 4.7% 16.3% 51.2% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.1c Business sector, country of origin and Local   







Pearson Chi-Square 1.937a 6 .925 
N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 12.564b 6 .051 
N of Valid Cases 43   
Ghanaian entrepreneurs expressed concern about local infrastructures especially the 
industry sector with 57.7 percent. Operating within a flexible exchange rate regime, 
they are exposed to fierce competition from multinationals and imported goods. These 
firms stressed that it is very important to work in an adequate and favourable locations 
with excellent transport connection, access to banking and information communication 
technology facilities. Thus, Robson and Obeng (2008, P 390) revealed that the closeness 
between firms and their customers can provide impetus for development due to the ease 
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with which the firm can identify customer needs. It is expected that those firms in 
conurbations encounter fewer barriers than other types of locations. 
From their survey on 500 entrepreneurs in Ghana, they found that firms in the cities 
were more likely than those in small towns to have difficulty with the high cost of 
utility charges, a lack of industrial sites, and the low quality of electricity and water 
supply.  
Thus, firms in conurbations may benefit from the closer presence of a larger customer 
base but the high number of firms and higher population result in problem and pressures 
associated with overcrowding – an infrastructure which is struggling to cope and may 
possibly in the future hinder the scope for development and growth (P 400). 
 
8.1.5 Hypothesis 5: Fixed exchange rate regime and therefore the monetary union 
encourages international trade and investment for Ivorian businesses (Regional 
integration) 
 
5.1 Encourages trade and financial flows 
 
In Table 5.1a, firms in both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana were asked if they felt that the 
monetary union encouraged trade and financial flows. 97 of 100 firms or 97.0 percent 
agreed, strongly supporting the hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.1a Encourages trade and financial flows 





Valid Not important at all 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  Less important 1 1.0 1.0 2.0 
  Moderately important 1 1.0 1.0 3.0 
  Very important 97 97.0 97.0 100.0 
  Total 100 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 5.1b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on the fact that monetary union encouraged trade and financial flows and Table 
5.1c the associated chi-square test. This test shows a significant association between 
business sectors and the view on encouraging trade and financial flows in Cote d’Ivoire 
because the country is part of WAEMU from which it is getting real benefits. While in 




Table 5.1b Business sector, country of origin and Encourages trade and financial flows: 
Cross-tabulation 
Q3 Encourages trade and financial flows 
Total 
Not important 
at all Less important 
Moderately 
important Very important 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Q2 Agriculture Count  1  6 7 
% within Q2  14.3%  85.7% 100.0% 
Industry Count  0  39 39 
% within Q2  .0%  100.0% 100.0% 
Services Count  0  11 11 
% within Q2  .0%  100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count  1  56 57 
% within Q2  1.8%  98.2% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count 0  0 2 2 
% within Q2 .0%  .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count 1  0 25 26 
% within Q2 3.8%  .0% 96.2% 100.0% 
Services Count 0  1 14 15 
% within Q2 .0%  6.7% 93.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 1  1 41 43 
% within Q2 2.3%  2.3% 95.3% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.1c Business sector, country of origin and Encourages trade and financial flows: 
Chi-Square Tests 
Q3   Value df 
Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 
Cote d’Ivoire Pearson Chi-Square 7.270(a) 2 .026 
  N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 2.533(b) 4 .639 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
More efficient financial services available to countries with a fixed link to the Euro 
further encourage trade and investment. However, European financial markets are much 
more accessible and more liquid due to the fact that all the major financial instruments 
are listed in the Euro. More and more, CFA zone and developing countries in general, 
are adopting an open economy. So, the introduction of the Euro facilitated that option. 
However, liberal economic regime gave a prominent role to market forces and had 
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profound implications for macroeconomic policy management in general and for 
monetary and exchange rate policies in particular. 
  
Ivorian firms gain easy access to the European capital market due to the peg between 
the Euro and the CFA Franc. According to Zafar (2008, P 5), the rationale of the CFA 
system is to maintain macroeconomic stability in West and Central Africa as well as 
strengthen trade and financial flows between Europe and the two zones by creating an 
environment with a stable exchange rate. 
 
Trade liberalization is essential to enhancing global growth and poverty reduction. 
Given its benefit, developing countries reduce their trade barriers and provide real 
market access in goods and services to both developed and third countries. In fact, a 
developing country experiences higher levels of growth and development by opening its 
financial services sector to foreign direct investment (Snow, 2005, P 1 - 4). 
 
For Ivorian businesses dealing with their European counterparts, there is lower 
commercial and currency transaction costs. These firms believe that transactions costs 
are lower for the country with fixed exchange rate regime, and this further encourages 
trade and investment compared to the country with a floating exchange rate regime. 
Many growing businesses need to export in order to expand output, increase 
productivity and spread risks. Through exporting, they are exposed to tougher 
competition and more demanding customers, which in turn improve their 
competitiveness.  
 
This analysis is backed by various authors like Fiawoyife and Abor (2007, P 151). Their 
study reveals that firms engaged in international trade have difficulties in trading across 
borders. These difficulties include bureaucracies in obtaining trade documents, high 
tariffs, difficulties in pricing in foreign currencies, foreign exchange risks, smuggling, 
restrictions at border and problems of clearing goods at ports and harbours, unfair 
competition from informal traders and harassment by border officials. 
These difficulties, the firms believe, would be reduced, if not, entirely removed by 
regional integration. Consequently, regional integration would provide enough 
incentives for increased participation in foreign trade and investment. 
 
According to Dobson and Yui (1997, P 263 – 266), governments should bow to the 
market forces pushing integration by removing obstacles to intraregional trade flows. 
They should open domestic economies to allow for greater participation in the 
international (global) division of labour. They should cooperate in providing favourable 
conditions for investment, including the freer flow of product information and 
accelerated preferential trading arrangements and should cooperate to remove 




Multilateral measures are under active discussion within the WTO. Such measures 
would encourage governments to liberalize FDI regimes and converge toward common 
standards on right of establishment, fair and equitable treatment, protection against 
nationalization, international-dispute settlement, and assurances for the repatriation of 
earnings and capital. Capping fiscal and financial incentives to reduce distortions should 
also be considered.  
The interests of multinationals are directly related to progress in these areas. When 
regional exports slow down in response to currency appreciation or slowing external 
demand, as they did in 1995 – 1996, multinationals run the risk of a hostile reaction to 
slower growth, blaming them for what, in reality, are cyclical fluctuations or the 
structural consequences of national trade and FDI policies. 
 
They concluded that one of the main findings of their study is that East Asia’s economic 
integration rests not only on its rapid growth and the proximity of diverse economies 
but also on firms cooperating successfully with governments. Multinational and 
international firms augment the growth of savings, jobs, and incomes, but their 
objectives will not always coincide with those of host governments. It is in the interests 
of both players to assist in achieving self-sustaining growth, which in turn depends 
heavily on productivity growth. Also, they find production networks contribute to 
regional integration, but this exchange of intermediate goods risks structural and 
cyclical vulnerability because final-goods markets, particularly at the high end, lie 
outside the region. 
  
Furthermore, on one side, proponents of monetary integration reveal a positive 
combination of greater exchange rate stability, reduced transaction costs, enhanced 
competition deriving from price transparency and low real interest rates resulting from a 
successful anti-inflation strategy pursued by the central bank. On the other side, 
opponents posit that it will result in adjustment costs, together with the loss of monetary 
and exchange rate policy instruments, which is likely to increase instability among 
countries exposed to asymmetric external shocks beyond the capability of the central 
bank using only one policy instrument: interest rates.  
In addition, the central bank may over-tighten its monetary policy in order to establish 
its anti-inflation credibility with financial markets, resulting in higher unemployment 











5.2 Improving business competitiveness 
In Table 5.2a, Ivorian and Ghanaian companies were asked if they felt that the monetary 
union improved business competitiveness. 94 of 100 firms or 94.0 percent agreed 
strongly supporting the hypothesis 
Table 5.2a Improving business competitiveness 





Valid Not important at all 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  Moderately important 1 1.0 1.0 2.0 
  Important 4 4.0 4.0 6.0 
  Very important 94 94.0 94.0 100.0 
  Total 100 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.2b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on improving business competitiveness and Table 5.2c the associated chi-square 
test. This test shows that there is significant association between business sectors and 
improving business competitiveness in Ghana due to massive low cost imports while in 
Cote d’Ivoire, the test shows no significant association between variables. 
Table 5.2b Business sector, country of origin and Improving business competitiveness: 
Cross-tabulation 










Q2 Agriculture Count 1 0 0 6 7 
% within Q2 14.3% .0% .0% 85.7% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0 1 1 37 39 
% within Q2 .0% 2.6% 2.6% 94.9% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 0 0 11 11 
% within Q2 .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 1 1 54 57 
% within Q2 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 94.7% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count   0 2 2 
% within Q2   .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count   0 26 26 
% within Q2   .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
186 
 
Services Count   3 12 15 
% within Q2   20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Total Count   3 40 43 
% within Q2   7.0% 93.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 5.2c Business sector, country of origin and Improving business competitiveness: 
Chi-Square Tests 






8.158(a) 6 .227 
  N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 6.020(b) 2 .049 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
The European Union is Ghana’s most important trading partner, accounting for between 
40 and 50 percent of imports and exports (ITC, 2008). As a result, Ghanaian firms are 
benefiting from the performance of the Euro. Therefore, according to the European 
Economic and Social Committee (2004), European firms are heavily investing in the 
world, especially in the developing countries, contributing to the growth of these 
regions including Ghana and set up an example for development. 
These firms have gained access to finance and develop tight link with their European 
partners. It is the consequence of trade liberalization and financial sector reforms 
engaged by Ghana since the 1980s which facilitate business environment improvement 
for businesses. Soderbom et al. (2006, P 553) argued that Ghana has introduced 
substantial reforms to liberalize a previously highly protected and public sector 
denominated economy. Those measures have particularly influenced the industrial 
sector including the introduction of a market based foreign exchange system, 
liberalization of trade policy, privatization of state-owned enterprises and fiscal reforms. 
Furthermore, wealth is created at the microeconomic level in the ability of firms to 
produce valuable goods and services using efficient methods. It is only this way that a 
nation can support high wages and the attractive returns to capital necessary to support 
sustained investment. The microeconomic foundations of productivity rest on two 
interrelated areas: the sophistication with which domestic companies or foreign 
subsidiaries operating in the country compete and the quality of the microeconomic 
business environment. Increasing productivity through more sophisticated ways of 
competing depends on parallel changes in the microeconomic business environment 
including the quality of factor (input) conditions, the context for firms’ strategy and 
rivalry, quality of local demand conditions and the presence of related and supporting 
industries. 
By confirming these assertions, Mesquita & Lazzarini (2008, P 359) integrate the 
resource-based view, transaction cost economics, and institutional theory to model how 
collaboration among small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in environments of 
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weak infrastructure and institutions help them achieve greater collective efficiencies and 
access to global markets.  
To them, in most developing economies, firms are urged to become internationally 
competitive to boost exports and decrease country risk exposure; at the same time, these 
firms tend to be deprived of the superior technology and supporting infrastructure often 
found in developed countries, such as government support, efficient ports, shared scale-
efficient resources that would ease reaching global markets. Ironically, although forging 
interorganizational collaborative arrangements appears to be critical for SMEs in weak 
infrastructure settings, it is precisely in those countries that firms also suffer from a host 
of institutional failures, such as poor legal systems, discretionary governmental policies, 
and inefficient regulation, that hinder the pursuit of joint action and impose high 
investment uncertainty and exchange hazards. 
Ghanaian firms viewed that a monetary union will bring to their enterprises more 
choices and business opportunities which will be stronger and more competitive by: 
 
 Reducing exchange rate risk so that they may have access to financial instruments to 
hedge against currency movements; 
 Increasing competition in the banking industry and lower interest rates so that firms 
can finance their operations at a much more favourable cost. 
 
Also, these firms felt that the union area will become a domestic market where they 
have the possibility to sell their products and services across a wider area (economies of 
scale) to large potential customers. Therefore, firms are encouraged to incorporate 
innovation and new technical solutions into their business strategies to their own benefit 
and the benefit of the entire union economy. 
5.3 Sizeable and unified market favourable to trade and investment 
In Table 5.3a, Ivorian and Ghanaian firms were asked if they felt that the monetary 
union provided a sizeable and unified market favourable to trade and investment.  87 of 
100 firms or 87.0 percent agreed strongly supporting the hypothesis.    
Table 5.3a Sizeable and unified market favourable to trade and investment 





Valid Not important at all 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  Moderately important 6 6.0 6.0 7.0 
  Important 6 6.0 6.0 13.0 
  Very important 87 87.0 87.0 100.0 





Table 5.3b shows the cross-tabulation between industry sector, country of origin and the 
view on that monetary union provided a sizeable and unified market favourable to trade 
and investment and Table 5.3c the associated chi-square test. This test reveals that there 
is significant association between business sectors and the view on sizeable and unified 
market favourable to trade and investment in Cote d’Ivoire given its membership to 
WAEMU while in Ghana there is no significant association between the variables. 
Table 5.3b Business sector, country of origin and Sizeable and unified market 
favourable to trade and investment: Cross-tabulation 
 











Q2 Agriculture Count 1 0 0 6 7 
% within Q2 14.3% .0% .0% 85.7% 100.0% 
Industry Count 0 1 2 36 39 
% within Q2 .0% 2.6% 5.1% 92.3% 100.0% 
Services Count 0 2 1 8 11 
% within Q2 .0% 18.2% 9.1% 72.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 3 3 50 57 
% within Q2 1.8% 5.3% 5.3% 87.7% 100.0% 
Ghana Q2 Agriculture Count  0 0 2 2 
% within Q2  .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Industry Count  3 0 23 26 
% within Q2  11.5% .0% 88.5% 100.0% 
Services Count  0 3 12 15 
% within Q2  .0% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Total Count  3 3 37 43 










Table 5.3c Business sector, country of origin and Sizeable and unified market 
favourable to trade and investment: Chi-Square Tests 






12.594(a) 6 .050 
  N of Valid Cases 57   
Ghana Pearson Chi-Square 7.688(b) 4 .104 
  N of Valid Cases 43   
 
The European Union has unified 27 different markets providing great potential to 
Ivorian firms. These firms have the opportunity to penetrate any European markets and 
sell their products to more than 300 million people. They can invest in the European 
financial market and/or raise capital for future business expansion. Also, any European 
firms can work closely with their Ivorian counterparts or set up their own business to 
promote their products as well as their expertise.  
The Euro is set to be a mean of payment for all these firms operating in the two systems, 
thereby reducing exchange rate risks and transaction costs. According to Akamavi et al. 
(2004, P 462), tied to the Euro with its convertibility guaranteed, the CFA Franc has the 
strength of the world’s largest market bloc behind it. This is an incentive for increasing 
investment from all over Europe and further diversification from traditional French 
investors. 
 
In the WAEMU region, foreign exchange controls were abolished, making financial 
integration much easier so that capital can move around, opening up the financial 
market of all member countries to all the banks. 
Many regulations are harmonized so that firms can produce to specifications common to 
all member states. This means that products are standardized, removing many non-tariff 
barriers to trade. 
 
Conclusion 
Our studies show that the variable ‘country of origin’ is very important as the 
significant relationship between different variables depends whether the firms are based 
in Cote d’Ivoire or Ghana. We find that the only issue commonly important for both 
countries is research and development, even though it is more highly significant in Cote 
d’Ivoire than Ghana. It is due to the fact Cote d’Ivoire is much more advanced 
economically than Ghana. Ivorian firms are investing considerable funds for research 
and development to cope with huge demand from the highly educated and sophisticated 
customers locally and other CFA Franc states. Given the development of infrastructure, 
the Ivorian firms have the potential and opportunities to cover the entire region.    
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8.2 SURVEY ANALYSIS USING CORRELATION  
 
The most familiar measure of dependence between two quantities is the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient, or "Pearson's correlation." It is obtained by 
dividing the covariance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations. 
The Pearson correlation is defined only if both of the standard deviations are finite and 
both of them are nonzero. It is a corollary of the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality that the 
correlation cannot exceed 1 in absolute value. The correlation coefficient is symmetric: 
corr(X,Y) = corr(Y,X). 
The Pearson correlation is +1 in the case of a perfect positive (increasing) linear 
relationship, −1 in the case of a perfect decreasing (negative) linear relationship [5], and 
some value between −1 and 1 in all other cases, indicating the degree of linear 
dependence between the variables. As it approaches zero there is less of a relationship. 
The closer the coefficient is to either −1 or 1, the stronger the correlation between the 
variables. 
If the variables are independent, Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0, but the converse 
is not true because the correlation coefficient detects only linear dependencies between 
two variables. For example, suppose the random variable X is symmetrically distributed 
about zero, and Y = X
2
. Then Y is completely determined by X, so that X and Y are 
perfectly dependent, but their correlation is zero; they are uncorrelated. However, in the 
special case when X and Y are jointly normal, uncorrelatedness is equivalent to 
independence. 
If we have a series of n measurements of X and Y written as xi and yi where i = 1, 2, ..., 
n, then the sample correlation coefficient, can be used to estimate the population 




where x and y are the sample means of X and Y, sx and sy are the sample standard 











The correlation test reveals the results below:  
 













trade and finance in 




Pearson Correlation .310* -.335*  
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .028 n/a 
N 48 43  
13b: Consumer goods Pearson Correlation -.421** .351* .293* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .021 .028 












trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
14a: Products are 
produced by own 
company 
Pearson Correlation -.287*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .048 n/a n/a 
N 48   
14c: Company distributes 
imported goods  
Pearson Correlation -.334*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 n/a n/a 
N 48   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 















trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
9: Company size Pearson Correlation  .376*  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .034 n/a 
N  32  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
From a series of studies, there is exposure of exchange rate regime across industries and 
firm attributes. As result, large firms, firms with high export rates, firms with large 
foreign ownership as well as those involved in distributing imported goods, are more 
exposed to exchange rate fluctuations than other firms. Especially, in Ghana, the 
exchange rate issue depends on the size of the company due the fact that the country 
opted for flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
This is confirmed by Broz et al. (2007, P 4) argue that little academic work directly 
addresses the exchange rate attitudes to business owners operating in different sectors of 
the economy. By contrast, there is a large body of work that examines sectoral and 
factoral attitudes towards trade policy. Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES), Broz and his team find systematic 
patterns linking sector of economic activity to exchange rate policy positions. Such 
analyses typically present that international oriented firms will be especially averse to 
the volatility associated with a floating rate and will therefore prefer a fixed exchange 
rate. They also typically suggest that tradable producers will be particularly averse to 
the relative price effects of a real appreciation. Nontradable producers, conversely, are 
expected to prefer floating rates and an appreciated currency (P 23). 
 
Fiawoyife & Abor (2007, P 144) reveals that firms engaged in international trade have 
difficulties in trading across borders. These difficulties include bureaucracies in 
obtaining trade documents, high tariffs, difficulties in pricing in foreign currencies, 
foreign exchange risks, smuggling, restrictions at border and problems of clearing goods 
at ports and harbours, unfair competition from informal traders and harassment by 
border officials. 
 
Dahlquist, Magnus and Robertsson, G¨oran (2001, P 2) conducted a survey on 352 
individual Swedish firms exposure on both an aggregated exchange rate index and to 
individual currencies. They find that large firms, firms with high export rates, and firms 
with large foreign ownership are more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations than other 
firms. However, firms in these groups show both negative and positive exposure, 
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suggesting that exposure is reduced through diversification, even among firms with 
similar attributes. Nevertheless, we find that exchange rate exposure disappears even 
when forming portfolios of firms with similar attributes.  
 
Following a textbook treatment, it can be categorized into economic exposure and 
translation exposure. Economic exposure is defined as the effect on a firm’s cash flows, 
and can in turn be divided into transaction exposure and operating exposure. 
Transaction exposure is the exposure that a firm is subject to when it has entered a 
contract denominated in a foreign currency but which is to be settled at a future date. 
On the other hand, translation exposure (or accounting exposure) arises as a result of 
translating the financial statements of a foreign subsidiary into the reporting currency of 
the parent company to prepare consolidated financial statements. 
Even firms with no foreign transactions are subject to operating exchange rate exposure 
for two reasons. The first reason is that competitiveness is altered when exchange rates 
change. This affects earnings for firms that have foreign competitors, leading to an 
increase in firm value when a depreciation of the domestic currency occurs. The second 
reason is valid even for firms that have no foreign competitors since exchange rate 
changes may affect the prices of inputs. For example, if the domestic currency 
depreciates, the export industry does well. This means that exporting firms have a 
































trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
17c: Technological efficiency Pearson Correlation -.431** .439**  
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .003 n/a 
N 48 43  
17d: Quality of customer services 
 
Pearson Correlation   .333* 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .012 
N   56 
17e: Product costs Pearson Correlation   .373** 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .005 
N   56 
17i: Financial resources and capital 
assets 
Pearson Correlation   .370** 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .005 
N   56 
17k: Marketing research and customer 
intelligence 
Pearson Correlation -.308*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .033 n/a n/a 
N 48   
17l: Research and development  Pearson Correlation   .313* 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .019 
N   56 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Note: there is no correlation between the different variable in Ghana 
 
This correlation covers the issues of technological efficiency, product costs, financial 
resources and capital assets, marketing research and customer intelligence and research 
and development. 
According to Mesquita & Lazzarini (2008, P 359), in most developing economies, firms 
are urged to become internationally competitive to boost exports and decrease country 
risk exposure; at the same time, these firms tend to be deprived of the superior 
technology and supporting infrastructure often found in developed countries, such as 
government support, efficient ports, shared scale-efficient resources that would ease 
reaching global markets. They found that different types of ties matter in different ways 
for these SMEs’ collective efficiencies. For instance, vertical ties yield manufacturing 
productivity along the supply chain, while horizontal ties enable collective resource use 
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as well as joint product innovation. These collective efficiencies, in turn, serve as 
competitive currencies helping SMEs access global markets.   
Again, Chelariu et al. (2002, P 457) examine two issues related to the implementation of 
market orientation among sub-Saharan African firms especially Cote d’Ivoire. They 
stress that Ivorian firms can, potentially, compete in world markets with appropriate 
market-oriented strategies.  
The findings of their study show that Ivorian firms must realign structural influences, 
systems and incentives to reflect both the objectives of the firm and to be sensitive to 
local conditions. However, factors such as lack of marketing skills, lack of financial 
resources and government intervention like price controls, are likely to be important 
deterrents in implementing market orientation (P 467) 













trade and finance 
in term of 
industrial 
countries monies 
18b: Cultural aspects Pearson Correlation  -.395**  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .009 n/a 
N  43  
18i: Product diversification Pearson Correlation -.322* .369*  
Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .015 n/a 
N 48 43  
18n: Research and development 
policy 
Pearson Correlation   .294* 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .028 
N   56 
18s: Service to the community 
and the country 
Pearson Correlation  .349*  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .022 n/a 
N  43  
19c: Local social values and 
customs 
Pearson Correlation  -.344*  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .024 n/a 
N  43  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
















trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
18c: Local infrastructures Pearson Correlation  .417*  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .016 n/a 
N  33  
18i: Product diversification Pearson Correlation -.534**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 n/a n/a 
N 36   
18n: Research and 
development policy 
Pearson Correlation  .474**  
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a .005 n/a 
N  33  
18r: Excellent public 
relation 
Pearson Correlation -.509**   
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 n/a n/a 
N 36   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
No correlation between exchange rate and company strategy and decision-making. 
This relationship is mainly based on non-technical issues such as cultural aspects, 
services to the community, local social values and customs, local infrastructures and 
excellent public relation including product diversification and research and 
development. As a result, Dobson & Yui (P 263 - 266) reveal that the first implication 
for trade and investment, concerns international firms’ impact on regional integration. 
The impact is mixed. Firms investing from within the region are more likely to 
contribute to intraregional trade than those investing from outside the region. Most 
international firms, as they mature, aspire to global strategies; hence, intraregional 
production and trade tend to be organized or, at least, to be rationalized within a global 
rather than strictly regional division of labour. 
 
The second implication is directly related. The close ties between the regional activities 
of multinationals (and those of the larger regional firms) and their global strategies have 
important implications for governments’ roles in influencing locational advantages. In a 
number of countries, the domestic market is still not fully open. Firms in Thailand 
surveyed by Ramstetter, for example, saw the lack of transparency in import regulations 
as a persistent problem. Governments continue to rely on more direct interventions in 

















trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
16b: Poor raw material 
flows / supplies 
Pearson Correlation   .276* 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .040 
N   56 
16d: Competitive threats 
from multinationals 
Pearson Correlation -.341*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 n/a n/a 
N 48   
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 












trade and finance in 
term of industrial 
countries monies 
16g: Scarcity of qualified 
workers 
Pearson Correlation .357*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 n/a n/a 
N 36   
16i: Local infrastructures Pearson Correlation .387*   
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 n/a n/a 
N 36   
16k: Bureaucracy burdens Pearson Correlation   -.344* 
Sig. (2-tailed) n/a n/a .026 
N   42 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
This correlation includes diverse issues such as poor raw materials flows and supplies, 
competitive threats from multinational, scarcity of qualified workers, local 
infrastructures and bureaucracy burdens. These issues are covered by Dobson and Yui 
(1997). To them, international firms create linkages across borders in their search for 
profitable opportunities through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology 
contracts, and other arrangements that provide flexibility needed to adjust to change and 
uncertainty in increasingly competitive factor and product markets (P 3). Dobson et al. 
found that the impact of the regional integration leads to a high degree of intrafirm 
trade. Intrafirm trade increases because of disintegration of numerous discrete value-
chain activities within the firm to reduce transaction costs. Also, it is a positive 
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development in economies pursuing industrial upgrading and enables East Asian 
economies to embark on export manufacturing without having to undergo a lengthy and 
costly period of building up technological, exporting, and marketing capabilities. 
 
From the perspective of the international firm, intrafirm trade ensures greater control 
over both upstream suppliers and downstream markets, particularly in business 
environments characterized by diverse political, economic, and legal frameworks. But 
the use of local suppliers, as well as the transfer of technology and industrial know-how 
from foreign investors to local firms, has been slow because it raises transaction costs, 
particularly among the less-internationalized firms. The more experienced the 
international firm is, the more it is capable of locating and using local suppliers (P 263-
266). 
 
Also, to Fiawoyife & Abor (2007, P 151), firms engaged in international trade have 
difficulties in trading across borders. These difficulties include bureaucracies in 
obtaining trade documents, high tariffs, difficulties in pricing in foreign currencies, 
foreign exchange risks, smuggling, restrictions at border and problems of clearing goods 
at ports and harbours, unfair competition from informal traders and harassment by 
border officials. 
These difficulties, the firms believe, would be reduced, if not, entirely removed by 
regional integration. Consequently, regional integration would provide enough 





















The main focus of the thesis has been to highlight the challenges facing Ivorian and 
Ghanaian firms operating internationally. Consequently, we stress the impact of the 
exchange rate regime on a company’s success in West Africa and how a monetary union 
is an interesting framework for these firms. 
To achieve the above objective, we defined the different monetary unions and identified 
their main characteristics or features. The costs and benefits of joining a monetary union 
have been reviewed and it is noticed that in the case of WAEMU, the decision to set up 
a currency union was more political than economic. It has been concluded that Western 
African countries are not doing well despite regular and profound macroeconomic 
policy reforms and some political will and commitments. 
The CFA zone comprising 14 countries in West and Central Africa was set up by 
France, their colonial master. As result, their common currency was not traded on 
foreign exchange markets but fully convertible into the French Franc guaranteed by the 
French Treasury through a special operations account at the Banque of France. 
According to Stephen Dearden (1999), the operations account can run into deficit and 
more effectively offer unlimited overdraft facilities. This allows the CFA states to avoid 
short run balance of payments constraints. In return, the two CFA zone central banks 
are required to deposit 65 percent of the foreign exchange reserves in their accounts. 
Also, the French authorities participate in monetary policy formulation for the whole 
zone. The central feature of Cote d’Ivoire’s economic policy is the pegged exchange 
rate regime whereby monetary policy is determined by the regional central bank 
(BCEAO). As a result, the government relies on fiscal policy as its main policy 
instrument. Fiscal policy has been and still the main source of disagreement with the 
International Monetary Fund; particularly at period of political crisis when the country 
accumulates domestic and external payment arrears. The government focuses on the 
most urgent and politically sensitive obligations, which are, paying civil service wages 
with other matters taking lower priority. It boosts its revenue by getting a solidarity levy 
on salaries, a series of new licences and fees for various activities and by efforts to 
improve tax collection. Helped by the reunification of the country since 2006, the 
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economy is recovering with the increased in private sector confidence and investment 
and the ongoing rehabilitation of public infrastructures.  
Comparatively, in the 1980s, the Ghanaian government launched a comprehensive 
economic recovery programme backed by the IMF and the World Bank, with the 
objective of reducing macroeconomic imbalances and carrying out structural reform of 
the economy. The policies and programmes set up established fiscal and monetary 
discipline and exchange rate liberalisation. The financial sector was also liberalised, 
ending government participation in banking and clearing bad loans from banks balance 
sheets. As result, competition was increased in the banking sector leading to innovation 
in the financial environment. 
Since its return to multiparty democracy in 1992, the government has continued with its 
economic reforms more slowly than donors and local business would have liked. Also, 
the financial sector has been reformed so that it can play a greater role in private sector 
development. In its most recent assessment (2003-2006), the IMF was relatively 
positive about the government’s performance particularly its commitment to policy 
implementation which contributed to the country’s strong economic performance in 
recent years. Under the present government’s declared era of ‘the Golden Age of 
Business’, the need for a vibrant private sector to act as the engine of growth has even 
gained more recognition (Fening et al., 2008, P 694). 
Moreover, the Ghanaian central bank is aware that high interest rates are hurting the 
private sector and therefore has a bias towards easing monetary policy in the hope that 
commercial banks will lower their lending rates which will encourage borrowing and 
investment. 
The last few years have seen the need to create a monetary union in the sub-region, the 
West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as a necessary step to increase intra-regional 
trade, catalyse foreign investment and stimulate economic growth (Fiawoyife & Abor, 
2007; Masson, 2008). That first stage will lead to a combination of the two monetary 
unions (WAEMU and WAMZ) aims to boost the economy of member states, build up 
strong political commitment as well as macroeconomic policy credibility and strategies 
to cope with asymmetric shocks. However, it is hoped, monetary union in Africa will 
accelerate the process of macroeconomic stability by strengthening national 
programmes of macroeconomic management, including price and exchange rate 
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stability and enhance monetary stability, with strict budgetary discipline and stronger 
growth performance. In fact, it has stated that monetary union among developing 
countries will encourage the mobilization, the management and the efficient 
contribution of human and financial resources. In Africa especially, the opportunities 
are so limited that these resources are diverging to developed economies such as France, 
Switzerland and the UK, called capital flight therefore there is great need to tighten 
economic and monetary integration among African countries.  Generally, those 
countries have to set up strong regional institutions integrating their economies 
including the removal of trade barriers, diversifying exports, tax reforms, encouraging 
economies of scale and innovations, developing infrastructures, improving the business 
environment and greater transparency in the legal and regulatory system, liberalizing 
investment and fewer restrictions on profit, strengthening banking and financial systems 
and social policies. Furthermore, the world economy witnessed increased effort to 
create an economic and monetary union resulted in a strong improvement in economic 
performance, rapid technological advancement and strong influences on global 
economic issues. The case of the European monetary union is a good example for its 
African counterparts. With monetary and economic integration, African countries could 
reduce debts burden and resources flows and control the decline of commodity prices. 
They could also benefit from the reform of the international financial system. For 
African nations today, economic and monetary integration is not a choice but a 
necessity due to external shocks, external public debts and internal credit. 
As discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the benefits of a monetary union are numerous at 
the microeconomic level. However, the creation of a single currency contributes to 
economic efficiency resulting in the elimination of transaction costs associated with the 
exchange of national currencies and risks coming from the uncertain future movements 
of the exchange rate. It is also resulting in lower transaction costs associated with 
trading goods and assets in different currencies which, in turn, enhances trade and 
therefore generates higher benefits from economic specialisation. That elimination of 
transaction costs reduces price discrimination across national markets. Mordi (2002) 
argued that monetary union can provide a stimulus to growth and employment. It will 
promote investment and employment in two ways: firstly, because it is based on a solid 
economic framework that puts public sector deficits under control and secures price 
stability. It will foster trade, improve the allocation of resources, encourage increased 
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savings, enhance growth and in the end create more employment and higher living 
standards. Second, the common central bank will have the means to fulfil its primary 
objective of ensuring price and monetary stability throughout the union; it will foster 
market confidence, which in turn should lower interest rates, especially long term rates.  
Although this thesis provides a detailed analysis of business operations in Cote d’Ivoire 
and Ghana, the author can conclude systematically that being part of monetary union is 
of benefit to West African companies. From the survey, we find different results using 
different statistical tools. By using the comparative descriptive statistics and difference 
of means tests, it is strongly suggested that West African firms would benefit from 
operating within a monetary union. Both Ivorian and Ghanaian firms strongly agree that 
the following issues impact their business operations: convertibility, exchange rate 
volatility, lower inflation and interest rate, transaction costs, price stability, capital 
inflows and integration between countries in the region. 
Also, by using frequency, cross-tabulation, chi-square tests and correlation tests, there 
are significant differences between Ivorian and Ghanaian firms despite the tremendous 
similarity economically, socially and culturally of the two countries. However, Ivorian 
businesses have the potential and opportunities to compete internationally better than 
their neighbouring counterparts. As argued, Chelariu et al. (2002, P 458) find that the 
Ivorian level of GDP per capita is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, implying 
the presence of a significant proportion of consumers with substantial purchasing power. 
Consequently, these firms can benefit from being market-oriented. They add Cote 
d’Ivoire has a long history of positive net trade accounts with the rest of the world, 
primarily with European and US markets, a feat that is rare in Africa. This implies that 
Ivorian firms can, potentially, compete in world markets with appropriate market-
oriented strategies. 
Two major issues are extremely significant to Ivorian and Ghanaian firms deeply 
developed across chapters 6 and 8: 
 Socio-political instability 
 Research and development 
Firms can only expand within a stable economic and socio-political environment 
released from the enormous rebellions, coups and demonstrations seen in both countries. 
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Again, firms need to invest in research and development, the engine for their expansion 
in particular and the whole nation in general. 
Finally, our analysis reveals the majority of issues covered by various authors and 
researchers worldwide. Therefore, there are similarities between our study and modern 
literature. But, there are limitations to our study. However, these limitations result 
directly from the way the research questions have been framed and the definition of the 
scope of the research. Firstly, the domaine of our study is developing countries 
especially two West African countries sharing the same border, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana. But, we stress that the study can be generalize to other African states due to their 
similarities at political, cultural and socio-political levels. Secondly, we limit the study 
to a particular time period. The survey is conducted between 2002 and 2004; and the 
whole theoretical aspects of the subject cover the period 1960 – 2006. We believe that 
with globalization, the business world changes dramatically coupled with liberalization 
policies across all sectors of the economy of developing countries. 
A significant number of economists encounter the same issues. Doh et al. (2004, P 246) 
reveal that the domaine of their study is emerging markets and also limit their research 
to a particular time period between 1990 and 1998. Given its exploratory nature, the 
study was limited to one Sub-Saharan African low-income emerging economy, Ghana. 
Although the business and economic environmental conditions in Ghana such as the 
implementation of economic liberalization and privatization policies, and increasing 
competition would lend support to the generalizability of the findings to other low-
income Sub-Saharan African countries. However, whether the findings can be 
generalized to international joint-ventures operating in the low-income emerging 
economies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe is an empirical 
question. Clearly, replication of the study in different national environments in Sub-
Saharan Africa and other emerging economies is warranted (Acquaah, 2009, P 58) 
In line of micro-effects of macro policies, Dobson & Yui (1997, P 263) argued that 
government incentives and subsidies that attract investment from one location to 
another that would otherwise have taken place on the grounds of transaction costs alone 
represent (1) transfers from taxpayers in the country providing the subsidy to the firm 
and its shareholders and (2) compensation of the firm for increased costs and reduced 
overall efficiency. Also, governments should be moving toward framework policies that 
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create new endowments, of skilled labour for example, through policy shifts from mere 
removal of illiteracy and supply of vocational education to the supply of education for 
technical and engineering labour and information technology. 
We can now admit that it is quite difficult to find strong academic researches covering 
comparative studies on two African countries especially Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and 
also discussing micro effects of macro policies using the same methodology we applied. 
Furthermore, some questions will be removed from the questionnaire to make it concise 
and focus. 
9.2 Contribution to knowledge 
The original contribution to knowledge is the focus on the integration issues in West 
Africa based on a qualitative assumption that monetary union has a contribution to 
make in resolving the various African development issues. 
More than two hundred questionnaires were sent out of which one hundred were 
completed (57 for Cote d’Ivoire and 43 for Ghana) and statistical tools are used for an 
analysis of findings. As a result, we notice how important is for companies to operate 
within a monetary union for Ivorian firms and more and more Ghanaians. Firstly, a 
monetary union involves two major elements which are: 
 An exchange rate union for example an area within which exchange rates have a 
permanently fixed relationship to each other even though the rates may vary 
relative to non-union currencies. 
 
 Convertibility: the permanent absence of all exchange controls whether for 
current or capital transactions within the area. 
 
Secondly, the benefits of monetary union are that it reduces transactions costs through 
the reduction of speculative capital flows and the elimination of the costs of currency 
conversion and hedging of exchange rate risks. Also, a monetary union increases trade 
and investment by reducing exchange rate uncertainty and risks. Finally, it enhances 
policy discipline and credibility thus reducing country risks premium and increasing 
private capital flows and domestic economic activity. 
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As result, since 2000, various monetary integrations have taken place. In West Africa, 
the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is set up by Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, 
Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia which is making slow progress but the different 
governments are very determined to push ahead. Later, it is intended that WAMZ will 
merge with the existing West African Economic and Monetary Union in order to create 
a West Africa single currency. Consequently, the concept emerges of a powerful 
integration between African countries positioning themselves in the global Economy. 
Like the European Monetary Union, Africa with its wealthy potential will contribute 
much more to the world economy. 
Furthermore, the choice of fixed exchange rate regime or the adoption of a common 
currency, the pooling of foreign exchange resources, a common central bank, factor 
mobility and harmonization of monetary, fiscal and credit policies are features of a 
durable monetary union. Although the financial sovereignty is determined by the 
common central bank, it is sometimes difficult for individual member states to control 
economic shocks. Their budget deficits may be reduced by improving fiscal positions, 
the price transparency may increase competition and most importantly, the intra-
regional trade is expected to increase. 
More and more, African leaders are focusing on integration as a way to promote the 
economic and political development of the continent but they need a strong political 
commitment. The establishment of a monetary union in the region is part of a general 
effort by African leaders to integrate the region with a view to enhancing trade and 
ultimately improve living conditions on the continent. 
That idea of monetary union has been reinforced by the successful launching of the 
Euro in 1999 and the severe economic costs of the spate of currency crisis experienced 
in Western Europe, Mexico and East Asia in the 1990s. 
The contribution to knowledge comes from the examination of the experience of Ivorian 
firms in a monetary union linked to the Euro zone and those that are not, the Ghanaian 
ones. Information has been collected on a range of commercial aspects. This provides 
the basis for an evaluation of the benefits and costs of links to a single currency zone in 
a variety of world economic environments. Given the numerous socio-political and 
military instability seen in West Africa, businesses are better off operating within a 
monetary union. Thus, they have the opportunity to easily strengthen their activities 
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across borders. Different studies concluded that Ghanaian companies are largely aware 
of the creation of a monetary union for the sub-region and its implications for firms’ 
growth (Fiawoyife & Abor, 2007, P 151). 
9.3 Recommendation 
Both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana have introduced substantial reforms since the 1980s. 
Both have undertaken a large number of policy and regulatory changes to liberalize a 
previously highly protected and public sector denominated economy. Measures which 
have impacted upon all business sectors including the introduction of a market based 
foreign exchange system, liberalisation of trade policy, privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and fiscal policy reforms. Overall, the Ivorian economy performs well above 
that of Ghana which can do better within a monetary union therefore currency union is 
recommended for the whole region. Different studies including this study reveal that 
Ghanaian firms are well-aware of the benefits of a monetary union. As a result, more 
attention is focused on the creation of WAMZ leading to a monetary union for the sub-
region and its implications for firms’ growth. Therefore, there is great need to intensify 
public awareness on the issue and conduct in-depth research to minimize the adverse 
socio-economic impacts associated with monetary unions. Despite the loss of monetary 
and exchange rate policy instrument which is likely to result in instability among 
member states, the advantages of a currency union are enormous. Monetary union 
seems the logical way to boost inter-regional trade and investment through the reduction 
of transaction costs and the removal of the imbalances associated with flexible exchange 
rate regime, free labour mobility, price transparency, policy discipline and credibility 
and finally, improved access to international financial markets.   
9.4 Future research 
An interesting research project would be to replicate this study to other Sub-Saharan 
African countries including Nigeria and South Africa as little has been done to 
investigate the deep impacts of the exchange rate regime on African businesses.  
The author is also passionate about conducting a research on community development 
in Africa inspired by the example of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh funded by Professor 
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FIRM-LEVEL RESPONSES TO MONETARY UNION AND EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIME. EVIDENCE FROM COTE D’IVOIRE AND GHANA 
 
This survey work is part of an academic research leading to a PhD degree in Economics at the 
University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the 
impact of the monetary union and exchange rate regime on a company success in West Africa. 
 
Please tick the appropriate box that is relevant to you. Please do not leave any questions unanswered. If 
you have any suggestions, please feel free to use spaces below for comments. 
For the scales: 1- strongly disagree, 2- slightly disagree, 3- neutral, 4- slightly agree, 5- strongly agree 





Section 1: Basic details 
 
1. Company name:……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
2. Nature of Business:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
  
3. Where is the company registered? …………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Does it have any subsidiaries?………………………………………………………………………... 
 









6.  Number of:  local staff…………………….                               
   Expatriates……………….……   in 2004  
 
 








8.   Type of employment 
 
 %  Permanent Temporary Contract 




9.  Company's size: small   medium   large   
 
 
10. How long has the company been established? 
 
 1 - 5yrs   5 - 10yrs   10 - 20yrs        20yrs & over  
 Creation date:………………. 
 
Section 2: Markets/ market forces 
 











12. What share of the market does your main product have? 
 
 
   % 
 
Comments: If you produce a range of products (say pharmaceuticals), indicate your size in relation to 








13. What kind of products does your company manufacture and percentage? 
 
a) Intermediate goods 
b) Consumer goods 





14. What is the company' s production / operation network? 
1.All 2.Some  3.None 
                                                                                             1 2   3      
a) Products are produced by own company 
b) Products are produced in other affiliates locally 
Or internationally 
c) Company distributes imported goods 
 
15. Does your company focus on a niche market related to a particular age group? 
 
0–20 years    20-40 years           40 years- over       all              not all 
 
Section 3: Financial details 
 
16. In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures in your industry? 
      1. Not important at all   2. Less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
 
                                                                                                  1  2    3  4   5 
a) Lack of responsiveness to demand   
b) Poor raw material flows / supplies 
c) Poor distribution channels 
d) Competitive threats from multinationals 
e) Competitive threats from other local industries 
f) Slowness of local administration 
g) Scarcity of qualified workers 
h) Managing change 
i) Local infrastructures 
j) Cultural barriers 
k) Bureaucracy burdens 
 
17. What is the company competitive advantage? 
1. Not important at all  2. Less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
  
                                                                                                  1  2   3   4   5 
a) Company's image 
b) Product quality 
c) Technological efficiency 
d) Quality of customer services 
e) Product costs                                                                                     
f) Management system 
g) Financial system 
h) Marketing system 
i) Financial resources and capital assets 
j) Bank credibility 
k) Marketing research and customer intelligence 
l) Research and development 
m) Communication system 





18.  What are the other variables influencing your company success? 
1. Strongly disagree  2. Slightly disagree  3. Neither (undecided)  4. Slightly agree  5. Strongly agree 
                                                                                                 1   2   3   4   5 
a) Geographic situation of the host country                            
b) Cultural aspects 
c) Local infrastructures 
d) Abundance of manpower 
e) Qualified workforce 
f) Clear corporate mission and objectives 
g) Effective strategic planning  
h) Quality management 
i) Product diversification 
j) Effective pricing policy 
k) Availability of raw materials 
l) Supply reliability 
m) Customer satisfaction 
n) Research and development policy 
o) Market shares 
p) Strong recruitment policy 
q) Co-operation with other industries 
r) Excellent public relation 
s) Service to the community and the country 






19. What is important to your company's planning, strategy setting and decision-making process? 
1. Not important at all  2. Less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
                                                                                                 1    2  3   4   5 
a) Local commercial regulation 
b) Global trade regulation 
c) Local social values and customs 




20. What is approximately the size of the market? 
 
 In currency ($ or Cedi)………….  
 In sales volumes…………………………….. … 
 
 
21. What is your company’s annual turnover? In  Cedi? 
 





22. What are the sources of initial investment capital? 
 
a) Domestic                          % 
b) Foreign                             % 
 
 
23. Which operations are computerised? 
 
a) Production only 
b) Administration only 
c) All operations 
d) Year of computerisation:   19 
 
 
Section 4: Risk management 
 
24. What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by your company? 
 Tick one box 
 
a) Currency pegged to major international currencies 
b) Completely flexible exchange rate 
c) International trade and finance in term of industrial countries monies 







25. In your opinion, is a fixed exchange rate regime beneficial for the following reasons? 
Tick one box or more 
 
a) Increases capital mobility 
b) Reduces exposure to exchange rate risks 
c) Increases benefit from portfolios diversification 
d) Increasing openness to international trade 
e) Shifting export towards manufactures 
f) Diversifying trade 
g) Greater interregional trade 












26. What are company benefits in operating in a fixed exchange rate states? 
1. Strongly disagree  2. Slightly disagree  3. Neither (undecided)  4. Slightly agree  5. Strongly agree 
                                                                                                         1   2   3  4   5 
a) Exchange rate is less volatile 
b) Price stability 
c) Enforcing trade and investment 
d) Inflation rate is under control 
e) Monitoring monetary policy by controlling exchange rate 
f) Growth of international trade 
g) Reducing risks of foreign exchange rate fluctuations 
h) Small fluctuation by maintaining pre-set narrow bands 
 
 
27. Could you evaluate your company's costs for operating in a fixed exchange rate regime? 
1. No impact  2. Little impact  3. Some impact  4. Important impact  5. Serious impact 
                                                                                                                  1   2   3   4   5 
a) Large foreign exchange reserves costs for international trade  
b) Cheaper imports  
c) Competition from foreign products 
d) Trading mostly with partners in developed countries 
 
 
28. Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible exchange rate regime? 
Tick one box or more 
 
a) Exchange rate is highly volatile 
b) Price instability 
c) Harming trade and investment 
d) High inflation rate 
 
29. What are company's advantages in operating in a flexible exchange rate system? 
1. No benefit  2. Some benefit  3. Moderate benefit  4. Important benefit  5. Very important benefit  
                                                                                        1   2   3  4   5     
a) Adjusting monetary policy without worrying         
about the exchange rate 
b) Cheaper exports and high import price protection 
 
 
30. How do exchange rate appreciations affect company investment policy? 
Tick one box or more 
  
a) Higher export price seriously reduces competitiveness 
b)  It is cheaper to replace imported equipment 









31. How do exchange rate adjustments affect company imports and exports? 
Tick one box or more 
 
a) Exchange rate depreciation stimulates exports and curtails imports 
b) Exchange rate appreciation damages exports and encourages imports 
c) Exchange rate depreciation improves exports price competitiveness 
d) Exchange rate depreciation encourage regional trade 
e) Exchange rate depreciation affects dollar-denominated debts by requiring 
more francs to pay off dollar debts 
 
 
32. What are the advantages to a company which is operating within a monetary union? 
1. Not important at all  2. Less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
                                                                                                                  1   2   3   4   5 
a) Encourages trade and financial flows 
b) Sources of funding for public and private borrowers 
c) Provides better channel for investment and savings 
d) Elimination of exchange rates risks 
e) Promotion of greater overall currency stability 
f) Encourages intra-zone trade and investment 
g) Reduces costs of hedging against currency fluctuations 
h) Elimination of transactions costs linked with conversion 
i) Better transparency in pricing 
j) Improving business competitiveness 
k) Simplification of procedures and operational issues 
l) A sizeable and unified market favourable to trade and investment 
m) Lower inflation and interest rates 
 
 
33. What are the costs for a company operating within a monetary union? 
1. Not important at all  2. Less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
                                                                                               1   2   3   4  5 
a) Less liberalised markets 
b) Policies inappropriate to domestic needs  
c) Concentration on monetary union export market 
 
 
Section 5: Foreign exchange 
 
 
34. What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange transactions? 
Tick one box or more 
 
a) Efficient payment facilities 
b) Long term credit for investment 








35. How does your company deal with exchange rate risks? 
Tick one box 
 
a) Uncovered 
b) Forward market hedging 




36. What are the company's foreign exchange risks? 
1. Not important at all  2. less important  3. Moderately important  4. Important  5. Very important 
                                           1  2   3   4   5 
a) Price level risk 
b) Interest rate risk 
 
 
37. For you, which are the variables influencing exchange rates? 
1. No impact  2. Little impact  3. Some impact  4. Important impact  5. Serious impact 
                                                                                                                  1   2   3  4   5 
a) Fluctuations in world prices 
b) Inflation differentials with major trading partner 
c) Capital inflows 
d) Pace of market reforms 






QUESTIONNAIRE DE RECHERCHE 
 
 
REPONSE DES ENTREPRISES AU PHENOMENE D’UNION 
MONETAIRE ET DU REGIME DU TAUX DE CHANGE. 
EVIDENCE DE LA COTE D’IVOIRE ET DU GHANA 
 
 
Cette étude fait partie d’une recherche académique conduisant au diplôme de PhD en 
Economie à l’Université de Westminster à Londres, Grande Bretagne. L’objectif de 
cette thèse est d’analyser l’impact du régime du taux de change sur le succès en 
productivité de l’Entreprise sans oublier les entreprises opérant dans une union 
monétaire. 
 
Prière cocher la case et entourer la réponse appropriée. Prière ne laisser aucune 
question sans réponse. Si vous avez une suggestion, vous voudriez bien utiliser les 
espaces prévus en dessous de chaque réponse. 
 
Pour l’échelle : 1- désapprouve catégoriquement, 2- désapprouve légèrement, 3- 
neutre, 4- approuve légèrement, 5- approuve vigoureusement. 
 
 
Section 1 : Information de base 
 
1. Nom de l’Entreprise :…………………………………………………… 
 
2. Quelle est le domaine d' activité?:………………………………………. 
 
3. Où est enregistrée l’Entreprise ? 
 
4. A-t-elle des succursales ? 
 









6. Nombre d’employée :   .locaux………………                                  








7. Effectif :  0 à 20              20 à 50            50 et plus (préciser)         …………
  
8.         Type d’emploi 
 




   
 
9. Quelle est la taille de votre entreprise 
 
Petite     Moyenne   Grande 
 
10.       Quand a-t-elle été implantée ?    
 
1 à 5 ans          5 à10 ans     10 à 20 ans                20 et plus   
Précisez l’année :……………….. 
 
Section 2 : Marches/ Forces du marche 
 











12. Quelle est la part  approximative du marche de l’entreprise dans son secteur 
d’industrie?      
                          
   En pourcentage    
 
13. Quel type de produits l’Entreprise fabrique-t-elle ? 
 
a)  Biens intermédiaires 






14. Quel est le circuit de production de l’Entreprise ? 
 1. Tous 2. Quelques uns 3. Rien 
 
a)  Biens produits par l’entreprise elle- même     
b)  Biens produits par une autre filiale sur le plan local ou 
international 
c)   L’entreprise distribue des biens importes 
   





15. Quelle est la clientèle ciblée par l’Entreprise ? 
 
  0 à 20  ans     20 à 40 ans        40 ans et au-delà Tous  Personne  
 
Section 3 : Informations financières 
 
16. Quelles sont les causes des échecs de votre entreprise ? 
 1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
  1    2    3     4    5 
a) Réponse à la demande      
b) Matière première et mouvement de l’offre      
c) Chaîne de distribution      
d) Compétition de la part des multinationales      
e) Compétition de la part des autres industries locales      
f) Lourdeur de l’Administration locale      
g) Manque de main d’oeuvre qualifiée      
h) Gestion des changements et résistance      
i) Infrastructures locales      
j) Barrières culturelles      
k) Forte bureaucratie      
 
17. Quel est l’avantage concurrentiel de votre entreprise ? 
1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
1    2     3     4     5 
a) Image de l’entreprise      
b) Qualité des produits      
c) Technologie efficiente      
d) Qualité du service clients      
e) Circuit de production      
f)  Système de gestion      
g)  Système financier      
h)  Système marketing      
i)   Ressources financières et actifs immobilisés      
j)  Crédibilité bancaire      
k)   Recherche marketing et client      
l) Recherche et développement      





18. Quelles sont les autres variables qui contribuent au succès de votre entreprise ? 
1. Intense désaccord 2. Peu de désaccord 3. Indécis 4. Un peu d’ accord 5. Intense accord 
1     2    3      4    5 
a) Situation géographique du pays hote      
b) Aspect culturel      
c) Infrastructures locales       
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d) Abondance de main d’oeuvre      
e) Main d’oeuvre qualifiée      
f) Mission et objectifs de l’entreprise      
g) Planification stratégique effective      
h) Qualité du management      
i) Diversification des biens et services      
j) Politique de prix effective      
k) Abondance de matière première      
l) Offre disponible      
m) Satisfaction de la clientèle      
n) Politique de recherche et développement      
o) Part importante du marché      
p) Forte politique de recrutement      
q) Coopération avec les autres industries      
r) Excellente relation publique      
s) Service à la communauté et au pays      
t) Autres, spécifiez SVP      
 
19. Quelles sont les données prises en compte dans la planification et les prises de 
décision de votre entreprise ? 
1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
 
1      2     3    4    5 
a) Régularisation du commerce locale 
b) Régularisation du commerce global 
c) Valeurs sociales locales et coutumes 
d) Code d’investissement 
     
     
     
     
 
20.    Quelle est la taille approximative du marché ? 
 
        a) En monnaie FCFA………………………………………  
        b) Volume de vente………………………………………..  
 
21.     Quel est le chiffre d’affaire de l’Entreprise ? 
 
Actuellement : 1 m          1 à 10 m          10 à 20 m         20 à 30 m        30 à 50 m   
                          
50m et au-delà    
 





23. Les opérations de votre entreprise sont-elles informatisées ? 
 
a) Seulement la production 
b) Seulement l’administration 
 
 
a) Local   





c) Toutes les opérations 





Section 4 : Gestion du risque 
 
24. Qu’entendez vous  par réajustement de taux de charge ? 
Cocher une case 
 
a) Monnaie liée à des devises internationales 
b) Taux de change flexible 
c) Financement et commerce international en terme des monnaies des pays 
industrialisés 









25. Selon vous, le taux de change fixe est-il bénéfique pour les raisons 
suivantes ? : 
Cocher une case ou plus 
 
a) Augmenter le transfert des capitaux 
b) Confronter aux risques du taux de change 
c) Diversifier les portefeuilles 
d) Large ouverture sur le commerce international 
e) Passer de l’exportation à la transformation 
f) Diversifier le commerce 
g) Intensifier le commerce interrégional 

















26. Est-il bénéfique pour votre entreprise d’être dans un régime de taux de 
change fixe? 
1. Intense désaccord 2. Peu de désaccord 3. Indécis 4. Un peu d’ accord 5. Intense accord   
  
a) Taux de change moins volatile 
b) Stabilité de prix 
c) Renforcement du commerce et l’investissement 
d) Contrôle du taux d’inflation 
e) Contrôle du taux de change 
f) Croissance du commerce international 
g) Réduction des risques de fluctuation du taux de change 
h) Maintenir les taux de fluctuations dans des proportions pré-
     
     
     
     
     
     
     





27. Quels sont les coûts pour votre entreprise d’opérer en régime de taux de 
change fixe ? 
1. Pas d’impact 2. Peu d’impact 3. Quelque impact 4. Impact important 5. Impact sérieux 
 
a) Grande réserve en devises par le commerce international 
b) Importation moins chères et exportations chères 
c) Confrontation à une concurrence des produits étrangers 
d) Traiter plus avec les partenaires des pays développés 
     
     
     
     
 
28. Quels sont les problèmes rencontrés par votre entreprise en régime de taux de 
charge flexible ? 
Cocher une case ou plus 
 
a) Taux de change très volatile 
b) Instabilité des prix  
c) Affecter le commerce et  l’investissement 






29. Quels sont les avantages pour votre entreprise opérant dans un système de taux 
de change flexible ? 
1. Pas de bénéfice 2. Quelque bénéfice 3. Bénéfice modère 4. Important bénéfice 5. Sérieux bénéfice 
                                                                                                                         
a) Ajustement de la politique monétaire sans se préoccuper du 
taux de change 
b) Exportations moins chères et prix d’importation élevé 
   
 
  
     
 
 
30. Comment le taux de change affecte-t-il la politique d’investissement de votre 
entreprise ? 
Cocher une case ou plus 
 
a) Plus le taux de change est élevé, plus le prix des exportations est élevé 
b) Coût élevé des équipements importés 





31. Comment le taux de change affecte les exportations et importations de  votre 
entreprise? 
Cocher une case ou plus 
 
a) Stimulation des exportations et restriction des importations par la 
dépréciation du taux de change 
b) Stimulation des importations et restriction des exportations par 
l'appréciation du taux de change 
c) Fluctuations du taux de change affectent la compétitivité du prix des 
exportations 
d) Fluctuations du taux de change stimulent le commerce régional 










32. Quels sont les avantages pour votre entreprise opérant à l’intérieur d’une union 
monétaire ? 
1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
                                                                                                                    
a) Performance du commerce et finance international 
b) Source de fonds pour les emprunts (publique et privé) 
c) Canal d’investissement et d’épargne 
d) Elimination des multiples risques du taux de change 
e) Promotion d’une grande stabilité de la monnaie 
f) Encouragement du commerce et de l’investissement 
interrégional 
g) Réduction des coûts de transactions contre toute fluctuation du 
taux de change 
h) Elimination des coûts de conversion 
i) Meilleure transparence dans les prix 
j) Amélioration de la compétitivité de l’Entreprise 
k) Simplification des problèmes de procédures et opérationnels 
l) Marché unique favorable au commerce et a l’investissement 
m) Bas taux d’inflation et d’intérêt 
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
    
 
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
33. Quels sont les coûts pour l’entreprise opérant à l’intérieur d’une union 
monétaire ? 
1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
 
a) Libéralisation des prix étant moindre 
b) Besoins domestiques étant inapproprié 
c) Marché des exportations étant restreint 
     
     







Section 5 : Taux de change 
 
34. Quel rôle joue votre banque dans vos transactions financières ? 
Cocher une case ou plus 
 
a) Rendre accessibles les moyens de paiement 
b) Faciliter les transferts 
c) Rendre accessibles les marchés des capitaux 
     
     
     
 
35. Comment votre entreprise fait elle face aux risques du taux de change ? 
Cocher une case 
 
a) ouvert 
b) vente anticipée 







36. Quels sont les risques de change pour votre entreprise ? 
1. Pas important du tout 2. Peu important 3. Modérément important 4. Important 5. Très important 
 
a)   Risque du niveau des prix 
b)   Risque du taux d’intérêt 
     
     
 
37. Quels sont, selon vous, les variables influençant le taux de change dans les 
pays en voie de développement ? 
1. Pas d’impact 2. Peu d’impact 3. Quelque impact 4. Impact important 5. Impact sérieux 
         1  2   3   4  5 
a) Fluctuations du terme de l'échange (relation entre les exportations  
et importations affectant la balance commerciale) 
     
b)  Inflation différentielle      
c)  Mouvement de capitaux      
d)  Etapes de reforme du marché      







Table 1a: Cote d’Ivoire  
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services as percent of GDP 
 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006  World Bank, World 


















YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1970 - - 
1971 - - 
1972 - - 
1973 38.5 40.4 
1974 46.3 42.1 
1975 37.6 40.1 
1976 42.3 38.7 
1977 43.7 38.6 
1978 38.3 39.7 
1979 35.4 39.3 
1980 35.2 40.7 
1981 34.0 39.1 
1982 37.0 39.0 
1983 36.4 38.4 
 1984 43.8 33.8 
1985 45.3 31.1 
1986 39.9 32.2 
1987 34.5 31.9 
1988 31.7 30.9 
1989 32.7 31.9 
1990 32.4 30.3 
1991 31.6 30.7 
1992 32.2 29.8 
1993 30.7 34.2 
1994 44.4 34.2 
1995 43.4 38.1 
1996 46.2 37.5 
1997 43.0 35.3 
1998 40.8 34.5 
1999 41.8 33.6 
2000 41.2 34.2 
2001 42.1 34.4 
2002 50.1 34.2 
2003 45.9 35.7 
2004 47.7 38.6 





Table 1b: Ghana  
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services as percent of GDP 
 
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1970 - - 
1971 - - 
1972 - - 
1973 21.5 17.2 
1974 18.3 22.6 
1975 19.4 19.2 
1976 15.7 16.8 
1977 10.5 11.6 
1978 8.4 9.0 
1979 11.3 10.4 
1980 7.8 7.6 
1981 3.1 4.7 
1982 2.3 2.6 
1983 2.3 3.0 
1984 8.1 9.3 
1985 10.6 13.3 
1986 14.0 17.0 
1987 18.7 24.7 
1988 18.4 24.3 
1989 16.9 24.5 
1990 15.8 24.2 
1991 16.7 25.1 
1992 17.2 28.8 
1993 20.3 36.4 
1994 25.5 36.8 
1995 24.5 32.8 
1996 24.9 34.3 
1997 24.0 37.9 
1998 27.0 36.0 
1999 17.0 26.0 
2000 49.0 67.5 
2001 45.0 65.0 
2002 42.0 54.0 
2003 40.0 52.0 
2004 34.5 54.4 
2005 30.4 49.5 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1981, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2006 






















Table 2a: COTE D’IVOIRE 











1970 0.471   0.39   
1971 0.459 -2.61 0.402 2.99 
1972 0.553 17.00 0.454 11.45 
1973 0.857 35.47 0.71 36.06 
1974 1.213 29.35 0.969 26.73 
1975 1.181 -2.71 1.127 14.02 
1976 1.632 27.63 1.296 13.04 
1977 2.157 24.34 1.756 26.20 
1978 2.322 7.11 2.326 24.51 
1979 2.514 7.64 2.491 6.62 
1980 3.135 19.81 2.991 16.72 
1981 2.533 -23.77 2.383 -25.51 
1982 2.298 -10.23 2.18 -9.31 
1983 2.091 -9.90 1.839 -18.54 
1984 2.707 22.76 1.497 -22.85 
1985 2.969 8.82 1.749 14.41 
1986 3.354 11.48 2.055 14.89 
1987 3.11 -7.85 2.241 8.30 
1988 2.77 -12.27 2.08 -7.74 
1989 2.807 1.32 2.111 1.47 
1990 3.072 8.63 2.098 -0.62 
1991 2.686 -14.37 2.103 0.24 
1992 2.875 6.57 2.352 10.59 
1993 2.519 -14.13 2.115 -11.21 
1994 2.742 8.13 1.917 -10.33 
1995 3.806 27.96 2.931 34.60 
1996 4.446 14.39 2.902 -1.00 
1997 4.451 0.11 2.781 -4.35 
1998 4.606 3.37 2.991 7.02 
1999 4.7 2.00 3.252 8.03 
2000 3.888 -20.88 2.535 -28.28 
2001 3.9 0.31 2.545 0.39 
2002 5.3 26.42 2.5 -1.80 
2003 5.8 8.62 3.2 21.88 
2004 6.9 15.94 4.2 23.81 
2005 7.2 4.17 4.7 10.64 























Table 2b: GHANA 




Growth (%) IMPORTS 
Import 
Growth (%) 
1970 0.5   0.4   
1971 0.3 -35.9 0.4 1.9 
1972 0.4 21.4 0.3 -39.8 
1973 0.6 25.1 0.4 29.8 
1974 0.7 21.4 0.8 47.9 
1975 0.8 9.7 0.8 -3.5 
1976 0.8 2.5 0.8 5.7 
1977 0.9 11.4 1.3 33.6 
1978 1.2 24.2 1.4 8.3 
1979 1.2 -2.7 1.3 -5.9 
1980 1.2 0.4 1.1 -15.1 
1981 1.0 -23.9 1.2 3.8 
1982 1.1 7.9 0.8 -51.5 
1983 0.7 -48.5 0.8 1.5 
1984 0.6 -19.7 0.7 -15.7 
1985 0.5 -30.8 0.8 14.2 
1986 0.9 47.2 0.8 -1.4 
1987 1.0 11.7 1.0 20.9 
1988 1.0 6.7 1.2 17.2 
1989 1.1 2.3 1.3 8.8 
1990 1.3 14.9 1.0 -35.4 
1991 0.6 -103.9 1.3 24.1 
1992 1.2 50.1 1.6 21.1 
1993 1.2 0.2 0.5 -215.9 
1994 1.6 22.3 2.1 76.1 
1995 1.6 2.1 2.1 -4.2 
1996 1.7 5.5 2.1 1.0 
1997 1.8 3.1 2.5 18.2 
1998 1.8 -1.3 3.4 26.0 
1999 1.8 -0.1 3.3 -5.2 
2000 1.5 -18.1 2.9 -13.4 
2001 1.5 -0.4 2.7 -6.9 
2002 1.7 10.4 3.0 10.8 
2003 2.0 16.8 3.9 22.3 
2004 2.3 12.2 5.3 26.4 
2005 2.3 3.8 5.8 9.6 




















 APPENDIX 7 
 
    
                                     
                                                  Table 7.1 Survey Results                       
    
                                                            
                                        Comparative Descriptive Statistics                      
 
Q'aire                                 Question        COTE D'IVOIRE                                   GHANA                                    
Code        m Mean Std Dev n Mean Std Dev 
16 
a 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Lack of responsiveness to demand 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.2632 1.50625 43 4.163 1.60253 
16 
b 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Poor raw materials flows / supplies  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.0526 1.65207 43 4.395 1.39965 
16 
c 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Poor distribution channels 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.2281 1.59259 43 4.535 1.20216 
16 
d 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Competitive threats from multinationals 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.6667 0.96978 43 4.93 0.33773 
16 
e 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Competitive threats from other local industries 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.1754 1.35123 43 4.581 0.95699 
16 
f 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Slowness of local administration 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.0526 1.28759 43 2.093 1.55554 
16 
g 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Scarcity of qualified workers 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.5088 1.3774 43 1.744 1.77406 
16 
h 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Managing change  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 1.5263 1.1968 43 2.093 1.55554 
16 
i 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Local infrastructures 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.9649 1.67934 43 3.628 1.73237 
16 
j 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Cultural barriers (1=Not important at all to 5=Very 
important) 57 1.2281 0.7796 43 1.488 1.09918 
16 
k 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company 
failures in your industry? 
Bureaucracy burdens 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.4035 1.46214 43 1.861 1.44059 
17 
a 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Company's image 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
17 
b 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Product quality 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
17 
c 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Technological efficiency 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.3684 1.24831 43 4.767 0.81174 
17 
d 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Quality of customer services 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.8246 0.50437 43 4.954 0.21308 
17 
e 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Product costs  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.5088 1.11999 43 4.814 0.5458 
17 
f 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Management system 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9649 0.18564 43 4.837 0.53141 
17 
g 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Financial system  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.8246 0.50437 43 4.674 0.71451 
17 
h 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Marketing system  57 4.7895 0.5586 43 4.814 0.50028 
229 
 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 
17 
i 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Financial resources and capital assets 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.7018 0.8653 43 4.698 0.80282 
17 
j 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Bank credibility  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9474 0.22528 43 4.837 0.68765 
17 
k 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Marketing research and customer intelligence 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.807 1.30163 43 4.116 1.19939 
17 
l 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Research and development 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.7719 1.59259 43 4.372 1.23488 
17 
m 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Communication system 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.807 0.66651 43 5 0 
18 
a 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Geographic situation of the host country 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree)  57 5 0 43 4.767 0.64871 
18 
b 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Cultural aspects  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 1.9649 1.48763 43 2.512 1.79114 
18 
c 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Local infrastructures 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.9474 0.22528 43 4.698 0.88734 
18 
d 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Abundance of manpower 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.7368 0.81342 43 4.814 0.69884 
18 
e 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Qualified workforce  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 3.386 1.37262 43 2.791 1.68407 
18 
f 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Clear corporate mission and objectives 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.9825 0.13245 43 5 0 
18 
g 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Effective strategic planning 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
18 
h 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Quality management 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
18 
i 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Product diversification 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.386 1.1141 43 4.767 0.78185 
18 
j 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Effective pricing policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.7193 0.70088 43 4.861 0.55982 
18 
k 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Availability of raw materials 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.614 1.08157 43 4.581 1.09615 
18 
l 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Supply reliability  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.9649 0.18564 43 4.93 0.33773 
18 
m 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Customer satisfaction 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.9298 0.31958 43 4.861 0.67547 
18 
n 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Research and development policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 3.7895 1.66623 43 4.465 1.31564 
18 
o 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Market shares  





What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Strong recruitment policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 3.2281 1.46406 43 3.698 1.61149 
18 
q 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Cooperation with other industries 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.6491 0.61212 43 4.767 0.6109 
18 
r 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Excellent public relation 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.7895 0.45264 43 4.744 0.75885 
18 
s 
What are the other variables influencing your 
company success? 
Service to the community and the country 







What is important to your company’ planning, 
strategy setting & decision-making process? 
Local commercial regulation 







What is important to your company’ planning, 
strategy setting & decision-making process? 
Global trade regulation 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 4.954 0.305 
19 
c 
What is important to your company’ planning, 
strategy setting & decision-making process? 
Local social values and customs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.2632 1.45806 43 3.279 1.56335 
19 
d 
What is important to your company’ planning, 
strategy setting & decision-making process? 
Investment codes  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.807 0.66651 43 4.93 0.33773 
22 
a 
What are your sources of initial investment capital? 
Domestic (%) 56 43.518 30.92277 43 50.72 35.563 
22 
b 
What are your sources of initial investment capital? 
Foreign (%) 54 58.574 29.45262 42 50.45 35.1417 
24 
a 
What is the percentage of output exported? 
Export CFA (or Ghana) - Euro zone (%) 48 40.223 34.70548 36 22.78 27.861 
24 
b 
What is the percentage of output exported? 
Others (%) 43 53.158 34.38589 33 49.52 32.3652 
25 
a 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by 
your company? 
Currency pegged to major international currencies  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.7857 0.41404 42 0.262 0.445 
25 
b 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by 
your company? 
Completely flexible exchange rate  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0 0 42 0.524 0.50549 
25 
c 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by 
your company? 
International trade and finance in term of industrial 
countries monies  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.2679 0.44685 42 0.286 0.45723 
26 
a 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Increases capital mobility  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.4737 0.50375 38 0.579 0.50036 
26 
b 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Reduces exposures to exchange rate risks  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.9474 0.22528 38 1 0 
26 
c 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Increases benefit from portfolios diversification  
(Y=1, N=0)  57 0.2632 0.44426 38 0.105 0.31101 
26 
d 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Increasing openness to international trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.5263 0.50375 38 0.395 0.49536 
26 
e 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Shifting export towards manufactures  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.5088 0.50437 38 0.158 0.36954 
26 
f 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Diversifying trade  





In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Greater interregional trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.8596 0.35044 38 0.421 0.50036 
26 
h 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial 
for the following reasons? 
Reducing inflation  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.9649 0.18564 38 0.947 0.22629 
27 
a 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Adjusting foreign exchange transactions and habits 
(Y=1,N=0) 57 1 0 43 0.977 0.1525 
27 
b 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Keeping informed of the Euro latest events  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.9825 0.13245 43 1 0 
27 
c 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Retraining staff and the management  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0 0 43 0 0 
27 
d 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Investing in new technologies  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.386 0.49115 43 0.302 0.4647 
27 
e 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Decentralizing the administration  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.0179 0.13363 43 0 0 
27 
f 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Assets conversion  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.0702 0.25771 43 0.07 0.25777 
27 
g 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Redenominating debts and effects  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0 0 43 0.047 0.21308 
27 
h 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Developing new markets, products and skills  
(Y=1, N=0)  57 0.4386 0.50063 43 0.465 0.50468 
27 
i 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Better exploitation of innovations, research and 
technological development  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.3333 0.47559 43 0.372 0.48908 
28 
a 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the 
Euro? 
Price transparency  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.9825 0.13245 43 1 0 
28 
b 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the 
Euro? 
Less currency convertibility issues  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 1 0 43 1 0 
28 
c 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the 
Euro? 
Cheaper imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.5088 0.50437 43 0.349 0.48224 
28 
d 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the 
Euro? 
Export promotion  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.8246 0.38372 43 0.488 0.50578 
29 
a 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Dealing with one currency instead of twelve different ones  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
29 
b 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
High integration between countries 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 4.884 0.54377 
29 
c 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Reducing transaction costs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
29 
d 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Principal sources of trading partners 





What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Low cost imports are guaranteed 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.9298 1.56821 42 3.714 1.43622 
29 
f 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Increasing market for company exports 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.7544 0.7856 43 4.884 0.44771 
29 
g 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Price stability 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9298 0.52981 43 4.93 0.33773 
29 
h 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Efficient use of cash 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.9649 1.63625 43 2.186 1.56229 
29 
i 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Controlling interest rate exposure 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.5965 0.70355 43 4.581 1.00552 
29 
j 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
High foreign investment due to increase trade links  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.8772 0.46561 43 4.605 0.76031 
29 
k 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Better and easier access to EU capital market 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
29 
l 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Reducing the burden of dollar denominated debts 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.4211 1.52301 43 2.07 1.51807 
32 
a 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Exchange rate is less volatile 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 5 0 34 5 0 
32 
b 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Price stability 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 5 0 34 4.912 0.37881 
32 
c 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Enforcing trade and investment 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 3.7018 1.22423 34 3.294 1.31494 
32 
d 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Inflation rate is under control 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.807 0.63916 34 4.971 0.1715 
32 
e 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Disciplining monetary policy by controlling exchange rate  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.8421 0.45472 34 4.647 0.73371 
32 
f 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Growth of international trade 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.0702 1.04982 34 3.5 1.35401 
32 
g 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Reducing risks of foreign exchange rate fluctuations 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 4.807 0.63916 34 4.941 0.23883 
32 
h 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Small fluctuation by maintaining pre-set narrow bands  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 57 3.7544 1.12251 33 3.849 1.0932 
33 
a 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for 
operating in a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Large foreign exchange reserves costs for international 
trade 
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 3.6316 1.42217 31 3.839 1.39276 
33 
b 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for 
operating in a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Cheaper imports  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 4 1.55839 31 2.871 1.70767 
33 
c 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for 
operating in a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Competition from foreign products 





Could you evaluate your company’s costs for 
operating in a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Trading mostly with partners in developed countries  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 4.3509 0.95415 32 4.625 0.87067 
34 
a 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
Exchange rate is highly volatile  
(Y=1, N=0) 48 0.9792 0.14434 43 0.977 0.1525 
34 
b 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
Price instability  
(Y=1, N=0) 48 0.9792 0.14434 43 0.907 0.2939 
34 
c 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
Harming trade and investment  
(Y=1, N=0) 47 0.5106 0.50529 43 0.116 0.32435 
34 
d 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
High inflation rate  
(Y=1, N=0) 47 0.9574 0.20403 43 0.907 0.2939 
35 
a 
What are your company’s advantages in operating in 
a flexible exchange rate regime? 
Adjusting monetary policy without worrying about the 
exchange rate  
(1=No benefit to 5=Very important benefit) 49 4.8367 0.79966 43 4.977 0.1525 
35 
b 
What are your company’s advantages in operating in 
a flexible exchange rate regime? 
Cheaper exports and high import price protection 
(1=No benefit to 5=Very important benefit) 49 3.898 1.55784 43 3.14 1.67021 
36 
a 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Higher export price seriously reduces competitiveness 
(Y=1, N=0)  56 0.8393 0.37059 42 0.595 0.4968 
36 
b 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Cheaper to replace imported equipment  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.7679 0.42602 42 0.548 0.50376 
36 
c 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Cheaper to purchase new technologies  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.7857 0.41404 42 0.405 0.4968 
37 
a 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation stimulates exports and 
curtails imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.6316 0.48666 43 0.488 0.50578 
37 
b 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate appreciation damages exports and 
encourages imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.386 0.49115 43 0.419 0.49917 
37 
c 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation improves exports price 
competitiveness  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.8772 0.33113 43 0.535 0.50468 
37 
d 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation encourage regional trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.7193 0.45334 43 0.744 0.44148 
37 
e 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation affects dollar-denominated 
debts by requiring more francs to pay off dollar debts  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.2982 0.46155 43 0.093 0.2939 
38 
a 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Encourages trade and financial flows 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9474 0.39736 43 4.861 0.67547 
38 
b 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Sources of funding for public and private borrowers 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.8421 0.70177 43 4.581 0.93178 
38 
c 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Provides better channel for investment and savings 





What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Elimination of exchange rates risks 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
38 
e 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Promotion of greater overall currency stability 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9825 0.13245 43 4.907 0.36606 
38 
f 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Encourages intra-zone trade and investment 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9123 0.391 43 4.907 0.42617 
38 
g 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Reduces costs of hedging against currency fluctuations  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.9123 0.54382 43 5 0 
38 
h 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Elimination of transactions costs linked with conversion  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 4.977 0.1525 
38 
i 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Better transparency in pricing 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 4.93 0.33773 
38 
j 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Improving business competitiveness 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.8772 0.59971 43 4.93 0.25777 
38 
k 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
Simplification of procedures and operational issues 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.2982 1.06846 43 4.512 0.79798 
38 
l 
What are the advantages to a company which 
operates within a monetary union? 
A sizeable and unified market favorable to trade and 
investment  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.7719 0.70755 43 4.791 0.55883 
38 
m 
What are the advantages to a company operating 
within a monetary union? 
Lower inflation and interest rates 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 5 0 43 5 0 
39 
a 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Less liberalized markets 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.0351 1.29511 43 4.861 0.51554 
39 
b 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Policies inappropriate to domestic needs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 2.9123 1.59554 43 4.14 1.45703 
39 
c 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Concentration on monetary union export market 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 3.7544 1.32666 42 3.881 1.34713 
40 
a 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions?  
Efficient payment facilities  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 1 0 42 0.976 0.1543 
40 
b 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions? 
Long term credit for investment  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.8596 0.35044 43 0.512 0.50578 
40 
c 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions? 
Short term trade credit  
(Y=1, N=0) 57 0.9649 0.18564 43 0.419 0.49917 
41 
a 
How does your company deal with exchange rate 
risks? 
Uncovered  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.1607 0.37059 36 0 0 
41 
b 
How does your company deal with exchange rate 
risks? 
Forward market hedging  
(Y=1, N=0) 56 0.7857 0.41404 36 0.944 0.23231 
41 
c 
How does your company deal with exchange rate 
risks? 
Forward market option  





What are the company’s foreign exchange risks? 
Price level risk  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.7368 0.93592 43 4.884 0.49806 
42 
b 
What are the company’s foreign exchange risks? 
Interest rate risk  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 57 4.4386 1.01801 43 4.442 1.07576 
43 
a 
For you, which are the variables influencing 
exchange rates? 
Fluctuation in world prices  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 5 0 43 4.977 0.1525 
43 
b 
For you, which are the variables influencing 
exchange rates? 
Inflation differentials with major trading partners 
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 3.4211 1.25282 43 3.651 1.2127 
43 
c 
For you, which are the variables influencing 
exchange rates? 
Capital inflows  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 4.7368 0.6416 43 4.023 1.22452 
43 
d 
For you, which are the variables influencing 
exchange rates? 
Pace of market reforms  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 4.5439 1.08677 43 4.814 0.627 
43 
e 
For you, which are the variables influencing 
exchange rates? 
Socio-political stability  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 57 4.9649 0.18564 43 4.954 0.305 






















































 APPENDIX 8 
 
                                                                                   Table 7.2 Survey Statistical Tests                                                                       
                                                                                                  Difference of Means                                                                                     
Q'aire  Question 
COTE 
D'IVOIRE GHANA     t    df Test 






In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Lack of responsiveness to demand 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.2632 4.1628 0.32 98 Ns 
16 
b 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Poor raw materials flows / supplies  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.0526 4.3953 -1.09 98 Ns 
16 
c 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Poor distribution channels 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.2281 4.5349 -1.06 98 Ns 
16 
d 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Competitive threats from multinationals 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.6667 4.9302 -1.70 98 Ns 
16 
e 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Competitive threats from other local industries 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.1754 4.5814 -1.68 98 Ns 
16 
f 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Slowness of local administration 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.0526 2.093 -0.14 98 Ns 
16 
g 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Scarcity of qualified workers 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.5088 1.7442 2.43 98 5% 
16 
h 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Managing change  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 1.5263 2.093 -2.06 98 5% 
16 
i 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Local infrastructures 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 3.9649 3.6279 0.98 98 Ns 
16 
j 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Cultural barriers (1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 1.2281 1.4884 -1.38 98 Ns 
16 
k 
In your opinion, what are the causes of company failures 
in your industry? 
Bureaucracy burdens 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.4035 1.8605 1.85 98 Ns 
17 
a 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Company's image 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
17 
b 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Product quality 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
17 
c 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Technological efficiency 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.3684 4.7674 -1.82 98 Ns 
17 
d 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Quality of customer services 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.8246 4.9535 -1.58 98 Ns 
17 
e 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Product costs  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.5088 4.814 -1.64 98 Ns 
17 
f 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Management system 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9649 4.8372 1.69 98 Ns 
17 
g 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Financial system  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.8246 4.6744 1.24 98 Ns 
17 h What is your company competitive advantage? 4.7895 4.814 -0.23 98 Ns 
237 
 
Marketing system  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 
17 
i 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Financial resources and capital assets 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.7018 4.6977 0.02 98 Ns 
17 
j 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Bank credibility  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9474 4.8372 1.14 98 Ns 
17 
k 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Marketing research and customer intelligence 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 3.807 4.1163 -1.22 98 Ns 
17 
l 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Research and development 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 3.7719 4.3721 -2.05 98 5% 
17 
m 
What is your company competitive advantage? 
Communication system 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.807 5 -1.90 98 Ns 
18 
a 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Geographic situation of the host country 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree)  5 4.7674 2.72 98 1% 
18 
b 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Cultural aspects  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 1.9649 2.5116 -1.67 98 10% 
18 
c 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Local infrastructures 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.9474 4.6977 2.04 98 5% 
18 
d 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Abundance of manpower 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.7368 4.814 -0.50 98 Ns 
18 
e 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Qualified workforce  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 3.386 2.7907 1.95 98 10% 
18 
f 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Clear corporate mission and objectives 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.9825 5 -0.87 98 Ns 
18 
g 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Effective strategic planning 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
18 
h 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Quality management 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
18 
i 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Product diversification 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.386 4.7674 -1.91 98 Ns 
18 
j 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Effective pricing policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.7193 4.8605 -1.09 98 Ns 
18 
k 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Availability of raw materials 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.614 4.5814 0.15 98 Ns 
18 
l 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Supply reliability  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.9649 4.9302 0.66 98 Ns 
18 
m 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Customer satisfaction 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.9298 4.8605 0.68 98 Ns 
18 
n 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Research and development policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 3.7895 4.4651 -2.19 98 5% 
18 
o 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Market shares  





What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Strong recruitment policy 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 3.2281 3.6977 -1.52 98 Ns 
18 
q 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Cooperation with other industries 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.6491 4.7674 -0.95 98 Ns 
18 
r 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Excellent public relation 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.7895 4.7442 0.37 98 Ns 
18 
s 
What are the other variables influencing your company 
success? 
Service to the community and the country 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.3509 4.814 -2.23 98 5% 
19 
a 
What is important to your company’ planning, strategy 
setting & decision-making process? 
Local commercial regulation 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.5263 4.6744 -0.76 98 Ns 
19 
b 
What is important to your company’ planning, strategy 
setting & decision-making process? 
Global trade regulation 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 4.9535 1.14 98 Ns 
19 
c 
What is important to your company’ planning, strategy 
setting & decision-making process? 
Local social values and customs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.2632 3.2791 -3.34 98 1% 
19 
d 
What is important to your company’ planning, strategy 
setting & decision-making process? 
Investment codes  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.807 4.9302 -1.11 98 Ns 
22 
a 
What are your sources of initial investment capital? 
Domestic (%) 43.5179 50.721 -1.08 97 Ns 
22 
b 
What are your sources of initial investment capital? 
Foreign (%) 58.5741 50.452 1.23 94 Ns 
24 
a 
What is the percentage of output exported? 
Export CFA (or Ghana) - Euro zone (%) 40.2229 22.778 2.48 82 5% 
24 
b 
What is the percentage of output exported? 
Others (%) 53.1581 49.515 0.47 74 Ns 
25 
a 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by your 
company? 
Currency pegged to major international currencies  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.7857 0.2619 6.00 96 1% 
25 
b 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by your 
company? 
Completely flexible exchange rate  
(Y=1, N=0) 0 0.5238 -7.77 96 1% 
25 
c 
What is the exchange rate arrangement preferred by your 
company? 
International trade and finance in term of industrial countries 
monies  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.2679 0.2857 -0.20 96 Ns 
26 
a 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Increases capital mobility  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.4737 0.5789 -1.00 93 Ns 
26 
b 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Reduces exposures to exchange rate risks  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9474 1 -1.44 93 Ns 
26 
c 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Increases benefit from portfolios diversification  
(Y=1, N=0)  0.2632 0.1053 1.90 93 Ns 
26 
d 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Increasing openness to international trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.5263 0.3947 1.25 93 Ns 
26 
e 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Shifting export towards manufactures  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.5088 0.1579 3.68 93 1% 
26 
f 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Diversifying trade  





In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Greater interregional trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.8596 0.4211 5.03 93 1% 
26 
h 
In your opinion, is a fixed exchange regime beneficial for 
the following reasons? 
Reducing inflation  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9649 0.9474 0.42 93 Ns 
27 
a 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Adjusting foreign exchange transactions and habits (Y=1,N=0) 1 0.9767 1.14 98 Ns 
27 
b 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Keeping informed of the Euro latest events  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9825 1 -0.87 98 Ns 
27 
c 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Retraining staff and the management  
(Y=1, N=0) 0 0 na 98 Ns 
27 
d 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Investing in new technologies  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.386 0.3023 0.87 98 Ns 
27 
e 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Decentralizing the administration  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.0179 0 0.88 97 Ns 
27 
f 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Assets conversion  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.0702 0.0698 0.00 98 Ns 
27 
g 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Redenominating debts and effects  
(Y=1, N=0) 0 0.0465 -1.67 98 10% 
27 
h 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Developing new markets, products and skills  
(Y=1, N=0)  0.4386 0.4651 -0.26 98 Ns 
27 
i 
Has the introduction of the Euro led to any of the 
following? 
Better exploitation of innovations, research and technological 
development  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.3333 0.3721 -0.40 98 Ns 
28 
a 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the Euro? 
Price transparency  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9825 1 -0.87 98 Ns 
28 
b 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the Euro? 
Less currency convertibility issues  
(Y=1, N=0) 1 1 na 98 Ns 
28 
c 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the Euro? 
Cheaper imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.5088 0.3488 1.60 98 Ns 
28 
d 
What are the benefits of the single currency, the Euro? 
Export promotion  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.8246 0.4884 3.79 98 1% 
29 
a 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Dealing with one currency instead of twelve different ones  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
29 
b 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
High integration between countries 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 4.8837 1.61 98 Ns 
29 
c 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Reducing transaction costs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
29 
d 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Principal sources of trading partners 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.7018 4.3488 1.79 98 10% 
29 
e 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Low cost imports are guaranteed 





What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Increasing market for company exports 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.7544 4.8837 -0.97 98 Ns 
29 
g 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Price stability 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9298 4.9302 0.00 98 Ns 
29 
h 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Efficient use of cash 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.9649 2.186 2.40 98 5% 
29 
i 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Controlling interest rate exposure 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.5965 4.5814 0.09 98 Ns 
29 
j 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
High foreign investment due to increase trade links  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.8772 4.6047 2.21 98 5% 
29 
k 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Better and easier access to EU capital market 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
29 
l 
What are the benefits of a link to the Euro for your 
company in trading with euroland countries? 
Reducing the burden of dollar denominated debts 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 3.4211 2.0698 4.40 98 Ns 
32 
a 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Exchange rate is less volatile 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 5 5 na 89 Ns 
32 
b 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Price stability 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 5 4.9118 1.76 89 10% 
32 
c 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Enforcing trade and investment 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 3.7018 3.2941 1.50 89 Ns 
32 
d 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Inflation rate is under control 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.807 4.9706 -1.46 89 Ns 
32 
e 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Disciplining monetary policy by controlling exchange rate  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.8421 4.6471 1.57 89 Ns 
32 
f 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Growth of international trade 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.0702 3.5 2.25 89 5% 
32 
g 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Reducing risks of foreign exchange rate fluctuations 
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 4.807 4.9412 -1.17 89 Ns 
32 
h 
What are company benefits in operating in a fixed 
exchange rate states? 
Small fluctuation by maintaining pre-set narrow bands  
(1=Strongly disagree to 5=Strongly agree) 3.7544 3.8485 -0.39 88 Ns 
33 
a 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for operating in 
a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Large foreign exchange reserves costs for international trade 
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 3.6316 3.8387 -0.66 86 Ns 
33 
b 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for operating in 
a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Cheaper imports  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4 2.871 3.14 86 1% 
33 
c 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for operating in 
a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Competition from foreign products 
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4.2632 4.871 -2.26 86 5% 
33 
d 
Could you evaluate your company’s costs for operating in 
a fixed exchange rate regime? 
Trading mostly with partners in developed countries  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4.3509 4.625 -1.34 87 Ns 
34 a Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 0.9792 0.9767 0.07 89 Ns 
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exchange rate regime? 




Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
Price instability  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9792 0.907 1.51 89 Ns 
34 
c 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
Harming trade and investment  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.5106 0.1163 4.36 88 1% 
34 
d 
Have you had any problems to operate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime? 
High inflation rate  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9574 0.907 0.95 88 Ns 
35 
a 
What are your company’s advantages in operating in a 
flexible exchange rate regime? 
Adjusting monetary policy without worrying about the 
exchange rate  
(1=No benefit to 5=Very important benefit) 4.8367 4.9767 -1.13 90 Ns 
35 
b 
What are your company’s advantages in operating in a 
flexible exchange rate regime? 
Cheaper exports and high import price protection 
(1=No benefit to 5=Very important benefit) 3.898 3.1395 2.25 90 5% 
36 
a 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Higher export price seriously reduces competitiveness 
(Y=1, N=0)  0.8393 0.5952 2.79 96 1% 
36 
b 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Cheaper to replace imported equipment  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.7679 0.5476 2.34 96 5% 
36 
c 
How do exchange rate appreciations affect company 
investment policy? 
Cheaper to purchase new technologies  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.7857 0.4048 4.13 96 1% 
37 
a 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation stimulates exports and curtails 
imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.6316 0.4884 1.44 98 Ns 
37 
b 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate appreciation damages exports and encourages 
imports  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.386 0.4186 -0.33 98 Ns 
37 
c 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation improves exports price 
competitiveness  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.8772 0.5349 4.09 98 1% 
37 
d 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation encourage regional trade  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.7193 0.7442 -0.27 98 Ns 
37 
e 
How do exchange rate adjustments affect company 
imports and exports? 
Exchange rate depreciation affects dollar-denominated debts 
by requiring more francs to pay off dollar debts  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.2982 0.093 2.55 98 5% 
38 
a 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Encourages trade and financial flows 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9474 4.8605 0.80 98 Ns 
38 
b 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Sources of funding for public and private borrowers 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.8421 4.5814 1.60 98 Ns 
38 
c 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Provides better channel for investment and savings 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.6667 4.7209 -0.30 98 Ns 
38 
d 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Elimination of exchange rates risks 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
38 e What are the advantages to a company which operates 4.9825 4.907 1.44 98 Ns 
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within a monetary union? 
Promotion of greater overall currency stability 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 
38 
f 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Encourages intra-zone trade and investment 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9123 4.907 0.06 98 Ns 
38 
g 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Reduces costs of hedging against currency fluctuations  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.9123 5 -1.06 98 Ns 
38 
h 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Elimination of transactions costs linked with conversion  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 4.9767 1.14 98 Ns 
38 
i 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Better transparency in pricing 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 4.9302 1.57 98 Ns 
38 
j 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Improving business competitiveness 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.8772 4.9302 -0.54 98 Ns 
38 
k 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
Simplification of procedures and operational issues 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.2982 4.5116 -1.10 98 Ns 
38 
l 
What are the advantages to a company which operates 
within a monetary union? 
A sizeable and unified market favorable to trade and 
investment  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.7719 4.7907 -0.15 98 Ns 
38 
m 
What are the advantages to a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Lower inflation and interest rates 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 5 5 na 98 Ns 
39 
a 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Less liberalized markets 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.0351 4.8605 -3.95 98 1% 
39 
b 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Policies inappropriate to domestic needs 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 2.9123 4.1395 -3.95 98 1% 
39 
c 
What are the costs for a company operating within a 
monetary union? 
Concentration on monetary union export market 
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 3.7544 3.881 -0.47 97 Ns 
40 
a 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions?  
Efficient payment facilities  
(Y=1, N=0) 1 0.9762 1.18 97 Ns 
40 
b 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions? 
Long term credit for investment  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.8596 0.5116 4.06 98 1% 
40 
c 
What is the role of your bank in the foreign exchange 
transactions? 
Short term trade credit  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.9649 0.4186 7.60 98 1% 
41 
a 
How does your company deal with exchange rate risks? 
Uncovered  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.1607 0 2.60 90 5% 
41 
b 
How does your company deal with exchange rate risks? 
Forward market hedging  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.7857 0.9444 -2.09 90 5% 
41 
c 
How does your company deal with exchange rate risks? 
Forward market option  
(Y=1, N=0) 0.2143 0.1944 0.23 90 Ns 
42 
a 
What are the company’s foreign exchange risks? 
Price level risk  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.7368 4.8837 -0.94 98 Ns 
42 
b 
What are the company’s foreign exchange risks? 
Interest rate risk  
(1=Not important at all to 5=Very important) 4.4386 4.4419 -0.02 98 Ns 
43 
a 
For you, which are the variables influencing exchange 
rates? 5 4.9767 1.14 98 Ns 
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Fluctuation in world prices  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 
43 
b 
For you, which are the variables influencing exchange 
rates? 
Inflation differentials with major trading partners 
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 3.4211 3.6512 -0.92 98 Ns 
43 
c 
For you, which are the variables influencing exchange 
rates? 
Capital inflows  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4.7368 4.0233 3.77 98 1% 
43 
d 
For you, which are the variables influencing exchange 
rates? 
Pace of market reforms  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4.5439 4.814 -1.46 98 Ns 
43 
e 
For you, which are the variables influencing exchange 
rates? 
Socio-political stability  
(1=No impact to 5=Serious impact) 4.9649 4.9535 0.22 98 Ns 
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